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CHAPTER 1 
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE ON COMMODITIES 
While commodity problems have b een on the agenda o f  
international affairs f o r  decades, it is only recently that they 
became a maj or issue . The heightened vis ibility o f  
commodities problems can t o  a large extent be  attributed to  the 
success of OPEC in quadrup ling the p rice of oil . The large increases 
in commodity prices during 1 9 7 2-74 ,  and their subsequent decline , 
and s everal o ther e'=nts also played a role . These  factors , however , 
are o f  a trans itory nature . The pers istent caus e o f  the increased 
importance o f  commodity policy has been the emergence o f  the Third 
Wo rld nations as an effective bloc. Fifteen years ago, international 
relations revolved around the East /West confrontat ion , and coilli�odity 
prob lems were o f  minor s ignificance to the developed nat ions. 
Commodity policy is now recognized as a major issue largely b ecause 
i t  involves the danger o f  a confrontation between the indus trialized 
nations of the North and the largely underdeveloped nations of the 
South . 
During the past  few years the debate on commodities 
problems has centered on a set of proposals -- called the Integrated · 
Programme for Commodities -- advanced by the less developed nations 
(LDCs ) .  The developed countries (DCs ) , and especially the United 
S t ates , have been in the position of responding to the LDCs '  
2 
proposals . Both the init iat ive and the response have been largely 
conducted within the U . N .  General Ass embly and the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) . Act ion on commodities can not 
be nego tiated within the U . N. General Ass embly or  UNCTAD. 
Nevertheless , debates conducted within these organizat ions and 
resolutions adopted by them have had a s i gnificant effect on forcing 
and directing act ion . 
This chapter reviews the debate on commodities policy as 
i t  has evolved over the pas t several years . The obj ective o f  the 
discuss ion is only to des cribe the positions adopted by the LDCs  
and the  DCs  and to  identi fy the issues . Some o f  the difficult 
factual and analytical questions that come up in the debate on 
commodities policy are the subj ects  o f  succeeding chapters . 
THE LDCs' PROPOSALS 
The appearance o f  the LDCs as a coherent bloc is  usually 
dated to the first  UNCTAD , held in 1964 . UNCTAD is an organ o f  the 
U.N. General Ass embly . As such , it includes all member nations 
and is not formally concerned only with the problems of the �DCs . 
However, UNCTAD is widely regarded as an organization " .  
dedicated to  exert ing pres s ure on the advanced countries to adapt 
1 
their policies to the needs o f  the develop ing countries . "  
In conjunc tion with UNCTAD , the LDCs formed the Group o f  
7 7(G-7 7 ) ,  which now includes approximat ely 112 nations .
2 
While i t s
members have shown a remarkab le degree o f  cohens ion , G-77 is n o t  an 
alliance or even a formally es tab lished organization. G-7 7  is best  
3 
regarded as a political party . It has taken the lead in obtaining 
a consensus among the LDCs and in advancing proposals of interest to 
the LDCs in particular , the Integrated Programme (IP) . 
The current debate on commodities had its specific o rigins 
in a s tatement , issued by G-77 in 1973 , calling for a "new 
int ernational economic order . "  This statement set out the broad 
obj ectives and principles that guided the development o f  the IP . 
At the U.N . General Ass emb ly Special Session on Raw Materials and 
Development , held during April and May , 1974 , the LDCs success fully 
pres s ed for  the adopt ion of the "Declaration on the Establishment 
of a New Internat ional Economic Order . "  The Special Sess ion also 
approved a "Pro gram .1f Act ion on the Es tablishment o f  a New 
Internat ional Economic Order, 11 3 which directed the UNCTAD Secretariat
to develop specific measures along the l ines set forth in the 
resolution and the "Declaration on the Es tablishment of a ijew 
Internat ional Economic Order . "  Over the year that followed, the 
UNCTAD S ecretariat , in respons e ,  developed the Integrated Programme 
for Commodities.4
The int ellectual background to the IP lies in the "new 
internat ional economic order" (NIE0) . 5 This is a complicated set
o f  ideas • .  NIEO is in part an expression o f  the LDCs economic and
political aspirat ions ; in part a s tatement of principles on the 
means of internat ional cooperat ion ; and , in part , a theory of the 
role of trade , especially trade in commodities , in economic 
development . 
4 
The "Declaration on the Es tab lishment o f  a New International 
Economic Order" cont ained three maj or point s . First , it ass erted 
that the LDCs should retain sovereignty over their natural 
resources. Second , the declaration s tated a need for imp roved 
terms of trade for raw materials producers; i.e. , higher prices for  
raw materials relat ive to  manufactured goods . Third , the declaration 
called for increased trans fers of resources to the developing nat ions. 
These bald points do not , however , convey much of the s ense of the 
NIEO . 
Spokesmen for the LDCs do not use the t erm " economic order" 
to  refer primarily to the market s ,  government policies and 
multinational ins titutions which now mediat e international exchange . 
Ins tead , they use this term to refer to the exist ing dis tribution 
of income among nations . In the eyes o f  the LDCs , the exis ting 
"order" is charact erized by the fact that 70 p er cent of the world ' s  
populat ion lives in the LDCs while thes e  people obtain only 30
percent of world income. A new "order" would , correspondingly , be  
a s ituation in  which income was much more evenly distributed . 
NIEO is also associated with some specific proposit ions 
on the role of markets in development . The LDCs argue that 
instab ility in commodity prices , and a cons equent ins tab ility in 
their export  earnings , is a maj or  obs tacle to development . Second , 
the LDCs argue that the terms of trade have shifted agains t 
commodities , and in favor o f  manufac ture , and that this trend can 
b e  expected to continue . Both o f  these point s , if correct , imply 
limitat ions on the commodities markets  as engines of development. 
5 
A third posit ion , shared by.many , although by no means all , o f  the
LDCs , is a hos t ility to private foreign investment . In s ome cases , 
this s imply reflects doctrinal cons iderat ions . In o ther cas es , 
there is a fear o f  domination by foreign business .  Beyond this , 
there is s ome concern that relatively short-term market forces 
can lock a country into an undes irable position from which it is 
difficult to  escape. In particular , the LDCs are concerned about 
their dependence on commodities. 
Thes e  arguments s erve as a bridge from the NIEO , as a 
broad s tatement o f  political purpo s e , and the obj ectives o f  a 
specific program on commodities. The LDCs argue that an 
internat ional program on commodities should attempt to stabilize  
commodity prices and shift  the  terms o f  trade in favor· of  
commodities; i . e . , increas e commodity p rices relative to the prices 
o f manufactured goods. The LDCs also have a predisposi tion i.n 
favor o f  d irect market intervent ion by an internat ional organization. 
The central feature o f  the IP is a set  o f  commodity 
agreements, Agreements would initially be  created for eighteen 
commodities: 6 bananas , bauxite ,  co co a ,  coffee , copper , cotton and
co tton yarn, hard fibres and products , iron ore , j ute and product s , 
manganes e , meat , phosphates , rubber , sugar , tea , tropical t imb er ,  
tin and vegetable oils . The IP envis ions the p o s s ibility that 
agreements would eventually be  negot iated for o ther commodities as 
well. " Commodity agreement"  refers to agreements which create an 
internat ional o rganization of both buyers and s ellers which is 
intended to take an active role in the market.
7 
The Internat ional 
6 
Commodity Organizat ion (IGO) created can b e  given a variety o f  
different roles and powers. In short , " commodity agreement s "  and 
IGO are generic terms that include many dif ferent types o f  operations . 
The IP ' s  commodity arguments would , i f  pos s ible ,
8 
be
built around buffer stocks managed by the ICOs. In principle , a 
pure buff er s t o ck is a device for reducing period-to-period 
variat ions in commodity prices . The IGO would purchase the commodity 
in periods o f  s lack demand so as to support a floor price , which 
would b e  s tated as some percentage o f  a target price . The stock 
acquired in s lack periods would be sold off  in periods o f  short 
supply , thereby defending a ceiling price. 
While the IP ' s  commodity agreements would include buffer 
stocks , the agreements envis ioned in the IP would be  very far from 
pure buffer stocks. Firs t , the document s that describe  the IP 
indicate that a primary purpose o f  the agreements  would be  to  
increase commodity prices .
9 
That is , the target prices for the
buffer stocks are to be set above the price that would prevail in 
a free market with many buyers and s ellers. 1
° 
Furthermore , the
IP' s commodity agreements would provide for the imposition of export 
quotas and product ion controls. These  would not b e  used s imply on 
a s tandby basis but would b e  a permanent feature of the markets.  
That is , the amount that each producer could p roduce and export 
would be nego t iated within the IGO . As is.argued in Chapter 3,  the 
net result is commodity agreements more nearly like OPEC style
cartels than p ure buffer stocks . 
The IP ' s  commodity agreements would be related by a 
"Common Fund." The Common Fund , which would b e  an organizat ion 
distinct from the ICOs, would have three funct ions . First , it 
7 
would f inance the buffer stocks; i.e. , s erve as a pool of money and/or 
credit which would be used to acquire s tocks as market conditions 
require , with repayment made when the s to ck is sold off.  The funds 
would be  provided by both buyers and s ellers.
11 Second , the
Common Fund would have the right to  funct ion as a buff er stock for 
commodities not covered by an agreement . Third , the Common Fund 
could take the initiative in organiz ing commodity agreements .  The 
relevant documents also hint that the Common Fund might develop 
into a central management for the various ICOs. 
The Common Fund is by far the mos t  controversial feature 
o f  the  IP. Pushed to its  l imits , the Common Fund would b e
something like a n  Internat ional Department o f  Agriculture .and 
Minerals. The vis ion s eems to be  of intervention in the world 
commodity markets along the l ines o f  the domestic  agricultural 
programs o f  the 1950s . 
THE U . S. RE SPONSE 
The maj or features o f  the IP -- including the idea o f  a 
Common Fund -- were not new.
12  Internat ional agencies have is sued
a s teady s tream of reports on ideas as sociated with the IP . For 
example ,  the effect of instability o f  export earnings on development 
has been discussed since the days of the League of Nations and 
interest in proposals to "stabilize" commodity prices go b ack at 
leas t as far . Since the lat e 1 940s, thes e proposals have been 
considered by various internat ional· agencies and they played a 
prominent role in UNCTADs held in 19 64, 1 9 68 and 1 9 7 2 . 
8 
The U . S. ,  along with the other DCs, has generally oppoPed 
proposals along the lines of the IP . This oppos ition was at times 
active; for examp le, the U . S .  along with mos t  of the other DCs , 
vo ted against or entered reservat ions on the Resolut ion on 
Commodities pres ented at UNCTADs and s imilar resolutions presented 
to the U . N .  General Assembly . More often, the DCs opposition was 
implicit in a lack of int erest in the LDCs' proposals . The DCs were 
unwilling to take up thes e proposals and develop them . 
The U . S .  began to alter its  posture on commodity problems 
during 19 74-1975 .  While the U.S . did not accept the IP, it 
attempt ed to respond to 'the concerns of the LDCs ·. This change was 
apparently prompted by the pressures of altered circums tances on 
two well es tablished policies . 
The first  o f  these  -- which is so basic that it is easy 
to overlook -- is the commitment of the DCs to int ernat ional 
cooperation; i . e . ,  the use of diplomatic means, including the U.N. 
and other mult inat ional agenc ies , to resolve or dampen int ernational
conflicts . ·The tangled relat ionships of the Western democracies 
with China and the U . S . S.R. remains the primary concern , but over 
the past decade, the pos s ibility of a serious North/South 
confrontat ion has evolved . The U . S .  might have chosen to act 
unilaterally o n  the issues involved, o r  t o  act in concert with the 
o t her DCs� or to s implf ignore the discussions o f  commodities in the
9 
U . N .  and UNCTAD . But the presumpt ion in favor o f  seeking cooperative 
solut ions would argue agains t thes e  cours es . One o f  the goals o f  
U . S .  policy was t o  find non-combative means o f  resolving the 
conflicts  between the DCs and the LDCs .
13
Second , the U . S .  and the o ther DCs have accep ted a 
responsibility for assis t ing the economic development o f  the LDCs . 
This respons ibility has b een formally made and renewed on many 
o ccas ions . It is pos s ible to ques tion the extent o f  the DCs'
commitment and the effectivenes s o f  exis t ing development assis tance 
programs, but the DCs' acceptance of  a policy of aiding the LDCs is 
well es tablished . 
The two decades after World War II were the era o f  foreign 
aid . The U . S .  inaugurated the Marshall Plan in 1947 . · While 
foreign aid was no t unknown before then, the size  and scope o f  the 
Marshall Plan was unique . It was the firs t real effort at.  foreign 
aid, and becaus e  the Marshall P lan was highly success ful, it 
became something o f  a model . A variety o f  bilateral programs for 
the LDCs -- the Marshall Plan was aimed at Europe was developed 
and in the late 1950s the emphas is began to shift to  mult ilateral 
aid programs . 
Developmen t as s is tance pro grams have not, however, 
succeed in producing s elf-sus taining growth in the LDCs . The 
failure to a ·cons iderable extent lies in the structure of exis t ing 
programs. While these flaws might b e  corrected , and the not ion o f  
foreign aid s alvaged, the level o f  funding is a more intractable 
problem .  I t  is generally conceded that the current spending on 
10 
development assis tance is much less  than would be required to 
provide rap id economic growth in the LDCs and , more important , that 
the political situat ion in the DCs is such that development 
assistance will no t increase significantly . 
This is a crucial point. Both the plans advanced by the 
LDCs and the DCs' responses arecast agains t existing l imitat ions o f  
development assistance . 1
4 
They assume a commitment o n  the part o f
the D C s  and assume that this commitment cannot b e  met through 
increases in development assis tance . The p o int of departure is: 
i f  not development assistance , then what ? 
The U . S .  respons e to the IP was set  by Secretary o f  State 
Kiss inger in a speech to  the Seventh Session o f  the U.N. General 
Ass embly in Sep·temb er, 197 5 . 1
5 
The U.S. adop ted a "po sitive
att itude ," in two respe�ts . Firs t , and perhaps ult imately the mos t  
important , the U . S. agreed that the full range o f  commodity 
problems perceived by the LDCs , were an important item for 
internat ional act ion . Second , the U.S. o ffered a set of proposals -­
in effect , a counterplan -- that responded to  the underlying concerns 
of the LDCs . 
The U . S .  accepted the content ion that ins tability in export 
earnings is a significant impediment to  development , but argued 
that this problem was best  dealt with by a sys tem of compensatory 
f inancing handled through the Int ernational Monetary Fund. 
Compensatory f inancing is a means for more or less automatically 
transferring funds to a country whenever export earnings fall
below s ome p r e-specified level . 16 For example , if the es tab lished
base level o f  earning for s ome year is $100  million , and actual 
earnings are $90 million , then -- s ubj ect to  certain limitations 
$10  million would be trans ferred to the country . The amount 
transferred would be repaid in years when export earnings were 
above trend or , in s ome cases , converted to  a grant . 
The s econd. maj or part o f  the U . S. proposals respond t o
the LDCs ' concern with the speed o f  their development. The LDCs 
11 
argue that t rade in commodities has not in the pas t ,  and will not 
in the future, provide a sufficient s timulus for growth . The IP ' s 
solution to this problem is commodity agreements designed to trans fer 
income t o  the LDCs  via higher prices for commodities . The increas ed 
earnings from commodity exports would then be used to  f inance 
investment . The U, S. took the position that usin.g commodity 
agreements was neither a promis ing nor des irable means of speeding 
development . Ins tead , the U . S .  proposed measures which wovld 
significantly increase the opportunities available to the LDCs . 
One way to do s o  is t o  improve the access o f  the LDCs to 
the market s  o f  the indus trialized nations . This means a reduct ion 
in exis ting tariff  and non-tariff barriers to  trade . These 
barriers fall into three groups . Firs t ,  mos t  nat ions -- LDCs and 
DCs -- employ various non-tariff barriers to trade -- especially 
import and export quotas . Import quotas , o f  cours e ,  very directly 
limit the opportunities o f  foreign suppliers . Subs idies to domes tic 
indus tries have a s imilar effect.  Second , mos t  nations set bas ic  
tariff s and t hen p rovide exceptions which favor particular trading 
partners . The U.S., for example, typ ically grants favorab le 
12 
treatment to exports  from Canada and the U . K .  tariffs favor 
Commonwealth Nat ions . Such preferences, o f  course , discriminate 
against  nat ions that are no t favored. A third significant feature 
of t ariff s truct ures is "tarif f escalation ,"  which refers to 
increases in the tariff with the degree of process ing . For example, 
the DCs ' tariffs  on copper ore , concentrate and refined copper are 
low zero in some cases -- while their tariffs  on s emi-fabricated 
copper products are typically in the range of 10-25 percent ad valorium .  
A s  a result , it  is very difficult f o r  those LDCs which produce copper 
to create dome s t ic s emi-fabricating indus tries . 
Trade is one major source o f  funds for the LDCs . The 
o ther is capital flows, in various forms; from the DCs . Development
ass i s tance makes up roughly half of the capital flow from the DCs 
t o  the LDCs. This source o f  funds is not expected to  increas e 
significantly in real terms, and hence cannot b e  expected to provide 
the increas ed s t imulus to  development . Given this point , i t  is 
necess ary to look for o ther sources o f  capital . The only "o ther 
source" apart from trade and development assistance is the private 
capital market . This is  immens e .  For example , gro s s  private 
domestic  investment in the U . S .  in 1971 was $209 billion . This is 
roughly five t imes the total value o f  the LDCs ' commodity exports  
(excluding oil)  and twenty times the amount o f  development as s is tance. 
The obs tacle t o  tappingthe private capital markets  is  not 
a lack of economically sound proj ects . Underdevelopment is o f t en 
described in t erms o f  very low income levels , lack o f  bas ic s ervices , 
underemployment and the painful social consequences o f  these 
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condit ions . Thes e  descript ions are to the point, but it is also 
relevant t o  no te  that underdevelopment by its  nature presents 
inves tment opportunities . There is  a natural tendency for capital 
to  flow from the developed nat ions , with t heir deep investment bases , 
to the LDCs . The underlying point is that the returns to cap ital 
tend to  be  highest where cap i tal is mos t  scarce . 
The barriers to an increased flow o f  p rivate capital to 
the LDCs are political in nature . Some LDCs encourage private 
foreign investment , a few forbid it  and mos t  fall somewhere in 
between these two extremes . Overall , the LDCs are coo l  t o  private 
foreign inves tment . The result o f  the LDCs' concerns , and actions , 
is a distinctly host ile inves tment climate .  In particular, the 
wave of nat ionalizations that o ccurred during the late 19 60s  and 
early 1970s  have made inves tments in the LDCs seem an unatt ract ive 
proposition . 
This s ituation cannot b e  eas ily resolved but i t  can b e  
s i gnificant ly ameliorated . The thrust o f  U . S .  proposals in this 
area is to int erpose multinational organizations between the private 
cap ital markets and inves tment projects in the LDCs . Specifically , 
the U . S .  proposed an expans ion o f  the Int ernat ional Finance 
Corporation and the creation o f  a new organization called an 
International Inves tment Trus t . These  organizations would s erve 
as conduits  for inves tment funds . From the point of view of the 
suppliers of funds, the multinational organization would serve to 
reduce the "political risks" of investment in LDCs -- i.e., the 
risk of expropriation. From the LDCd point of view , channeling 
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funds through a multinational organization is to reduce the danger 
of domination by foreign corporat ions . 
The three maj or elements o f  the U . S .  program have been 
identified so far -- compensatory financing , trade lib eralization 
and means for increas ing the flow of private inves tment funds to 
the LDCs. If the U . S .  pro gram had b een limited to these items,
its relationship to the IP would be relatively s traight-forward . 
The IP involves maj or ,  direct intervention in the commodity , while 
the U . S .  programs at tack the same problems with indirect  means .
1 7
The U . S . , however, d i d  no t entirely oppo s e  commodity 
agreement s .  Instead, the U . S .  adopted the pos ition that commodity 
agreements have a us eful role  to play in some cases and , hence, 
that commodity agreements should be considered on a cas e-by-case 
bas is. The U.S . did no t charac terize the cases in which commodity 
agreement s  might be appropriate and , while rej ecting higher 
commodity prices as a means of transferring income to the LDCs , 
the U.S. did no t indicate what type o f  commodity agreement s it  
regarded as acceptable. Furthermore, the U.S . agreed that 
instability in export earnings is a maj or obstacle to development1 8
and agreed that a "comprehens ive" approach t o  commodity problems 
was required . · While the need for a sys tem of commo dity agreements 
does no t inevitably follow from these propositions , they at leas t 
po int in that direction . In short , U . S .  policy on commo dity 
agreements was at best ambiguous . 
The U . S . , nevertheless , opposed the IP . This fact was 
not spelled out at the s�venth Session of the U . N .  General Ass embly 
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but it  became apparent at UNCTAD IV which was held in Nairobi in 
May , 19 7 6 .  There were two key issues o n  commodities a t  UNCTAD IV . 
Firs t , the LDCs pushed for the creation o f  agreements , under UNCTAD 
auspice s , for each o f  eighteen commodit ies . Second , the LDCs 
proposed that these  agreemen ts be  related by a Common Fund . The 
U . S .  opposed both the creation of a Common Fund and prior acceptance 
o f  the creation of commodity agreements for a pre-specified list o f  
commodities . The U . S .  posit ion at UNCTAD IV was no t unanimous ly 
accepted by the other DCs . Wes t Germany, Japan and the U . K .  
rej ected , with varying degrees o f  s trenuousness , the Common Fund. 
The other DCs were ready to accept -- with varying degrees o f  
enthus iam and qualification - - the IP •19
STRUCTURE OF THE ISSUES 
The debate on these issues reached a turning point �-
presumably no t the las t -- at UNCTAD IV . The Plenary Ses s ion o f  
UNCTAD I V  accepted a "consensus1120  Resolution o n  Commodities which
laid down a time table for the creation of what would effectively
be the Integrated Programme. The p ivo tal element in this time 
.table is a negot iating conference on a Common Fund to be held in 
March , 197 7 .  This conference would be preceded by two series o f  
preparatory conferences . One o f  these  would be concerned with 
the Common Fund . The o ther set o f  preliminary conferences would be 
called to produce drafts o f  agreements for each o f  eighteen 
commodities. These draft agreements would , after the negotiating 
conference on the Common Fund in March o f  1977, become the basis 
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o f  negot iat ions for final agreements . The entire system is to b e
completed by the end o f  1978. 
It is no t certain that this s chedule will b e  maintained 
and there is even greater uncertainty about what the final results 
will be . Nevertheless, the U . S .  program was shunted aside at  
UNCTAD I V  and the I P  advanced . The results o f  UNCTAD IV, then, force
the ques tion o f  whether the DCs, and especially the U . S . ,  should 
agree to participate in a pro gram along the lines of the IP . 
Economic self-interes t -- narrowly conceived -- is one 
relevant tes t of the des irab ility of �articipation in the IP. 
An economist or a cynic -- the two are no t neces sarily the same 
would be inclined to say immediately that the IP would not in the
economic interest of the DCs , but there is some disagreement over 
this po int . One popular argument holds that the DCs are dependent 
on raw materials s upplied by the LDCs and hence that the LDCs have 
s ignificant economic power over the DCs . The implication is, 
apparently,. that the DCs mus t accept the IP. A b i t  of reflection
is sufficient to  indicate that this argument is  gro ssly implausib le. 
I f  the LDCs have the requis ite p ower why don ' t  they s imply use it, 
as the OPEC nations did, to  increase prices? In fact, apart from
o il, the no tion that the DCs are vitally dependent on raw materials
supplied by the LDCs  is  largely fals e . 21 A second argument is
that price s tabilization b enefits buyers as well as sellers . 
are cases in which this is so, but the benefits  would b e  small 
(cf . Chapter 4) . Furthermore, the objective of the IP is no t 
simply to reduce period-to-period price fluctuations but to 
There 
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sub s tantially increas e commodity prices, and there is no doubt  that 
higher commodity prices, as s uch, would be to the economic 
disadvantage o f  the DCs . 
What ever weight this conclus ion finally receives, it is  
no t overwhelming in terms o f  the international debate on commo dities. 
The DCs have accepted a commitment to aid the economic development 
of the LDCs. This undoub tedly reflects  a mixture of enlightened 
self-interes t and humanitarian concerns . But whatever its  source , 
the fact o f  the COITJTiitment p oses this que s tion: Is the IP a
necessary or sound measure for speeding the development o f  the LDCs ? 
Stabilization o f  commodity prices appears, once again, as 
an aspect o f  this i sue . As was no ted above , it is argued that 
ins tability in the commodity markets, and a resulting ins tability 
in export earnings is a maj or ob s tacle to economic development .  
While this proposition sounds reasonable , the availab le evidence 
indicates that ins tability in export  earning is no t generally an 
obs tacle to development ( Chap ter 2 ) . The o ther, and more 
impor tant, aspect of the ques tion is  whether higher commodity 
prices are a good way o f  trans ferring income to the LDCs. The 
economics of this issue is well es tablished . Price increas es are 
a grossly inefficient way of making income trans fers in the s ense 
that they cos t the donors (buyers ) much more  than the beneficiaries 
(seller s )  receive .
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The means o f  making trans fers by  higher prices
are, furthermore, an adminis trative nightmare ,  even when compared 
with foreign aid programs . 
The conclusion o f  these comments  is that, from the Des' 
perspective, there is no sound economic cas e for a pro gram along 
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the lines of the IP . Such a pro gram would no t be in the economic 
interests o f  the DCs and , would not b e  a good way of transferring 
income to the LDCs . 
It follows that ·a rationale for an acceptance of the IP 
mus t  lie in politi cal considerations . The DCs have been and will 
be under s trong pressures from the LDCs to accept the IP , and a 
rej ection o f  the IP would probab ly entail s ome more or less 
immediate costs . However ,  the mat ter seems to b e  much less one o f  
threat than o f  opportunity . The political value claimed for the 
IP is "cooperat ion . "  .It is easy for anyone no t attuned to
international relations -- and perhaps especially an economist  
to miss  the significance o f  that vague term . The oppos ite  of  
" cooperation" is confrontation , which is a s ituation tending towards 
war . Many of the LDCs became independent nations only in the 1960s 
and the his tory of the nonaligned nations as a bloc goes b ack only 
a few years futher . How the LDCs , the DCs and the communis t nations 
will adjus t their relations remains an open issue. One very 
possible outcome is  a period of intermittent war and terrorism. 
Given the relat ively easy access to modern weapons , including 
nuclear weapons , this could be deadly for all nations . 
The problem posed by the IP , then , would seem to b e  one 
of trading economic cos t s  agains t political benefits.  This  view is 
acceptable , but , appearances p erhaps to the contrary , it does no t 
provide a quick step to a conclus ion . The economic costs  o f  a 
success ful IP would b e  s ignificant but manageab le -- perhaps a fifth 
o f  those  o f  OPEC . And the cos ts o f  a period o f  confrontation , 
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including episodes o f  terrorism and open war , would probably be  
larger , even if  loss o f  life and social disrupt ion are  not counted.  
The IP would then be a bargain i f  it significantly increased the 
prospects for peaceful relations among nations . 
The crucial difficulty with this argument lies in the 
assumpt ion that the IP would promote  cooperat ion . The IP is 
overtly a cooperat ive venture ; but then so is marriage . The analogy 
is appropriate. Under the IP , a wide range o f  economic decis ions-� 
on prices , inventories , inves tment, exports -� would be subject  
to negot iation within international agencies rather than made 
independently by firms and nations . There is no presumption that 
s uch a change would rlampen , rather than heighten conflict , and no 
presumption that the ins titut ions of the IP would be s 'table . Pas t 
history suggests , on the contrary , that commodity agreements  
designed to increase prices  are  devisive and uns table . 
Whether the IP would p romote cooperation is , then, a 
serious question . In terms o f  the DCs'  acceptance o f  the program , 
it is p erhaps the p ivotal ques t ion . 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The implications of the IP for international relations is 
no t strictly a question of politics. The issue involves both 
political and economic elements. The connect ion between ·the two is
reasonably straightforward . The IP would place international 
agencies over existing market ins titutions for s ome eighteen 
commodities , and relate these  agencies by a Common Fund . The Common 
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Fund and the individual commodity organizations would have certain 
obj ectives and powers . It is poss ible to describe , us ing s tandard 
methods and results , what economic pressures and conflicts would 
be  p laced on these ins titutions . This information provides a 
basis for analyz ing how the IP would funct ion , whether it would be 
s table and, eventually , for assess ing the likely polit ical 
consequences of any pro gram along the lines o f  the IP . To use an 
analogy , the task is much like that of a s tructural engineer trying 
to visualize  a complet.ed building on the basis of a blueprint.
Such , in brief , is the pro gram o f  the remainder of the 
book. The dis cus s ions falls , logically ,  into two main parts. 
Chapters 2-5 are concerned with various specific aspects o f  commodity 
agreements . While these chapters explore several byways , their 
overall aims are firs t ,  to  distinguish sharply agreements des igned 
to increas e prices from thos e  designed to reduce price fluctuations 
and second , to assess the relevant characteris tics o f  each type o f  
agreement . Chap ter 6 draws the conclus ions reached in 
chap ters 2-5 into an analysis of the IP ' s  s trategy and prospe�ts
and o f fers an assessment o f  some o f  its  imp lications for international 
relations . The f inal chap ter comments briefly on alterna tives to the 
IP. 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
I .  Frank , "The Role o f  Trade in Development , "  The Global 
Partnership: Internat ional Agencies and Economic Development , 
eds . R .  Gardner and M .  Millikan (New York: Praeger , 1968 ) . 
Some commentators ranked the s ignificance o f  the first  
UNCTAD with " • • .  the formation o f  the first trade union in 
nineteenth-century capitalist  societies . "  G .  K .  Helleiner, ed . 
A World Divided (Cambridge , Ma . :  Harvard Univers ity Press, 19 76) , 
p .  4 .  Whether this is true remains to be s een . However , i t  
may be worth no ting that . the Wagner Act was pass ed eighty-nine
years after the firs t labor union was formed in the U . S .  
It should perhaps b e  said that there.is nothing unusual about 
this; the nations attending an international meet ing are 
frequently divided into groups. 
The two resolutions we.re comb ined in a "Charter o f  Economic 
Rights and Duties o f  States , "  which was approved by the General 
Ass embly in December 1 9 7 4. 
4 .  See UNCTAD , Trade and Development Board , Committee on Commodities , 
"An Integrated Programme for Commodit ies " TB/ B/ C . 1/ 1 9 3  and 
"An Integrated Programme for Commodities : Measures for
Individual Commodities , " TD/B /C.1/194, (October , 1975) • 
5 .
6 .  
7 .  
8 .
9. 
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The NIEO is es s entially a party plat form and , accordingly , mus t  
be read with a n  eye on political realities . Accepted  language 
can cover a hos t  of conflicts . Nevertheles s ,  the ideas 
contained in the IP have a sub s t antial measure of accep tance 
among the LDCs . 
This list appears in the Resolution on Commodities adopted by 
the Plenary Sess ion at UNCTAD IV . The Integrated Programme 
p repared by the UNCTAD Secretariat specified a somewhat 
different set  of commodities . 
Agreements  that create an organization which includes both 
buyers and s ellers but which is no t intended to intervene in 
the market are o f ten called " producer/ consumer forums . "  A 
commodity cartel is an organization which is des igned to 
intervene in the market but which does no t include consumer 
representatives . 
Buffer s tocks are impossible  for perishable commodities and 
can only b e  of limited effect for products  that deteriorate 
with s torage . The IP , however , takes a very optimis tic view 
o f  the possibilities for buffer s to cks . 
For example , the following is included in a descrip t ion o f  �he 
obj ectives of commodity agreements : "one such [ o ther] objective 
would be the avoidance o f  deterioration in the ' real' price o f  
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a commodity, when the commodity roughly maintains its position 
in final consumer preferences or as a raw material in indus trial 
usage . A s econd , and not inconsistent obj ective , would be 
the reversal o f  a downward trend in prices where uncoordinated 
production in many countries is caus ing chronically depres s ed 
prices because o f  national prob lems o f  adj us tments to saturated 
international markets . "  UNCTAD , Trade and Development Board , 
"An Integrated Programme for Commodities," TD/B/ C . 1/194 
(October 1975 ) ,  p .  7 .  
10 . It is not entirely clear how the target price would be set . 
The mos t  controvers ial possib ility is "indexation , "  which means 
that the prices of commodities in the program be tied to an 
appropriate index of the prices o f  manufactured goods in 
world trade. 
11 . For example , one possib ility sugges ted in UNCTAD s taff 
documents is that buyers contribute 5 0  percent and sellers 
contribute the remaini.ng 50  percent, See UNCTAD � Trade and
Development Board, "An Integrated Programme for Commodities/' 
TD/B / C . 1/196  (Oc tober 1975) , p .  8 .  
12. Keynes , for example, s ugges ted a sys tem o f  centrally financed
buffer stocks. See J. M. Keynes , "The Policy of Government
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S torage o f  Food stu ffs and Raw Mater ials, " Eco nomic Jour nal 68 
(19 38 ) : 68-83 . 
13 . The s eco nd sentenc e of S ecr etary o f  S tate Kis sing er 's sp eech to 
UNCTAD IV at Nairob i r eads as fo llo ws: " Our goal is nothing 
l ess than to sh arie a n  enduring structur e o f  inter national 
collaboratio n tha t  o ffer s p eace a nd prosp erity , equal 
opportuni ty and digni ty ,  to all p eop l es. " Kissi ng er ,  "UNCT AD 
IV: Expa nd ing Coop eratio n  fo r Global Ec onomic D evelopment," 
U . S .  D epar tment o f  S tate, Bur eau of Public  Affair s, May 6 , 19 7 6 , 
P· 1 . 
1 4. The I P  is no t mea nt to entirely disp lace es tab lished forms o f  
development ass istanc e, b ut it is und er stood b y  b oth DCs a nd 
LDC s  as an al ter nativ e  to them .  Fo r examp le,  a statement 
i ssued by the French government in 1972  co ntains the fo llowing: 
. . By making co ns umers in rich co untr ies pay a 
higher p r ic e  for th es e food stuffs and metals tha n  
would r esult from the fr ee p lay o f  comp etition, 
F ranc e  is foster ing the mo st accep tab l e  form of a id ­
p ayment for human effort rather than char ity pur e  a nd 
simpl e .  
Quo ted by z. Mikd ashi, Foreign Polic y 14 (Sp ri ng , 1974), p. 59. 
15. S ec retary of S tate Henry Kis s iner , " Global Co ns ensu s  a nd 
Economic D evel opment, " D epartment of S ta te Bulleti n ,  vol. 7 3
( S ep temb er 22 , 1975), pp . 42 5- 441. The U . S .  p osition wa s not 
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u na nimous ly accep ted b y  th e other DCs , a po int about whi ch more 
is said b elow . 
1 6 . Th e Europ ea n  Eco nomic Community r ecently instituted a 
comp ensa tory  fina nci ng scheme called ST ABEX. S T AB EX cover s  
twelve commoditi es and for ty- six c ou ntries . The I nter national 
Mo netary Fu nd has op era ted a c omp ensatory financi ng scheme 
sinc e 1963 . 
17.  A co mmitment to help sp eed d evelopment would s eem to imply 
that the market mecha ni:sm ca n.no t b e  r elied on to prov id e  
" su ffic iently rapid" d evelopment. Viewed i n  this l igh t, the 
U . S .  po sitio n is a wkward , a s  it is bas ically a ma tter of 
r emoving existing barriers to trade and cap ital flows 
i . e. ,  r emovi ng fla ws in the market. 
18 . "Thus , the unp r edictab ility o f  expor t ear ning s can make a 
mo ckery o f  d ev elopment planning , " · Kissinger , "Global Co nsensus, " 
£E_. cit., p. 428. 
19 . The sp l its in th e ranks o f  th e d evelop ed nations r eflec t 
sev eral co nsid Lcatio ns. F irs t, the o ther DCs,  esp ec ially the 
Eur op ean na tio ns, have trad itio nally taken a much mor e  tol erant 
vi ew to ward car tels tha n  has th e U .S .  S ec o nd ,  Canada a nd 
Australia are inclined to take the p ositi on of maj or exp orter s, 
which they ar e. Third, for a var i ety of r ea sons, maj or 
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c onc es s ions on tari ffs ar e mor e  d i fficult for Eur op ean nati ons 
than for th e U.S . 
2 0 .  The U.S . ent er ed a s tat ement that -- i n  effect - - disagr eed with 
s ome key featur es of this r es olut i on ,  esp ecially , the C ommon 
Fund . 
21. The qual i ficat i on is needed only b ecaus e  ther e  are a few metals
-- t ungs t en ,  c obalt , t in -- that ar e largely suppl ied by LDCs . 
However ,  ther e  ar e subs titues for th es e metals in mos t
app l ications , subs titut es for th e "app licat i ons " in which the
metals are requir ed and enormous r oom for t echnol ogical
devel opment to find ways ar ound shortages . It is als o worth
not ing , that th e U.S . is th e larges t  p r od ucer , or among the lar g es t
pr oducers , of iron , c opper, aluminum, l ead and zinc - - t o  s ay 
nothing of moly bd enum , vanadium , ura nium , etc . Th er e  is no 
LDC that even b egins t o  rival th e U.S .  in p r oduct i on of basic  
c ommodities .  S ecretary Kis s inger dis c ount ed an economic t hr eat 
from th e LDCs : "Th e  Unit ed S t a t es ,  b et t er than almos t any other 
nat i on; c ould survive a p eriod of economic war far e, " Kiss inger ,  
"UNCT AD IV, " �· c it . , p .  2 .  
22 . The short s t ory is that buy ers l os e  t wi c e  - - by the h igh er 
price and by the r educt i on in quantity c ons umed . Price 
incr eas es a ls o  s et up s econdary dis t orti ons which further 
reduce the valu e  of goods  and s ervices ava i la ble to buyers . 
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C HAPTER 2 
AS PEC TS OF P RICE INSTABILITY
Th e und erlying purp os e  of a sys t em of c ommodity agr eements 
along th e lines of th e IP would be to sp eed th e ec onomi c gr owth of 
the LDCs . Wh i le this ob jec t ive might s eem t o  obvious ly i mply 
high er c ommodity pri ces , dis cus s i ons of c ommodity agr eements are 
oft en n ot frankly based on that assump t i on. I t  is ins t ead arg ued that 
ins tability in c ommod ity prices is a ma jor obs tacle to d evelopment 
and , h ence,  that arrangements that s tabiliz ed c ommodity p r i ces 
would promot e d evel opment . " S tab l e  prices "  is oft en und er s t ood as 
a euph emism for "high er pr i c es ;• but th e prop os i t ion that the ext r eme 
fluc tuat i on of c ommodity prices is a s i gn ificant obs tacle t o  
d evel opment i s  t aken s erious ly . Or , a t  l east  taken s erious ly 
en ough t o  c onfus e discus s i ons of commod i t y  a gr eements . 
Given that ins tab i lity in c ommodity pric es is a ma jor 
p r ob lem for th e LDCs , accep tanc e  of arrangements t hat s imp ly r educ ed 
p er i od- t o-p eriod price fluctuati ons would s eem t o  b e  an appropriat e 
way for the DCs t o  r ed eem their c ommitment t o  aid the LDCs ', d evel opment . 
Such measur es , inclu r�ing buffer s t ocks , would b e  r elatively 
innocuous .1 Furth ermore,  it is oft en sug ges ted that price 
stabilizat i on would b en efit b uy ers ( in s ome unsp ecifi ed way ) as  
well as s el l ers . Agreements d esi gned t o  s ign ificantly i n cr ease  
commodity prices would n ot ,  h owever ,  be i nn ocuous . They would  
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no t be  in the direct economic interests  of  the DCs and , as is  argued in 
l a t e r  chapters , would be a fertile source o f  conflicts . 
This chapter reviews the various effects that are 
commonly a t t r ibuted t o  the ins tab i l i ty of commo d i ty p r i c e s , especially
effects on d eve l opment . The dis cus s ion a t t emp t s  to clarify the poss ible 
roles of commodity agreements and , in the course o f  doing s o , to 
identify the crucial economic issues . 
INSTABILITY IN COMMODITY PRICES AND THE LDCs ' EXPORT EARNINGS 
It is commonly assumed that the LDCs' obtain mos t  o f  
their export earnings b y  s elling commodities to  the DCs ; that 
commodity prices are subj ect  to large fluctuations ; and that , 
consequently, the LDCs' exp o r t  earnings are extremely uns tab le .  
While the facts are s omewh a t  more comp l icat ed ,  the s e  views are
substantially correct . 
Tab le 2-1 pres ents some summary data on the ins tability 
o f  export earnings o f  DCs and LDCs . The " index o f  ins tab ility"
used is  a measure o f  departures from trend . Assuming that the 
deviations from trend have a normal ( i . e . , bell shaped) dis tribution , a 
value o f  (say)  10 for the index o f  ins tability means that export 
earnin�s will be  within 
�10 percent o f  trend approximately two-thirds
of the t ime . 2 The mean value o f  the index of ins tability for LDCs
was about 30  percent above that for the DCs during the period 
1946-1958 . The index o f  ins tab ility fell for both DCs and LDCs in
the period 1954-19 6 6 , but the index for LDCs was s till more than 
twice that for the DCs . 
- 3 -
Tab l e  2 - 1  
Cowp:irison o �  t.h2 rrl-St2b l l i  ty o f  Ex:;:ior!:s o f  Merchar..d i s e  
P l u s  Servi c e s  o f  S e lected D Cs  a n d  LDCs 
19;46-1 9 5 8  
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1 9 5 4 - 1 9 0 6  Index o f  Ins tabil ity 
Charac teri s t ic s� DCs LDCs DCs 
mean 
r:;edia.i.1 
2nedic.:i. of upper half 
median o f  upper quartile 
standard duration 
coefficient of variation 
(percent) 
17 . 6  
18 . 1
2 3 . 3 
2 6 . 4  
7 . 1  
4 0 . 3  
!:./ See text for an explanation of this index . 
2 3 . 0  6 . 2  
18 . 3 6 , 3  
32 . 0  7 . 8  
41 . 3 8 . 9  
1 2 . 8  2 . 2  
5 5 . 7 3 5 . 5  
LDCs 
1 3 . 4  
12 . 8
17 . 8  
21 . 5 
6 .. 2 
46 . 3
Source : G .  E rb auJ S .  Scld.avo- Carnp o ,  "Et.:u1wm:i r. Ius t.:ability , Level o f  Development
and Economic Size  of Less Developed Countries , "  Bulletin of the Oxford 
Univers i ty Ins titute o f  Economics and Statistics , Vo1 . 31 ( 1969) , p .  267.
I . i 
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A maj or  caus e o f  ins tability in LDC export earnings is 
ins tab ility in the commodity markets . 3 The commodities indus tries
are to  a greater extent than manufacturing or  services subj ect  to  
inherent uncertainties . Weather is the principal s ource o f  uncertainty 
for agricultural commodities . The supply of metals is reasonably 
s table but there are wide swings in demand . Furthermore , short-run 
supply and d emand for mos t  commodities are price inelas tic . 
Consequently , small variations in either s upply o r  demand give rise  
to  large changes in price . 
Table 2-2 indicates actual variations in the prices of 17  
commodit ies . 4 For the s ake o f  comparis ion , s imilar data are given 
for the U . S .  prices o f  s everal manufactured goods . Comparison o f  
the "highs"  and " lows " clearly sugges ts that commodity prices are 
much less s t able, than the p rices o f  manufactured goods . This 
impress ion is confirmed by the coefficients of  variation .
5 
For the
period 19 50-19 75  the coefficients of variat ion for the commodity 
prices ( excep t for bananas , wheat and rice) , were at leas t twice 
6
thos e  o f  the manufactured goods . 
The effect  o f  changes in a commod ity ' s  price depends in 
part on the extent to which the LDCs' exports are diversified . The 
LDCs are often viewed as "one crop" or " f ew crop" economies ; i . e . , 
nations whi ch drive the bulk o f  their incomes from export  o f  only 
a few commodities . The data presented in Table 2-3 indicate that 
mos t  LDCs do fit this pattern . (More detailed data appear in
App endix 2-1) . Only one o f  these natinns (British Wes t  Indies)
TADLE 2-2 
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Var i a ti o n  in C orruuodi ty P r i c e s , :!:/ 1 9 5 1 - 1 9 7 5  
High Low Coe f f i c i en t  o f  
( 1 9 7 5  = 1 0 0 ) VariationV 
b a n a n a s  2 1 4 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 . 1 8 
c o c o a  1 9 0 . 7 5 4 . 9 . 2 9  
c o f f e e  2 8 8 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 . 2 5 
tea 2 7 4 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 . 2 6 
whe a t  1 2 5 . 6 7 2 . 9 . 1 4 
r i c e  1 5 3 . 5 6 9 . 2 • 2 1
c o t ton 2 2 7 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 . 2 2 
j ute.Y 1 6 6 . 7 7 7 . 4  . 2 1  
s i s a li/ 1 4 4 . 5 . 4 1 . 4 . 3 8 
woo l  3 2 4 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 . 2 9 
b e e f.Y 1 2 9 . 4 2 6 . 8 . 5 5 
s u g a r  l?. 8 . 7 1 6 . 9 . 6 1 
rubb e r  5 3 1 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 . 3 8 
copper 2 8 5 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 . 3 3 
t i n  1 2 9 . 0 6 7 . 9 ·. 2 0  
ironY 1 5 7 . 1 6 1 . 0 . 2 5 
E l G c t r i c a l  
mach i n e ry and 
eq uipme n t 12 7 . 0 1 0 0 ; 0 . 0 6 
mechan i c a l  
powe r  and 
tran smi s s ion 
equipment 1 0 3 . 0 7 4 . 3  . 1 0 
new c a r s 15 3 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 . 1 3§1 
wome n ' s and 
g i r l ' s  
appare l 1 4 0 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 . O B 
v 
TABLE 2-2 (cont ' d )
Cor:imod i ty p r i c e s  we re de f lated by the U . N .  wor l d  
pr i c e  i n d e x  f o r  a l l  commod i t i e s .  'l'he p r i c e s  o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  machinery and equipment a n d  mechan i c a l  
powe r a n d  tran s mi s s ion equipment we re de f l a ted by 
the U . S .  who l e s a l e  p r i c e  index of durab le manu ­
fac ture s .  The pr ices of new cars and women ' s  and 
g i r l ' s  appare l were de f lated by the U . S .  c o n s umer 
price index .
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2/  The coef ficient of var i a ti on i s  the ratio of the -
s tandard deviation of the s eries to i ts average 
va lue . 
v S e r i e s  begins w i th 1 9 5 4 . 
v Serie s begins with 1 9 5 5 . 
5_./ 1 9 5 1.- 1 9 7 5 . 
v 1 9 5 3 - 19 7 5 . 
S o ur c e s : Int e r nati on a l  Bank for Re c on s t r uc t i on and D ev e lopment ,  
C ommod ity T r ad e  and Pr i c e  T r end s ,  1 9 7 5  e dition ; 
Unit e d  N ation s , F o o d  and A g d c ultu r e  Or gani z a tion, 
T r ad e  Y ea r b ook ;  Unite d  N ation s , M onthly Bulletin of 
Statis ti c s ;  U . S .  Department of L ab or ,  Bur eau of Lab or
Stati_s tic _s , C on s um e r  Pri c e s  and · Pr i c e  Indi c e s ; Bur e au 
of Lab or Stati s ti c s ,  Whole s a l e  P r ic e s  and P r i c e _  Indexe s .  
Percent o f  
TABLE 2 - 3 
Percent o f  LDCs1 Export Earn ings 
De r iv e d  f r om C onuri.odit ie s ,  
_
Exc ept Petr oleum 
: 
3 3  
Largest Larges t Three Al l Expo rt Earnings Commo d i ty Commodity Commo d i ty From :  
9 0 - 1 0 0  
8 0 ·-9 0 
7 0 - 8 0  
6 0 - 7 0  
. 5 0 - 6 0  
4 0 - 5 0 
3 0 - 4 0  
2 0 -:- 3 0  
10 - 2 0  
0 - 10 
Sour c e :  
Exp o r t  Expo rts Exports 
. NUirJ:ier 
1 
4 
4 
6 
12 
7 
1 2  
1 8  
15 
35 
Cumulative 
l 
5 
9 
15 
2 7  
3 4  
4 6  
6 4  
7 9  
1 1 4  
Number 
6 
5 
6 
1 1  
1 5  
1 0  
1 1  
1 1  
7 
3 2  
Cumu lative Nur:tber 
6 1 2  
1 1  1 2  
1 7  1 5  
2 8  1 3  
4 3  1 2  
5 3  9 
6 4  . · 9 
7 5  9 
8 2  5 
1 1 4  1 8  
C ompiled fr om data i,n, Inte r national Bank f or Re c onstr uction and · 
Development , C ommodity T rade and P r i c e  T r ends , 1 9 7 5  edition. 
Cumulatii 
12 
2 4  
3 9  
5 2  
6 �  
7 3  
8 2  
9 1  
9 6  
1 1 4  
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is literally a one crop economy . However , more than half o f  the 
LDCs derive at least 50 percent of their export earnings from three 
or fewer commodities and only 18 of the 114 LDCs ob tain less than 10
percent o f  their export earnings from three commodities . 
The s i gnificance o f  ins tability in export earnings depends 
on the size  of the export sector relative to the economy as a whole . 
Tab le 2-4 provides s ome data whi ch bears on this point . For 25 o f  
thes e nations , export earnings were a t  leas t 40 percent o f  Gros s  
Domes tic  Product ( GDP ) i n  1 9 7 2 . Mos t  o f  the r..ations i n  this group 
have clas s i c  " few crop" economies . That is , no t only are their 
export earnings derived from only a few commodities but also the 
export sector is the bulk of  the e conomy . This is no t ,  however , 
typi cal o f  LDCs as a group . Export earnings were less than 40
percent of GDP for 8 7  of the LDCs and less than 20 percent for 60
of the LDCs . 
The conclusions that have been of fered here are not 
controversial . There is s ome dispute over whether the export 
earnings of the LDCs  are markedly less s table than thos e  of the 
DCs . But this is not a crucial point , 7 and the ins tability of
commodity prices is  well established . The important disagreements 
are over the s igni ficance of the fact of ins tability in commodity 
prices and export earnings . 
TWO POPULAR ARGUMENTS 
Popular discuss ions usually do not explain why price
ins tability is a problem ;  it is taken for granted that the 
w 
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TABLE 2 - 4  
Di s tribution o f  LDC s '  Expor t Earn i n g s  a s  a Percent o f  GD!? 19 7 2Y 
Export Earnings a s · 
a Percent of GDP 
Numb er of 
LDCs 
Cumu l a t i v e  
1 0 0 - 3 3 
8 0  - 1 0 0 4 .  7 
6 0 .  - 8 0  1 0  17 
4 0  - 6 0  8 2 5  
2 0  - 4 0  2 7  5 2  
1 0  - 2 0  3 5  8 7  
0 - 1 0  2 5  1 1 2  
I_/ In s ev e r a l  c a s e s ,  it wa s ne c e s s a r y  t o  u s e  the a v e r a g e  va lue 
of exp o r t s  for 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 2 .  
Sour c e s : Int e rnati ona l  Bank for Re c on s tr ucti on and D e v e lopment , 
C ornmo d itv T r ad e  and Pr i c e  T r end s ,  1 9 7 5  e dit ion ; E ur opa 
P ublis hing C omp any, E ur oua Y e arb o ok ;  and International 
Monetary Fund, Int e rnational F inancial Statis ti c s . 
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ins tability of commodity prices is  a burden on the LDCs . When the 
undes irable e f fects  o f  price ins tability are explained at all , it 
is with a pas s ing reference to the "boom-bus t"  cycle or , les s 
frequently , to the "excess ive" risk o f  the commodity markets . 8
Neither o f  these  cons iderations is taken s eriously in the profess ional 
literature , but they are worth dis cus s ion becaus e they are s o  
frequently heard . 
The s cenario assumed in the boom-bust cycle argument is  
as follows . In periods when demand is high and prices are rising , 
exis ting producers expand their production and entrants are 
attracted . The increased supply and/or  a decline in demand 
subsequently drive price down to a very low level . What seemed 
to b e  a good inves tment can , then , prove to be unprofitable . Supply 
is cut back , marginal producers leave the market and the cycle 
begins a gain . 
The effect  o f  a buffer s to ck on the boom-bus t 
cycle seems s t raigh t forward at firs t glance . The buffer stock 
would buy in periods o f  "excess "  supply , thereby maintaining price 
and producers ' revenues . The stocks acquired would b e  sold o f f  in 
periods of tight supply . The result would be  s tab le prices and 
revenues , o r , in short , a cure for the boom-bus t cyc le . 
This  view is correct as far as i t  goes , but i t  does not 
go very far . The mis sing element is a clear appreciation o f  the 
cos ts of the boom-bus t cycle , whi ch are those of the "excess "
inves tment . That is , unpro fitable inves tments are made and thes e 
represent resources that are , for at leas t a t ime , was ted , In the view 
sketched above , these cos t s  are s imply trans ferred to the buffer 
stock organization . There is no net gain , and very possib ly no 
. l "  9 gain even to supp iers . 
Price s ta1ilization , then , is no t equivalent to a cure 
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for the boom-bus t cycle . I f  a buffer s tock is to have a s ubs tantial 
effect on the boom-bus t cycle :i. t  mus t , by s tabilizing prices , reduce 
or  prevent "exces s "  inves tment . I t  may seem reasonable to s uppose
that s table prices  would promote  a s table pattern o f  inves tment , 
but this is no t obvious . To establish the point , s omething mus t 
be s aid about the causal relationship connecting price ins tability 
and inves tment decisions . 
A relatively s imple pos s ibility lies in what can be 
called the "myopia theory" of  the boom-bus t cycle . The myopia 
theory ass erts that competitive firms p lace undue wei ght  on 
near-term conditions . In particular , during boom periods 
competitive firms fals ely believe that high prices will persis t .  
There is , consequently , overinves tment , which drives prices down 
and so forces some suppliers from the market . A buffer s t o ck would 
cure the myopia by holding price closer  to its _long-run equilib rium 
level , announcing a target price related to the long-run equilibrium 
price and otherwis e providing a s ound bas is for forecas t ing . 
The myopia theory is not however the only "reasonable" 
explanat ion o f  boom-bus t cycles . Ano ther poss ibility follows from 
a critique o f  the limitations o f  prices as a signaling devi c e .  
Suppose : (1)  that there are initially 100 equal s ized producers
of the commodity ; (2) that there i s  a small permanent increase in
demand ; and ( 3) at the higher level o f  demand there is  room for one 
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new producer or  one producer twice the ' s ize  of the o thers . The 
increase in demand will cause a short-run increas e in price . The 
increase in price provides all of the existing producers with an 
incentive to expand . But i f  all p roducers expand , the increase in 
supply will be  100 times greater than that required to  meet the 
increas e in demand . 
This example makes the point that price gives suppliers 
only "yes /no" information on inves tment . Price does no t indicate 
how many new suppliers should enter and how much capacity should 
be  added by existing firms . Consequently , i f  each producer and 
po t�ntial entrant responds in the expected way , the result can be 
"overinves tment . 1 1 Markets solve this problem by trial and error ; 
i . e . , by squeezing out , via price decreases , excess capacity . 
Given the process j us t  sketched , even a large well managed buffer 
stock would no t cure the problem at all . Price , i f  i t  is to play 
its  role as a s ignaling device , mus t  be allowed to rise by enough 
to attract addi tional supply as that becomes necessary . A rush to 
inves t ,  as des cribed in the example , would then occur . 4 buffer
s tock could , in fact , exacerbate the prob lem i f  producers had reason 
to believe that excess produc t ion would be  absorbed by the buffer 
s t o ck .  
The key element in this discuss ion i s  the relationship 
between price ins tability and the t iming of inves tments .  This 
relationship is no t well understood but , given the present s tate 
o f  knowledge , it cannot b e  s aid that the boom-bus t cycle provides 
a clear rationale for buffer s to cks . 
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A s econd popular , but  less frequently asserted proposition , 
is that the commodity market s  are " excessively" risky . While the 
commodity markets are more risky than mos t  manufacturing indus tries
10
it is far from obvious j us t  what it means to s ay that the commodity 
markets are " excess ively" risky".  
One possibility identifies risk with incomplete information . 
The price that p revails on a market at any time does· not depend 
only on the current levels o f  supply and demand but also on buyers ' 
and sellers' expectations about the future . To the extent that the 
information behind these expectations is incorrect or  incomplete , 
current prices will give misleading s ignals and was teful decis ions 
may result . But the fact that "mis takes" are apparent in re trospect 
is  not in itself  an indictment o f  a market ' s  ab ility to  deal with 
uncertainty . I t  is not because informat ion is cos tly to acquire. ;
the s ituation is clearly not improved i f  the cos t o f  acquiring the 
informat ion required to avo id mis takes exceeds the cos t of the 
mis takes . 
Real world markets probably p as s  this tes t . Any buyer or  
s eller who has  better information than the market can act on that 
informat ion to make a pro fi t . Cons equently , it  is reasonable to 
presume that buyers and s ellers use all availab le information and 
push their s earch for information11 to the point where the cost  o f
collecting additional informat ion j us t equals the value of that 
information . I f  this condition is satis fied , a market can not be 
j udged "exces s ively" risky in the s ens e that informat ion is 
" excessively" incomplete . 
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The presump t ion that the market process efficiently 
acquires and incorporates information is s trong but not absolute . 
For a variety o f  reasons , inc luding laws , differences in language 
and trade cus toms , a governmental organi zation may be able to 
collect information more cheaply than private firms . To the 
extent that is s o , the commodity markets are non-optimally risky . 
A cas e for buffer s tocks would not , however , follow 
immediately i f  this premise were accepted . The underlying problem 
is , by as sump tion , a lack o f  information . This problem could be 
attacked directly by creating an improved sys tem o f  communication 
(news services , trade as sociations , price reporting , s tatis ti�al 
publications ) .  A buffer s to ck would be warranted only i f  i t  were 
cheaper to have a central authority act on the information than to 
diss eminate it  to  participants in the market . 
The preceding argument is , at bes t ,  shaky . I t  is far 
from clear that the information availab le on the commodity markets 
is " exces s ively" incomplete -- i . e . , that the benefits  o f  additional 
information would exceed its cos ts . Even if this is s o , it is 
implausible to suppose  that a buffer s t ock is  the leas t cos tly way 
to solve the problem . 
A much more s traightforward argument can be produced by 
identi fying risk with price fluc tuations . The cos ts o f  risk are 
then the cos ts associated with period-to-period variations in prices . 
Firs t ,  as the degree o f  price ins tability increases , both buyers 
and s ellers may b e  led to employ more wo rking capital , and ho ld 
la�ger inventories . Second , price ins tability can increase cos t s  
4 1  
b y  requiring changes i n  production rates , creating prob lems o f  
s cheduling the work force , complicating purchas ing decis ions , etc . 
Third , ins tabili ty in prices typically implies ins tability in 
suppliers' returns and as returns become more variab le the cos t o f  
capital t o  suppliers increases . 
A buffer s tock could , by s tabilizing p rices , lead to a 
reduction in these costs . The buf fer s t ock would be warranted i f  
i t s  cos t s  were l e s s  than the c o s t  s avings to  buyers and s ellers . 
However ,  i t  s eems unlikely that this condition is in fact satis fied . 
At leas t much o f  any reduc tion in buyer� and s eller� inventories 
would be matched by an increas e in ' inventories held by the buffer 
s tock . 1
2 
Furthermore , in mos t  o f  the commodit ies indus tries ,
capital requirements  are relatively low and the agricultural 
capital intens ive . Thes e considerations 
s ugges t that cos t  savings would be  minor . The costs  o f  buffer s t o cks 
are no t typically minor ;  as is dis cus s ed in Chapter 4 ,  buffer s to cks 
are o ften expensive p ropositions . 13 While these comments are far
from conclusive , they suggest  that i t  is unlikely that buffer s t o cks 
could be· j us t i fied as a device for r.educing cos t s .
The conclus ion o f  this dis cuss ion is that popular 
conceptions of the effects of price ins tab ility do not provide,, a 
solid rationale for buffer stocks . I t  may be that the boom-bus t 
cycle is a serious problem o r  that commodi ty markets are excess ively 
risky , but even a reasonable presumption in favor of either of these 
propositions has yet to b e  es tablished . 
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C OMMODITY PRICES  A,"!D DEVELOPME NT 
Inter na ti onal discus s i ons of c ommodities are framed i n  
terms of the relati onships be tween trade and deve l opme nt. In part 
this s imply reflects the LDCs' c oncern wi th ec onomic developme nt. 
But ge neral accep tance of this f ocus reflec ts the c ons e ns us that 
i nter nati onal c oopera ti on on deve l opme nt is required . Wi thin these 
terms , the fac ts sketched i n  Chap ter 1 rais e the ques ti on of the 
exte nt to whi ch i ns tability of c ommodi ty p ri ces a nd exp or t 
ear ni ngs are a n  obs tacle to ec onomic deve l opme nt. This issue has 
played a promi ne nt r ole in i nter na tional discus s i ons of c ommod i ties . 
It is - generally agreed that to the exte nt tha t  i ns tab i l i ty is a n  
obs tacle to developme nt, i nter na ti onal c oopera ti on to s tab ilize the 
LDCs exp or t  ear ni ngs is warranted . This would not j us tify measures 
designed to i ncreas e c ommodi ty prices . It might,  however , j us ti fy 
pure buffer s tocks or c ompe nsa tory f i na ncing . C omp e ns a tory 
f i na nc i ng is probab ly the . be tter of the two, but atte ntion has been 
f ocus ed on buf fer s tocks . 1 4  
There a r e  s everal ways i n  which i ns tabili ty i n  exp or t  
·ear ni ngs c a n  adversely effect  deve l opme nt.
15 The argument made 
mos t  freque ntly tur ns on the r ole of the LDCs' g overnme nts i n  the 
developme nt proces s . Mos t of the LDCs have a treme nd ous need f or 
i nfras truc ture i nves tme nt -- r oads , h os p i tals , s chools - - and , as 
i n  the DCs , the resp ons ibili ty f or i nfras tructure i nves tment res ts 
wi th the g over nment. Fur thermore , i n  many of the LDCs the 
government assumes a s ubs tantial d i r e c t  respons ibility fp r  
agricultural a nd i ndus trial i nves tment. 
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Developme nt pr ograms ge nera te a demand f or f oreign 
ma nufactures -- fer tilizers , cement, s teel , machi nery , e tc. Imp orts 
of these i tems mus t be paid f or wi th f oreign currencies , whi ch the 
LDCs largely acquire by export  o f  commodities . Governments can 
tap the flow of f oreign excha nge ear ni ngs in a variety of ways . 
One c onnnon pro c edure is to require producers to sell to the 
g over nme nt a t  a fixed price , whi ch is s e t  well below the market 
price . Payme nt is mad e  i n  the nati onal currency . The g over nme nt 
the n  s ells the commodi ty in i nterna ti onal marke ts a nd is p aid i n  
f oreign curre ncies . 
Whatever par ti cular method is us e d ,  the f oreign exchange 
available to the LDCs g over nme nts depends on connnodi ty prices . 
When c ommodi ty prices are high , the g overnme nt' s c ommand ove r 
f oreign excha nge is c orresp ondi ngly high . 1
6 A sharp drop i n  
commodi ty prices typically resul ts i n  a decli ne i n  exp ort ear ni ngs 
a nd g overnme nt reve nues . To the exte nt tha t  they depe nd on imp or ts , 
g over nme nt f i nancial development programs mus t b e  cut back . 
Fur thermore , i f  imp or ts are mai ntained a t  exis ting levels , a 
reduc ti on i n  the value of exp orts pr oduces a balance of p ayme nts 
deficit.  This puts pres s ure on the c ountry ' s  excha nge rate and 
creates a need f or b orro wi ng .  
The "ups ar.:i d owns " of the c ommod i ty marke ts d o  not 
necess arily bala nce out from the p oi nt of vie w of d evelopme nt. 
They do not becaus e a reducti on in funds availab le can require 
cos t ly delays in p roj e c t s , add uncertainty to the timing o f  related
p r oj e cts , e tc .  The general p r op os i tion is tha t  ins tability i n  
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connnodity prices , and export earnings adversely affects  inves tment 
planning . 
This argument is plausib le and its  factual basis is 
substantially corre c t . Nevertheles s ,  the available  evidence does 
not s upport the propo s ition that ins tability is  a maj or obs tacle 
to development . This conclus ion emerges from a s tatis tical s tudy 
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o f  a sample  o f  LDCs . MacBean found a negative correlation 
between growth in GDP and ins tab ility in export earnings . However ,  
the correlations did no t differ s i gnificantly from zero , which is 
to say that  this test  indicates the abs ence any marked effect ·  of 
ins tab ility in export earnings on GDP . Fur thermore , on each of 
s everal tes ts , the relationship between inves tment and instab ility 
proved to be s tatistically ins ignificant but positive ; i . e . , 
higher levels of inves tment proved to be associated with less 
s tab le export earnings . As inves tment is the means by whi ch 
development occurs , this finding runs s trongly agains t the 
propos ition that ins tab ility in export earnings is a maj or  ob s tacle 
to development . 
These results are confirmed in a recent study by 
Knuds en and Parnes . 18 Knuds en and Parnes , again , found a positive 
asso ciation between inves tment and ins tab ility of export earnings . 
They also found a positive association between the rate o f  growth o f  
GNP and GNP per capita and ins tab ility in export earnings . 
The s tatistical results obtained by McBean and Knudsen 
and Parnes do no t deny the logic of �he argument t h a t  instab i l i ty 
in export earnings disrupts p lanning ,
19 
or the logic o f  the o ther 
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. .  
reasonab le arguments that show how ins tability in export earnings 
can be an obs tacle to development . I t  is the importance o f  thes e 
arguments that is challenged . The empirical results at a minimum 
indicate that the connections between ins tab ility in export earnings 
. 20 and development are generally weak . The evidence does not rule 
out the possibility that ins tability in export earnings is a s erious 
obs tacle to development in some cases . For small nations which 
depend on only two or three connnodities , ins tability in export 
earnings may be  a crucial prob lem .  However , i t  does not s eem 
possible to make a general cas e that price s tab ility advers ely 
affects economic development . 
The crucial connection between trade in connnodities and 
economic development does not lie �n price or earnings ins tability , 
but in the position o f  the LDCs in the commodity markets . The LDCs 
s eek to exploit the fact that , in mos t  cases , the b ulk of the 
connnodity is  s upplied by a relat ively small number of nations . 
Given this fact , monopolis tic pricing is conceivable . The model is 
OPEC , which has had a tremendous e f fect on the development of the 
maj or oil  producers among the LDCs . But this effect was no t 
achieved by reducing fluctuat ions in oil prices but by quadrupling 
them . The same is true o f  o ther commodities . A sys tem o f , 
connnodity agreements along the lines o f  the IP would have a 
significant effect on development to the extent that it increas ed 
the LDCs earnings from commodity exports . I f  the primary obj ective 
of commodity agreements is to speed economic development , " s tabilizat ion" 
in the s ense of reduced price fluctuations mus t not be confus ed with 
46 
"s tabilization" in the s ens e o f  higher commodity p rices . It is the 
latter of thes e that is of maj or signi ficance for economic development . 
DIRECT EFFECTS OF PRI CE STABILIZAT ION ON BUYERS AND SELLERS 
The discuss ion might end at this point but for the 
contention that price s tab ilization can b e ,  apart from � effects 
on development , o f  b enefit to both buyers and sellers . This is the 
mos t  complex and confus ing aspect of the dis cus s ion of commodity 
p roblems . It is widely believed that "exces s ive" ins tability 
in commodity prices is undes irable . This belief seems to . be based 
only on intui tion ; apart from possible  effects of development , it 
is no t explained in concrete terms why price s tability is 
undesirable . Given that buffer s tocks are cos tly , this issue cannot 
b e  avo ided . Is price instability s imply a nuisance or is i t  a 
s erious mat ter ?  
Surprisingly enough , there is a clear and direct way in 
which price s tabilization may benefit s ellers , buyers or b o th .  The 
argument is made by taking a close look at the effects of price 
changes on suppliers ' revenues and the value that buyers place on 
h . h 
21 t eir pure ases . 
Table 2-5 presents a hypo thetical example which focuses 
on suppliers' revenues . I t  is assumed that the level o f  demand is 
cons tant and that supply varies from " low" to "average" to "high" 
as weather is "bad , "  "normal" or " good . 112 2  When supply is "low , "  
p rice and revenue are relatively ·  high ;  conversely , when s upply is 
' 'high , "  price and revenue are relatively low . The s econd set  o f  
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f igures in Tab l e  2-5 shows the e f fects  of eve ning out var iatio ns in 
p r ice and s upply . The remarkab le fact that appears is that suppl iers ' 
reve nue is increased by s t ab iliz ing price. Th is is no t an  acc idental 
result that depe nds on the par t icular numerical values us ed ; it is , 
ins t ead , a ge neral property o f  cases in wh ich dema nd is co ns t a nt 
a nd supply varies . The result als o  does no t require a ny " t r icks . "  
As a matter o f  ar ithme t ic ,  it appears becaus e as s upply is increased 
a nd price falls , reve nue falls at an  increas ing rate . The underly i ng 
propo s it io n  is that whe n  price is already lo w,  relat ively large 
decreas es in price are necessary to persuade the market to accept 
an  increase in s upply . Given th is commo ns e ns e  propo s it io n ,  the 
arithmet ic sho ws that ( if supply varies w�ile dema nd is co ns ta nt) 
p r ice s tab il izatio n increas es s uppl iers ' reve nues .
23 Buyers in 
this cas e clearly lose by price s t ab il iz a t io n  s ince , o n  average , 
they p ay mo re for the same qua nt ity . 
The example in Tab le 2-5 is int e nded o nly to po int to the 
fact that price s t ab il izat io n  has predictable effects o n  s uppl iers ' 
reve nues a nd pro f its a nd on buyers ' gains from the ir purchase s .  
Th is l ine o f  argument is pursued i n  Chap ter 4 .  I t  is sho wn there , 
that : (1) if s upply varies wh ile dema nd is co ns ta nt ,  s uppliers 
ga in from p�ice s tab ilizatio n  wh ile b uyers los e ,  but the s upp l iers ' 
gai n exceeds the buyers ' los s ;
2 4 ( 2) if dema nd is co ns ta nt wh ile 
supply var ies , buyers gain from p r ice s tab il izat io n ,  wh ile s ellers 
los e ,  but the buyers ' gain exceeds the s ellers loss; ( 3 ) if b o th 
supply and d emand vary , there is a net gain to price s t ab ilization , 
but, depending on the :ela t ive variab ility o f  supply a nd demand , 
w 
suppliers may gain and buyers los e ;  or buyers may ga in wh ile 
supp l iers los e ;  or both buyers and s ellers may gai n. 
These propos it ions sp eak o nly to the b e ne f its o f  price 
s tab ilizat io n. To move from this po int to a cas e for pure buf fer 
stocks requires a comparis o n  of b e ne f its a nd cos t s .  But it is 
necess ary to ask f irs t whether exis t ing market i ns t itutio ns 
especially futures markets -- obviate the ques t io n. 
Futures markets provide b o th buyers a nd s ellers a way 
o f  avo iding uncertainty .  F o r  example , s uppose a crop is planted 
in Apr il a nd harves ted in Augus t .  In April ,  a producer can s ell 
a specif ied qua nt ity forward at a guaranteed p r ice .
25 
S imilarly , 
49 
a user can buy " no w" at a guara nteed p r ice for future deliver . The 
futures markets , however , are also used for purely f inancial 
transactio ns -- i . e., specula t io n. 
The ques t io n  typ ically raised at th is po int is whether 
futures markets . te nd to s tab il ize prices o r ,  ins tead , lead to eve n 
greater price ins tab il ity . Eco nomis ts have usually argued that 
specula t io n  is s tab il iz ing.
26 I f  so , the exis te nce o f  a futures 
market_ in a commod ity reduces the need for a buffer s tock. Others 
argue that amateur speculators -- who are eve ntually drive n from 
the market by losses -- are frequent ly a des tab il iz ing inf luence .  
I n  th is eve nt , the exis te nce o f  a futures market s trengthens the 
case for a buffer s tock .  
There is a more s ubtle  poi nt that puts this is sue in a 
dif ferent perspec tive . A s upplier or buyer can "buy ins urance" on 
a futures market by s elling o r  buy ing forward. The entire crop 
50 
would no t be sold forward , as i f  p ro duction is less than expected 
the s eller would have to buy back his own contracts . Furthermore , if  
the  price  in  the future turns o ut to  b e  unexpectedly high , the 
producer would pre fer no t to have s old forwar d .  A buffer s to ck 
avoids these difficulties and s o  may be a superior form o f  insurance .
27  
The conclusion o f  these comments is  that a buffer stock 
which s t ab ilized prices would provide benefits to suppliers , buyers , 
or both .
28 This is a s trictly limited conclusion . I t  leaves open 
issues concerned with the practicalities o f  buffer s tock management 
and the ques tion of whether the benefits o f  buffer s tocks would 
exceed their costs . 
CONCLUDING C OMMENTS 
This chapter has presented two maj or conclusions . Firs t ,  
and mos t important , instability in export earnings i s  not a maj or  
obs tacle to development . Given this fac t ,  i t  is not s ensible to 
at once maintain that the obj ective of commodity agreements is to 
s peed economic development and that commodity agreements would be 
limited to reducing period-to-period variations in commodity prices . 
S econd , reducing per iod-to-period variations in prices might  be o f  
direct benefit t o  s ellers or buyers o r  both .  
The net result o f  the discuss ion i s  a sharp dis tinction 
between two alternative obj ectives of commodity agreements . One 
potential obj ective is economi c development ; commodity agreements 
would then s e rve to transfer income t o  the LDCs via higher commo dity 
prices . The alterna dve "bas ic obj ective" is s imply to reduce 
ll 
5 1  
period-to-period variations · i n  commodity prices without increasing 
their average level . 
Much hangs on this dis tinction . The type o f  agreement 
that is appropriate , the problems that agreements would face , the 
terms on which they would be j udged and the direction in which 
agreements would evolve all depend on the obj ec tive that is  to b e  
served . Pure buffer s tocks are the type o f  arrangement to be  
cons idered i f  the  obj ec tive is  to reduce period-to-period variations 
in prices . Given this relatively modes t obj ec tive the ques tions are , 
firs t ,  whether buf fer s t o cks could be limited to the task o f  reducing 
price fluctuations and , second , whether the benefits  of buffer 
s tocks would exceed their cos ts . I f  the obj ective is to s peed 
economic development , commodity agreements mus t be  des igned to 
increas e commodity prices . This would require agreements with 
provis ions that go b eyond tho s e  o f  a pure buffer stock arrangement -­
production controls , export quotas , limitations on entry , etc . Such 
agreements would b e  j udged in terms o f  their effect  on the LDCs 
development and whether they would s peed development would depend 
on their ability to contain the forces o f  competition among 
s uppliers . 
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57 . 9 7 5. 4 84.  1 � 3 
3 8 . 3 4 3 . 8 4 8 . 4 i 2  
1 8 .  1 3 8 . 0 6 0 . 9 1 3  
5 2 .  1 5 7 .  1 5 7 .  1 5 
1 8 . 3 3 6 . 0 44. 2 
3 . 4 4 . 9 6. 8 7 8  
. 9 1 .  3 1 o o. 0 1 3  
55 . 4 5 5 . 8 6 2 . 9 2 9  
o . o  o. 0 1 5. 3 6 
. .  
o . o o. 9 1 0 0 .  0 9 0  
2 . 0 4 . 2 5  4 2 . 8 3 1  
2 6 . 5 52 ;  7 7 5 . 3 7 7  
S our c e : lnte rnationa� Bank for Re c onstructi on and Development, Commodity T r ade and Price  T r end s , 1 9 7 5 Editi on.  
*' G r e ater than 5 0  pe r c ent s ha r e  of exports  in p etr ole um .  
VI "' 
�;: �;: Includ e s 34 c onnnoditie s  in all, the 18  c orn1nodit ie s  in  que s ti on and th e f ollowing in addition :  ab ac a , c oc onut oil ,  
c opr a ,  fis hn"l e a l ,  g r ound nut oil,  gr ound nut s , hide s / s kin s ,  lead,  lin s e e d  oil ,  ma iz e ,  mangane s e  or e ,  pa lni oil ,  
phosphate r o ck , s ilv e r ,  tabacco , and zinc . 
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The coefficient o f  variation is  the ratio o f  t h e  s t andard 
deviation of a s eries to  its average . I f  the values in the 
s eries are independently and normally dis tributed , a value o f , 
for example , 0 . 1  for the coe fficient o f  variation means that 
values will be within :!:"10 percent of the mean value about 
two-thirds o f  the time . 
The coefficients of variation are s omewhat lower i f  the years 
19 7 3-1975  are omitted . Nevertheless , the coefficients o f  
variation remain much higher f o r  commodities than for 
manufactured goods . 
7 . I t  is not becaus e any given degree o f  ins tability in export 
earnings may have very different cons equences for an 
underdeveloped nation than for  an indus trialized nation . 
8 .  I t  i s  important t o  distinguish buffer s tocks , and o ther 
arrangements designed to s tabilize prices , from contingency 
s tocks . A contingency s to ck is held agains t specific 
possib ilities -- war , famine , etc . The benefit  o f  a contingency 
s to ck is  its insurance value . As a buf fer s tock would 
periodically be at zero level , it  would not provide reliable  
insurance . Contingency s tocks have been proposed for foods , 
especially maj or grains . While thes e propos als are potentially 
significant , they have no t played a central role in international 
dis cus s ions of cc.=odity prob l ems . See R .  Wecks tein ,  "Do We 
'-.-::: 
' 
9 .  
10 . 
11 . 
12 . 
Need a World Food Res erve ? A Counter Propos al , "  unpublished 
paper , no date . 
5 9  
Suppliers would contribute all , or at leas t much , o f  the costs  
of  the buffer stock .  That is , suppliers mus t pay out to the 
buffer s t o ck when it is buying . Suppliers , then , would s imply 
get b ack in larger revenues what they pay out to the buffer 
s tock .  This wo uld not occur once the buffer s to ck has 
accumulated a sufficiently large pool of funds . The s e  funds , 
however , would s till carry an implicit interes t cos t  equal to 
the return that could b e  obtained in the b es t  alternative 
employment of them. 
Although perhaps less risky than many financial markets and 
s ome types of construction . 
And create a demand for firms that specialize in providing 
information . 
See Charles River Associates , Public and Private Stockpiling ; 
report prepared for the National Commission on Supplies and 
Shortages , Augus t 1976 , for an analytical treatment o f  this 
issue . It is also worth noting that a buffer s tock would at 
least to s ome extent assume p rivate inventory costs , which is 
probab ly one reason why s tab ilization measures are favored . 
1 3 .  
14 . 
15 . 
16. 
17 . 
18 . 
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I t  is  als o  worth noting that exis ting futures markets provide 
a way for buyers and s ellers to  escape s ome forms of uncertainty . 
For example , a supplier can ob tain a known , certain return in 
the future by s elling forward . A buyer can , s imilarly eliminate 
uncertainty over price and availability by buying a futures 
contract . 
Because o f  perishability , high s torage costs  and heterogenous 
grades , buffer stocks are feas ible for only a few commodities . 
Compensatory financing can have a much broader coverage and 
s trikes directly at the problem .  Furthermore , compensatory 
financing avoids the s torage and interes t  costs  ass oc iated 
with buffer s tocks . 
For a summary o f  thes e  arguments , see  A .  MacBean , �· cit . ,  
ch . 1 .  
This s tatement assumes that the demand for commoditi�s is  
price inelas tic which , with only a few excep tions , is  the cas e .  
MacBean , � ·  ci t . , ch . 4 .  MacBean also buttres s ed his 
s tatis tical work with s everal case s tudies . 
0 .  Knuds en and A .  Parnes , Trade Ins tability and Economic 
Development (Lexington Books , 1975) , especially '.Ch .. 9 .  
19 . 
20 . 
21 . 
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However ,  Knudsen and Parnes argue that ins tability in exports 
earnings tends to reduce the propens ity to consume and , therefore , 
p romotes s aving , which tends to speed development . 
Several reasons why this is s o  can be found . For example , much 
o f  the funding for development pro grams comes from external 
s ources rather than export earnings . A s e cond reason appeared 
in Table  2-4 , in particular , in over half of the LDCs , export 
earnings are 20 percent or less o f  gros s  domestic  
produc t . 
The argument developed here follows B .  Ma is s ell , "Price 
S tabilizat ion and Welfare , "  Quarterly Journal o f  E conomics 83 
'(1969 ) : 285-2 9 8 ,  which provides references to  the 
earlier literature . See  als o  S .  Turnovsky , "The Dis tribution 
of the Welfare Gains from Price S tabilization : The Case o f  
Multiplicative Dis turbances , "  International Economic Review 1 7  
(19 7 6 ) : 133-14 8 . 
22 . Supply is assumed to b e  perfectly inelas tic and the elas ticity 
o f  demand is assumed to be -0 . 4 .  These  assumpt ions do not 
affect  the point of the example . 
23 . I t is worth noting that , in terms o f  this example , compensatory 
f inancing would no t b e  a s ub s t i tu t e  for buf fer s t o cks . Comp ensatory 
financing s imply s erves to s tab ilize export earnings by direct 
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t rans fers . This does no t e f f e c t  the gains to s upp liers and/or  
buyers o f  s tabilizing part icular conunodity prices . 
24 . Expenditure is no t the approp riate measure o f  gains and los s es 
to buyers . To see  why this is so , suppos e  that price falls . 
Quantity demanded wi ll then increas e and total expendi ture 
may increas e ,  but buyers clearly can no t b e  worse  o f f  when 
price falls . The approp riate measure is consumers' · surplus , 
which is de fined as the total value that buyers place on the 
quantity demanded less their expenditure . Cons·umer s '  s urplus , 
and the way in which i t  is measured , are dis cus s e d  further in 
ch . I+ .  
25 . Namely , the futures price for Augus t that prevails at the 
time of the s ale in April . 
26 .  Pro fitable speculation will generally b e  s t abilizing , s ince , 
for example , a profit is made on material purchas ed "now" 
only if it is resold at a higher price . This argument is 
pres ent ed in M .  Friedman , Essays in Pos i t ive Economics 
(Chicago , 1 9 5 3) , p .  175 . For counter ar guments see  W.  Baumol , 
" S peculation , Pro fi t ability and S t ability , "  Review o f  Economics 
and Statist ics 39  ( 1 9 5 7 ) : 2 6 3-271 ; and H. Johnson , 
"Des tabilizing Speculat ion : A General Equilibrium Approach , "  
Journal o f  Polit ical Economy 84 . (1976 ) , 109-122 . 
2 7 . 
28 . 
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S e e  B .  Mais s ell , "Some Welfare Impl icat ions o f  International 
Price S tabilization , "  Journal of Political Economy . 6 8 (19 70) ; 
404-417 . 
I f  this is so , i t  mi ght be asked why buyers and s ellers do no t 
organi z e  a buffer s tock . It may s imp ly be that the costs  o f  
a buffer s tock exceed the benefits , b u t  there a r e  two o ther 
possibilities . Firs t , it is cos tly to organize the many 
participants in a market . A s econd difficulty is what is 
known as the " free rider problem . " I f  a buffer s tock were 
organized , its benefit �ould go to all suppliers o r  buyers 
whe ther or no t they contributed . 
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CHAPT ER 3 
TYPE.S OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
There is little p oin t in mainta ining the distinc tion 
between reduced price fluc tua tions and h igher p r ices i f  c ommodity 
agreemen ts invar iab ly increase average p r ice . Whe ther they w ould 
in fact do so turns in part on the effec ts of creat ing an 
organization to intervene in a marke t. The organization , as such , 
would p r ovide suppliers with a means to c ooperate in ra ising p r ic e s. 
Furthermore , price , and perhap s supp ly , w ould become matters f or 
neg otiation between buyers and sellers,  and to the extent tha t  
suppliers are d ominant, the organiza tion crea ted would ac t as a 
cartel . 
The se c omments d o  n ot, h owever , exhaust wha t can be said 
ab out the operati on of c ommod ity agreements. " C ommodity agreement" 
is a generic term tha t  c over s  a var ie ty of arrangemen ts. D if ferent 
ch oices on spe c if ic p r ovisions g ive c ommodity agreements which 
serve dif ferent obj ec tive s and face dif ferent problems. The 
que stion , then , is : g iven the agreemen t's ob jec tive -- higher pric e  
or reduced period- to-per iod var ia ti on in pr ice - - which spe c if ic 
mechanisms are required and which are unaccep table?  
The f ir st two sec tions of  th is chap ter take up , in order ,  
pure buffer st ocks and c ommod ity cartels.  This material p rovides 
w 
65  
the b a sis f or the third sec tion ' s d iscussions o f  the mixed typ e  of 
c ommod ity agreements that c ome up in p ractice . 
PURE BUFFER STOCKS 
The idea of a pure buffer stock a ssume s the existence 
of an organized market in the c ommod ity .
1 
A centrally held stock 
is clearly p ossible in other cases.  However , there is n o  need to 
create a buffer stock to stab il iz e price if p r ice is set by supplie rs 
or is under some other f orm of administrative c ontr ol . 
The purp ose of an exchange is to e stab lish the price that 
balance s  supply and demand . S ince order s to buy and sell are 
d irectly registered on the market,
2 
it i s  not surpr ising that 
exchange s generally d o  this job well and tha t  the priee e stab lished 
is very sensitive to change s  in supply and d emand . As supply and/ or 
demand f or individual c ommod itie s can change rad ically ove� relatively 
short per iods of time , it is also n ot surpr ising to f i.nd tha t  
c ommod ity pric e s  exhib it wid e  f l uc tuations. 
A pure buffer stock is a mea ns f or reduc ing the magnitude 
of price fluc tua tions. In prac tice , th is means tha t  the International 
C ommod ity Organizati on (ICO) would trade on one or more of the 
exchanges in an a ttemp t to stab ili z e  the c ommod ity ' s  p r ice . More 
prec isely , a targe t  p r ice would b e  e stab l ished and the ICO's manager s 
would be in struc ted to trade so as to keep price within ( say) ±10 
percent o f  the targe t p r ice . 3 
A buffer sto ck is only intended to even out short-term, 
t ransito ry change s in p rices;  it i s  n ot intended to alter the 
average level o f  price from what i t  would 
·
b e  in the abs ence o f  a 
buffer s tock .  Something like this thought is o f t en expressed by 
s aying that the target price should follow the trend in price . 
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For  reasons that are  developed b elow , this rule can b e  treacherous . 
Although perhap s  a couns el o f  perfection , the app ropriate rule for 
a pure buf fer s to ck is to set the target price equal to long-run 
average cos t  o f  product ion , where average cos t is defined to include 
the compe titive return on capital e�p loyed . 4 
The argument behind this rule turns on the propo si tion 
that price in a competitive market t ends towards the long-run 
average cos t of e f ficient operations . This result is guaranteed 
by entry and exit . I f  price falls below long-run average cos t ,  
firms leave the market ,  supply is thereby reduced and price rises . 
Convers ely , if price rises above long-run average cos t , additional 
supply is at tracted and price is bid down . Given , then , that a 
pure buffer stock is not intended to alter the average level o f  
price , target price should b e  s e t  equal t o  long-run average cos t .  
Figure 3-1 describes the operations o f  a buffer stock 
for a s imple case . I t  is assumed that the demand curve (D) remains 
s t able while supply varies from s1 (bad crop years ) to s 2 ( good 
crop years ) . In the abs ence o f  a buffer s tock ,  price would b e  P1 
in b ad crop years and P 2 .in good crop years . Target price is P ,  
which i s  assumed t o  b e  equal t o  long-run average cos t , and the lower 
·and upper bounds to be defended are P '  and P" respectively . When 
supply is at s1 , the buffer stock would be required to make s ales 
equal to the difference between demand ( qd" )  and production ( qs ")  
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at price P " . When supply is at  s 2 , the buffer s t o ck would make 
sales equal to q� - qd . 
Figure 3-2  shows es timates o f  the effects on price that 
a buffer s t ock for copper would have had over the years 1955-19 7 3 .  
The es timates were computed us ing an econometric model o f  the 
. 5 indus try . The buf fer s tock would have supported the price o f  copper 
through the early 1960 ' s  and by selling , would have avo ided the 
high prices that prevailed during 1965-1970  and again in 1 9 7 3 . 
This example is almo s t  certainly characteristic . There is no real 
doub t  that a properly managed buffer s to ck could p rovide a high 
degree �f price s tability . This does no t mean , however , that a 
buffer s tock would necess arily s tab ilize price . Operation o f  a 
buffer s tock is . no t nearly so s imp le in practice as it is in broad 
concep t . 
The problems grow out o f  the difficulties o f  estab lishing 
a target price . :Long-run · verage cost is very hard to measure and 
there is no s impl e  rule that is guaranteed to produce a tolerab ly 
c.lose approximat ion to long-run average cos t . As a practical matter , 
the best  that could be hoped for is that the target p rice would b e  
negotiated on the basis  o f  long-run average cos t .  
The market would provide evidence o f  mis takes in s e t ting 
the target price . I f  the target price were set  b elow long-run 
average cost , production would dec line and , once the s t o ck was 
exhaus ted , the price could not be held . I f  pric.e were set  above 
long-run average cos t ,  supply would exceed demand and when the buffer 
s tock reached the l imit o f  its ab ility to  purchas e "excess supply , "  
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price would fall . If thes e signals are correctly perceived and 
acted upon , small errors in settin g  the target price are tolerab le .  
The danger lies in the possibility that market signals will b e  
mis interpreted or , even if  correctly interpreted , n o t  ac ted upon . 
A buffer s tock is likely to work best  when structural , 
technolo gical and cost  factors change s lowly . In that cas e ,  price 
will fluctuate about a cons tant value or  a s table trend . In 
agr icultural markets , for example , large price changes are usually 
due to year-to-year variations in supply . The buffer s tock would 
(basi cally )  buy in good crop years and sell in bad crop years .
6 
Problems aris e ,  however , when there are permanent shifts in the 
determinants o f  supply or damand . 
Suppos e ,  for example , that technolo gical improvement o f  
a sub s titute product results i n  a large decreas e i n  demand . The 
market adj us tments  that would o c cur in this s i tuation are as follows : 
1 .  Price will ini tially fall b elow long-run average cos t ;  
2 .  All suppliers will incur losses o n  a long-term b as is ; 
marginal supp liers may be forced out immediately ; there 
will b e  no new entry and exis t ing capacity will not b e  
replaced a s  it  wears out ; 
3 .  As supply fal.ls , price will rise toward long-run average 
cos t ;  
4 .  A new equilibrium i s  · eventually estab lished wi th price 
equal to long-run average cos t but with consump tion and 
supp ly reduced in accord with the lower l evel of demand . 
7 1  
I f  the dec line i n  demand were temporary , the buf fer s t o ck should 
purchase so  as to support price at the pre-set lower bound . However , 
given that the declh.e in demand is permanent , an attemp t to support  
the price will  s low down the adj us tment process and lead to an  ever 
increas ing s to ck .  Cons equently ·  a buffer s t o ck should not attempt 
to support price in the face o f  permanent decreas e in demand . 
Technolo gical change that reduces cos t  presents a s imilar 
problem .  Once the new technology has been introduced on a 
s i gnificant s cale , price will tend to fall t oward the average cos t 
with the new technology which is , by hypo thes is , less than the 
average cost  with the o l d .  · Suppliers who use the o l d  technology 
will lose money , and will con t inue to lose money until they leave 
the market or adopt the new techno lo gy . The buffer s tock should 
again , not attempt to  suppo rt the p rice . 
A large increas e in operating cos t ,  while demand remains 
cons tant , provides a third and probab ly mo re commonly encountered 
problem .  I n  this case , price will initially ris e ,  b u t  b y  l e s s  than 
the amount o f  the increas e . in average cos t ,
7 
so all firms will 
experience losses . The adj us tment to long-run equilibrium then 
pro ceeds as in the fir s t  example . In this s i tuation , i t  would 
clearly be wrong to at temp t t o  hold price down . It is more likely 
that managers of a buf fer s tock would be under pressure to recogni ze 
the full impact o f  the cost increas e in the target price . However , 
doing so would eliminate the incentive to reduce capacity . The 
correct respons e for the buffer · s to ck is to let price ris e as i t  
will - - i . e . , d o  nothing . 
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The common element o f  thes e . three examp les is the  need for  
a reduct ion in  capacity . I f  the ICO b lindly defended price bounds , 
i t  would thwart the required changes . The direct resul t  would b e  
the accumulation o f  a l arge s to ck .  This i s  clearly not s tab ilizat ioli 
in the s ens e o f  reduced fluctuations in price ; a pure buffer s to ck 
should act only to filter out the e f fects  o f  trans itory events and 
not to block permanent changes . Furthermore , i f  too high a price is 
s e t  and a large s to ck accumulated , the s olvency o f  the buffer s tock 
may be threatened . A s i gnificant part o f  any buffer s tock would 
very p robably be financed by loans , and the loans would be s ecured 
by �he material in the s tock . 8 If the s to ck becomes too large , 
l enders would no t only s top extending cred i t  but might also force 
sale o f  the s to ck to  cut their losses . The result would b e  the 
bankrup tcy of the buffer s tock and , perhaps , "panic s elling , "  
which would be des tabili zing . 9 
It is ques tionable whether an international organization 
could res ist  pressures to preserve the s tatus quo . Although this 
ques tion canno t b e  answered conclus ively , i t  is pos s ib le · to  l�s t  
condit ions which mus t b e  satisfied i f  a buffer s to ck i s  t o  b e  
limited to the task o f  smo o thing t emporary changes i n  price . Firs t ,  
the ICO should b e  required t o  operate s o  that the buffer s tock is 
liquidated from time to time . Second , the rules o f  the ICO mus t 
recognize  the pos s ibility o f  permanent changes in the market and 
indicate that  thes e are not to be res is ted . Third , the ICO mus t 
have a s t rong capabil ity for analy zing the market and must b e  under 
profes s ional , non-politicized management .  
COMMODITY CARTELS 
At the o ther extreme from a pure buffer s t ock is a 
commodity cartel . The memb ership o f  a cartel is limited to 
suppliers and its  central obj ective is to increas e it  memb ers ' 
p rofits  by increasing price above the competitive level . 
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A cartel is usually thought o f  a s  selling at  a s e t  price 
agreed on by its memb ers . OPEC , for example , has operated in this 
way . It is typi cal for a cartel t o  directly set price , but this 
is no t ne ces s ary . The cartel could retain an open market in the 
commodity and manipulate price via s upply . A buf fer s tock might 
then b e  us e ful . The target price would be the nego tiated car tel 
price and the cartel buf fer s tock would buy and sell to absorb the 
effects of short-run changes in demand and unanticipated changes 
in supply . 
Whether a cartel s ells at a s e t  price or us es a market 
to  establish price , it mus t have a means of limiting o utput . This 
canno t  b e  done on a decentral ized basis , as the members o f  the 
cartel , acting individually , will no t produce the amount cons i s t ent 
with the cartel price . To achieve cons istency between price and 
output , i t  is necessary for the memb ers o f  the cartel to agree on 
d . 
10 pro uction or export quo tas . 
The ancient ins ight that s uppliers can increase their 
p ro f i t  by colluding to  rais e price is valid and important . This 
is the fact that leads to the formation of cartels and it is  the 
force that makes the problems of nego tiating price and market shares 
solvable . For example , while a low cos t producer will prefer a 
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lower price than wil l  a high c o s t  pro ducer , there is a compromise 
price which leaves both producers with more profit than they would 
ob tain wi thout agreement . The fac t that " cooperation pays " is , 
however ,  only one s ide o f  the economics of cartels . The o ther s ide 
is the fact that success in raising price sets up forces that work 
agains t continued success . 
In the short-run , a car tel price above the competitive 
level provides each member with an incentive to  " cheat . "  Given 
that the cartel price is above marginal cos t , additional sales 
will increas e the suppliers ' p ro f i t , and increas ed sales can b e  
attracted b y  o f fering a price b elow the cartel price . "Cheating" 
on price will be dis covered eventually , but , until dis covered , it 
can be  pro fitable . Particularly in periods when all suppliers are 
operating at much less than capacity , the temptation to cheat can 
be very nearly irres istible . Widespread "chiseling" creates an 
untenab le situat ion . The results are a decline in s ales by those  
who adhere to the  agreement . They are typically left  worse o f f  
than they would b e  without an agreement , and the agreement accordingly 
collapses . 
The upsho t o f  these comments is that an e f fective cartel 
requires a mechanism for policing the agreement . The antitrus t laws 
o f  foreign nations tend to be much more lenient than thos e  o f  the 
u . s . ,
11  
so  a nat ional cartel agreement mi ght b e  enforceable  through 
the courts . But , apart from the tendency towards more stringent 
antitrus t laws , this means is generally no t availab l e  to international 
cartels . 
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The p robl em o f  policing is s omet imes solved -- o r , 
amelio rated -- by forming a central sales agency . That is , all 
memb ers of the cartel may agree to make all of their s ales to the 
central agency , which then res ells to consumers on b ehalf of cartel 
members . Another means that has b een us ed in the pas t is poo ling . 
Under a pooling s cheme , memb ers o f  the cartel pay in to the car tel 
organization all o f  their revenues or profits and then , at regular 
intervals , receive b ack a predetermined share of to tal revenues or 
profits . Under such a s cheme , memb ers o f  the car tel obvious ly have 
an incentive to hide revenues and /or profits but , to the extent 
that this can be prevented , the incentive to " chisel" on p rice is 
removed .  
The only o ther method o f  policing an agreement is 
retaliation . In particular , if one memb er o f  the cartel  is 
dis covered cutting price , the o ther memb ers may agree to no t only 
match the cut but cut price even further so as to punish the cheater . 
The knowledge , perhaps based on past demons trations , that cheating 
will provoke such a respons e may deter price cutting . 
His torically , the methods that have been , described for 
policing cartel agreements have no t been very success ful .
12  
However , 
it is sugges t ed below that commodity agreements may have means o f  
policing a n  agreement that a r e  more effective than those  availab le 
to a cartel .  
In the long-run , a price set  above the competitive level 
works to defeat a cartel by attrac ting entry . There are cas es in 
which entry is virtually impos s ible . Or the average cos ts o f  
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potential entrants may b e  above tho s e  o f  cartel entrants , in which 
cas e entry. can be deterred by s etting a cartel price j us t  below 
potential entrants' average cos t . 1 3 However ,  i t  is no t safe to 
assume that either of thes e s i tuations is typical of the commodity 
indus tries and entry would then b e  a crucial problem .  The additional 
supply from new entrants would force price down . The cartel might 
not collapse  as an organization , but with significant new entry it 
b ecomes impos s ible to sus tain a p rice above the competitive leve1 . 14 
In short , at leas t in many cas es , an effective cartel requires a 
means o f  limiting entry . 
Some pas t agreements have attemp ted to contain the problem 
of entry by es tablishing a " free zone ; "  i . e . , geo graphic markets in 
which the market is le ft to determine price and s upply . The total 
output o f  new entrants and "overshipments " o f  members o f  the 
agreement are sold in the free zone . The result is a free zone 
price that is b elow the agreement ' s  price . This creates a s trong 
incentive for purchasers in the free zone to res ell in the 
" regulated zone , "  and a variety of imaginative procedures can b e  
devised f o r  doing so . 
Valid patents can , o f  course , be a limitation on entry 
and various sorts o f  restrictive practices can sometimes make entry 
more difficult . 15 But cartels do not have available to them goo d  
means o f  limiting entry , and entry i n  various forms is a common 
reason for the failure of cartels . I t  is again , argued in a la�er 
chap ter that a sys tem of commodity agreements might be able to do 
better in this respect than cartels . 
7 7  
RESTRICTIVE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
The commodity agreements envis ioned by the IP are neither 
pure buffer s to cks nor cartels , but have elements of both .  I t  is 
useful to label such arrangements "res trictive commo dity agr e ements . " 
Specifically , a restrictive commodity agreement differs from a p ure 
buffer stock in that it  involves the use of controls on production 
and exports . It differs from a commodity cartel in that buyers are 
represented on the IGO and , at least o stensibly , the IGO will not 
attempt to limit entry . The ques tion taken up here is : to what 
extent will a res trictive commodity agreement approximate the 
b ehavior of a cartel . 
Pricing is clearly a key topic . There is no ques tion 
but that commodity agreements provide a means o f  setting price . 
The only issue is whether the price set  would be s ignificantly 
above the competitive level . 
There are three mechanisms which might b e  used to es tablish 
a target price . Firs t ,  the commodity agreement could specify that 
target price is to equal long-run average cost and delegate the 
task . o f  estimating long-run average cost  to the s taff of the IGO . 
Given the difficulty o f  making precise  and defens ible estimates o f  
cos t , and the importance o f  target price to both buyers and s ellers , 
it is unlikely that ':his approach would b e  acceptable . 
The second possib ility is for the memb ers o f  the IGO to 
agree on a s imple "automatic" rule . The commodity agreements favored 
by the LDCs would us e one o f  two rules : (1) " indexation" ; or 
(2)  a moving average of  pas t  prices . 16 Under the firs t o f  thes e  
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methods , the target price would be  set  equal to a b a s e  price times 
an index of the prices paid by the LDCs for imports . 17 Changes in 
commodity prices would then parallel changes in import prices but 
there would be no intelligible relationship between the target 
price and either the cartel price or  the competitive price . 
Furthermore , buffer s tock operations conducted in terms o f  such 
an indexed target price would no t be r elated to cycles in the 
market and hence would not s tab ilize commodity prices . 
While the use o f  a moving average rule may appear to b e  
innocuous , it  could eas ily produce a target price that is above · the 
long-run competitive equilibrium .  This will occur if  the s tocks 
acquired in defending the lower bound on price are insufficient to 
defend the upper bound . The s tock will almost  certainly b e  
insufficient if  export controls , rather than purchas es , are used 
to support price  in s lack periods . Even i f  export controls are 
not us ed , the stock will be  insufficient if  "boom" perio ds are 
more frequent and/or  more extreme than slack periods , which is no t 
unlikely . 
The final alternative is periodic renego tiation of the 
target price . The rules o f  the ICO could s tate that the nego tiations 
are· to be on the basis of long-run average cos t . However , given 
the difficulties in measurement , this rule would not be very 
restrictive . Target price would bas ically b e  determined by the 
bargaining power and positions of buyers and s ellers . The buyers ' 
tnteres ts  would lead them to seek a target price equal to long-run 
average cos t . It is no t so c lear wha t  p o s i t ion s ellers would adopt . 
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They might reco gniz e  that a high price could endanger the exis tence 
of the ICO and hence agree to a target price equal to long-run 
average cos t . However ,  suppliers might well b e  led by 
considerations of short-run gain to s eek a price above long-run 
average cos t . If they do , the result is likely to be a target 
price greater than long-run average cos t but less than the price 
sought by s ellers . 
None o f  the three availab le alternatives would b e  
guaranteed to yield a target price near long-run average cos t .  
While indexation i s  clearly unsatis factory , whatever approach is 
chos en it would ultimately be necessary to rely on the skill o f  
the buffer s tock managers and the moderation o f  suppliers . These 
provide at best weak insurance , and one central fact about 
commodity agreements is that they provide a means for s e tting 
price above the competitive l evel . Furthermore , one o f  the stated 
obj ec tives of the IPs commodity agreements is to increas e commodity 
prices . 
A price above the competitive level canno t b e  sustained 
without limitations on supply . Res trictive commodity agreements 
provide the necessary means -- export quo tas and production controls . 
Thes e are b latantly restrictive practices . However ,  this fac� is 
obs cured by the exis t enc ,, of o ther rationales for "supply management . "  
Firs t ,  it i s  argued that production controls and export quotas should 
be available as "standby measures " to be used when there is a 
catas trophic decline in demand . The thought is that the use o f  
export quo tas o r  production controls would avoid the very large 
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expenditures required to s upport the lower bound on p rice . While 
this is eorrect , the argument does no t s tand up to close  inspection . 
If export quotas are used , and suppliers are required to accumulate 
s to cks , the ICO becomes a mechanism for coordinating nationally 
held s tocks . Costs are no t avoided but only shifted from the buffer 
stock to suppliers . 18 I f  production controls are used , and 
suppliers are no t required to accumulate stocks , it is very unlikely 
that the buf fer stock will be able to defend the upper bound on 
price . The use o f  production controls , then , runs squarely counter 
to the goal of reducing period-to-period variations in price . 
A second argument for production controls turns on the 
length of time required to adj us t supply . The variable cost of  
producing some agricultural commodities is very low . For example , 
once they are planted , cocoa trees will continue to produce for 
many years with little or no expenditures required . Furthermore , 
these  commodities are o f  ten grown by small landowners who cannot 
readily shift to other crops o r  occupations . In these  circums tances , 
price can remain very low for s everal years before producers leave 
the market . 19 
The argument for production controls associated with 
thes e  circums tances is s imply that a painful adj us tment process 
should b e  speeded up by direct intervention . This argument might 
have cons iderab le force if there were no alternative to p roduction 
controls , but in fact , there is an alternative . The s traightforward 
cure is to allocate inves tment funds to divers ification -- i . e . , a 
changeover to new crops and/or  the creation o f  new indus tries . ·  
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Furthermore , the use of  export quotas or  produc tion controls tends 
to lock an indus try into an uneconomical pattern . Production by 
s uppliers with high marginal cos t  should b e  cut back more than producers 
with low marginal costs , and low cost suppliers should be allowed 
to enter . 2
0 
However ,  high cos t producers would oppose  these rules 
and it  is unlikely that they could be followed by an international 
organization . I f  they are not , the result is excess ively high 
cos t and lower p.rofit for the suppliers as a group . 
There are two other aspects o f  "supply management " that 
should be  noted . Firs t ,  determination o f  production or export 
quotas i . e . , market shares -- would be  a devis ive issue . Market 
shares would probab ly be based on pas t shares . This can b e  
acceptable i n  a s tatic situation , b u t  situations i n  the commodities 
markets are rarely s tatic and altered circums tances call for 
painful adj us tments . In particular , low cost producers , especially 
those  with unexploited resources , can be expected to claim an 
increas ing share of the market . 21 If demand is not growing with 
sufficient rapidity -- and demand for mos t  commodities is growing 
rather slowly -- this can require other producers �o reduce output . 
At a minimum , other producers mus t "move over , "  which means 
accepting a relatively s low rate of growth in their output . Second , 
as a practical mat t er supply restrictions probably could not be limited to 
s tandby us e .  Given that price i s  increased above long-run average 
cos t ,  there will be  chronic excess supply and hence a persis tent 
us e for supply management . In this s ens e ,  the p rice increase will 
create the appearance of a depress ed market and the �as e  for 
limiting the stock by production controls . 
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Export quotas and produc tion controls have no role to 
play if the obj ective of a buffer s tock is to reduce p eriod-to-perio d  
variations in pric e .  They clearly d o  have a role t o  play i f  the 
obj ective is a higher price . A price in excess o f  average cost  can 
not b e  sustained unles s s upply is limited . It is basically for 
that reason that export quotas and , especially , production controls 
are important . 
The conclus ion o f  the discuss ion t o  this point is that 
commodi ty agreements along the lines of those  specified in the IP 
have the crucial features of commodity cartels . In particular , 
res trictive commodity agreements contain the means for increas ing 
price above the competitive level and l imiting supply to the level 
cons is tent with the increased price . 
I f  price is increased above the competitive level , the 
policing problems ident ified in the preceding section arise . The 
commodity agreements favored by the LDCs would rely on buyers to 
solve the short-run policing problem .  I n  particular , buyers would 
agree not to pay less than the agreed price and not to accep t any 
shipments b ut thos e  certified by the IGO as within the s uppliers 
quota . The IP 's commodity agreements do no t provide any direct 
. means for limiting entry but the certificate sys tem ,  together with 
the power of buyers , might b e  used to s olve the problem .  This 
possibility and the operation of a certificate sys tem ,  are dis cuss e� 
further in Chap ter 6 .  
The final issue that warrants dis cuss ion is the financing 
of buffer stocks . The LDCs sugge s t  that the costs of the buffer 
stock b e  shared by buyers and s ellers .
22  
It is argued that buyer 
contributions are warranted becaus e buyers also benefit by 
increased price s tab ility , which as was noted in Chapter 2 , is 
possible . 
The potential importance o f  f inancing arrangements can 
mos t  easily be grasped by assuming : ( 1) that target price is set  
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above the competitive level ; ( 2 ) export quotas and production c ontrols 
are not used ; and ( 3) buyers pay the entire cos t of the buffer stock .  
I n  this s e t  o f  circums tances s uppliers will produce far more than 
the market will absorb at the target price and the "excess production" 
will be  taken off the market by the buffer s tock at the buyers ' 
expense .  Essentially the same result can o ccur under less extreme 
assumptions . Supp os e ,  for example , that target price is s e t  at 
two and a half times cos t and that buyers pay one half the cost o f  
the buffer s tock . Suppliers could , then , earn a profit  equal to 
half of their cost by s elling excess p roduction t o  the buffer stock .  
O f  cours e ,  i t  would b e  necessary t o  limit this proces s , and the 
"obvious " way of doing so is by impos ing production controls . 
The situation j us t  des cribed is es s entially that o f  
domestic agricultural programs ; i . e . , price supports ( target price) , 
government purchases (buf fer s tock) and acreage allo tments (production 
controls ) . While tf.,� analogy may be s tartling , it  is appropriate . 
Some , including the leaders o f  some indus triali zed nations , have 
unders tood commodity agreements in precis ely thes e terms . 
CONCLUS IONS 
This chapter has pointed out s everal requirements that 
mus t be satis fied by a pure buffer stock .  These  are a s  follows : 
1 .  A buffer s tock is unsuitable for commodities in which 
there is no open market ;  
2 . The s tock should be self liquidating in the s ense 
that purchases and sales balance over the cycle 
in demand ; 
3 .  Target price mus t approximate long-run average cos t ;  
4 .  The buffer s tock mus t have the ab ility t o  recogniz e  
basic changes i n  the market and mus t not a c t  t o  
thwart them; this would require a pro fessional , 
non-politicized management ;  
5 .  Export quotas and production controls should not be 
used , even on a s tandby basis . 
6 .  There mus t be  limits on the amount o f  b uyer� 
contributions to the buffer s tock . 
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I f  these  res trictions are satis fied , the buffer s tock would be 
limited to the task o f  reducing period- to-period variations in price . 
A res trictive commodity · agreement -- i . e . , an agreement 
designed to increase price -- would not require a buffer s tock . It 
would require : 
1 .  A mechanism for s e t t ing pr�ce ; 
2 . A means -- esp . export ·quo tas and/or productions controls --
for l imiting supply ; and 
3 .  Means for policing the agreement . 
The first two o f  these requirements are easily met .  The crucial 
problem would be  that of policing the agreement and , especially , 
o f  limiting entry . 
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Thes e guidelines provide working definitions o f  a pure 
buffer s tock and a res trictive commodity agreement . As such , they 
cas t in terms o f  specific mechanisms the preceding chapter ' s  
distinction between alternative roles o f  commodity agreements 
economic development vs . reduction in price fluctuations . A pure 
buffer stock is designed only to reduce period-to-period variations 
in price . Res trictive provis ions -- especially production controls 
and export  quotas -- are not requi�ed for price s tabilization in 
this s ens e .  They serve , inst ead , as a means of increasing prices 
and thereby trans ferring income from the indus trialized nations to 
the LDCs . 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
FOOTNOTES T O  CHAPTER 3 
Wheat , and many o ther agricul tural commodities , for example , 
are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (as well as 
o ther exchanges ) and s everal metals are traded on the London 
Metal Exchange and the New York Commodity Exchange . Thes e 
marke t s  are open to consumers , suppliers , brokers and , via 
brokers , anyone els e .  O ther commodities -- bauxite , for 
example -- are sold  at prices announced by producers or  at 
prices nego tiated by buyers and s e llers . Appendix 4-3 
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(p . 122 ) lis t s  organized markets in s everal maj or· commodities . 
Price is determined by a type o f  auction . Orders to buy or 
sell usually mus t  he placed with authorized·  traders . While 
the details of the process vary from one exchange to  ano ther , 
it is typical for traders to gather in a "pit"  (really a 
platform) in which the commodity is traded and shout out the 
price at which they are currently willing to buy or  sell . I f  
demand exceeds supp ly , it  quickly becomes apparent that buyers 
mus t  increase their b ids . Convers ely , i f  s upply exceeds demand , 
bids and c los ing prices fal l .  
Alternatively,  a quant ity rule , such a s  the ratio o f  s tocks to  
consump tion , could b e  us ed . The ICO would b e  ins truc ted t o  
purchas e when the s t ock to consump t ion ratio r o s e  s ome frac t ion 
above a specifiec level and to sell  when the ratio was s ome 
.. 
4 . 
5 .  
fraction below target . However ,  the connection b e tween the 
s to ck to  consump tion ratio is complicated and adequate  data 
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on s t o cks is o ften unavailable . For these reasons , a quantity 
rule would typically not be feasible . 
That is , the return that the capi tal employed coul d  ob tain in 
·:its  mo st  profi table alternative use . Long-run average cos t also 
includes any "rent s "  obtained by sup erior factors o f  production . 
For examp l e , even i f  a superior block o f  land is owned outright , 
a rent equal to what it could command on the market would b e  
attrib uted to i t . 
Both �he deflated price o f  copper and th e es t imated price with 
a buffer s to ck were taken from U . S .  Department of the Treasury , .  
O f f ice o f  Raw Materials and Oceans Policy . A Review o f  Pas t 
and Prospect ive Commodity Policy for Selected Non-Fuel Minerals , 
Washington , February , 1 9 7 6 , p . 74 .  The results shown assume 
that the init ial s tock is zero and that purchas es and sales 
are made s o  as to  maintain price within �7 . 5 percent of the 
five-year lagged moving average price . 
6 .  · Even in this cas e ,  s ales can be a problem .  Cons iderations o f  
short run pro f i t  give sellers a n  incentive to  oppose .  s ales even 
in p eriods of s t rong demand . Unless sales are made at s uch 
t imes , the amount held by the s t o ck will increase over t ime and 
the buffer s tock will cease to p lay a stabilizing rol e .  
7 .  
8 .  
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In  the short run , suppliers will. push production to the point 
where marginal (or  incremental) cost is equal t o  price . If  
the price paid for inputs increases , then so  does marginal 
cos t .  This implies that at the initial price , firms will b e  
willing to supply less than before c o s t  increased . Price 
consequently rises . But the increase in price leads to a 
decrease in the quantity purchas ed . Suppliers are then left 
with excess capacity which is , loos ely speaking , why the 
initial price increase is less than the increase in average 
cos t . 
This means all o f  the s tock.  For example , a bank o r  group of  
b anks might loan the buffer s tock only two-thirds of  the value 
of the s tock , but the loan would be s ecured by all of the 
material purchased . 
9 . · The exis tence o f  a large s to ck tends to depress the market , 
and hence creates the need for continued purchases . ·  The 
process is in this respect self-feeding .  
10 . Alternatively , members o f  the cartel can b e  assigned particular 
geographic markets . Then , given that each member o f  the cartel 
agrees not to s ell  outside its assigned market , and that the 
characteris tics of demand do not vary s ignificantly among 
markets , memb ers o f  the cartel do not have an incentive to 
produce more than is consistent with the es tab lished price . 
.1 . 
Under such a s cheme , each member o f  the cartel is in effect 
assigned a regional monopoly . 
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Any agreement among U . S .  f i rms to fix p r i c e  o r  divide markets 
within the U . S .  is a � � violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act . The Webb-Pomerene Act ,  however , permits U . S .  
firms , subj ect t o  certain limitations , t o  participate in export 
cartels . Mo s t  o ther developed nations follow a s imilar 
practice . 
l2 . Some aspects o f  the hist_orical record o f  cartels are briefly 
reviewed in ch . 5 .  
L3 . 
14 . 
This is the no tion o f  limit pricing sugges ted by Joe Bain . 
See Joe S .  Bain , "A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly , "  
American Economic Review 39 ( 19 4 9 ) : 448-46 4 .  
This does not necesarily imply that i t  would b e  unprofitable  
for exis ting suppliers to organize a cartel  and set  a high 
price . Entry typically requires at leas t two o r  three years 
and may take a decade or more . It can b e  profitable  for 
suppliers to set a high price and then let that price be 
eroded by ent ry . For example , s ee R. P indyck , "Gains to 
Pro ducers from Cartelization of Exhaus tible Resources , "  
Massachus etts  Ins titute o { Technology , Energy Laboratory 
World Oil Proj ect , Working Paper MITEL 76-012WP. (May , 1976) . 
15 . 
16 . 
17 . 
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Res trictive practices -- tie- in sales , reciprocity , requirements 
selling , etc . -- typically play a prominent role in ant itrus t 
cases . However ,  it is far from clear that us e o f  such practices 
can effectively exclude from any market a firm who is willing 
to  sell an equivalent produc t for less than the price charged 
by exis ting s uppliers . 
See U . N .  Conference on Trade and Development , Trade and 
Development Board , "An Integrated Pro gramme for Commodities , "  
TB/B /C . 1 / 194 (Oct . , 19 7 5 ) , pp . 6-8 . 
The underlying ar gument , whi ch was mentioned in ch . 1 
(p . 4 ) is that the terms o f  trade invariab ly shift agains t 
commodities . A much more s�nsible cho ice is an index o f  the 
cost  of produc tion . Indexation would then merely refer to a 
formula for computing a target price equal to long-run average 
cos t . This procedure would , however , encounter the obj ec tions 
pointed out above -- esp . , the difficulty of es t imat ing cos t .  
18 . And if buyers contribute to the buffer s tock ,  the suppliers 
mus t lose bv this shi f t . 
1 9 . See  J. Rowe , Primary Commodities in Internat ional Trade 
(Cambridge University Pres s , 1 9 6 5 ) , pp . 189-19 3 .  
20 . 
2 1 .  
2 2 .  
9 1  
For a case i n  which this issue appears , see I .  Kravis, "International 
Commodity Agreements to Promo te _ Aid and Efficiency : The Case of .. 
Coffee, ". Canadian Journal o f  Economics 1 (19 68 ) :  
295-317 . 
For some examples , s ee G .  Gwyer , "Three Commodity Agreements : 
The Experience o f  Eas t Africa , "  Economi c  Development and 
Cultural Change 22 ( 1 9 7 2 ) : 465-476 . 
Several dif ferent formulas are s ugges ted , but under each the 
buyers' contribution would be at  leas t one- third of the to tal . 
See U . N .  Conference on Trade and Development , Trade and 
Development Board , ' 'An Integrated Programme for Commodities 
TB/B/ C . 1/ 19 6 ( O ct . , 1 9 7 5 ) , pp . 7-10 . 
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CHAPTER 4 
PURE BUFFER STOCK ARRANGEMENTS 
Extreme fluctuations in price are commonly regarded as 
at leas t a nuisance . Accordingly , there would be little obj ection 
to an o rganization that was firmly confined to reducing period-to­
period variat ions in price . I f  it is assumed that a pure buffer 
s tock would be  limited to  this task , the maj or ques tion is whether 
the b enefits of reducing variations in price exceed the costs o f  
the operation . The ambiguous policy that the U . S .  has adopted adds 
spice to this is sue . The U . S .  has agreed to consider commodity 
agreements ,  including buffer s to cks on a case by cas e basis , which 
raises the ques tion : In what cas es is  a buffer s tock economically 
warranted ? 
The firs t two sec tions o f  this chapter take up success ively 
the cos ts and the benefits of pure buffer s tocks . The final . section 
presents a tentative identification of the commodities which are the 
mos t  promis ing candidates for buffer s tocks . 
COSTS OF BUFFER STOCKS 
Discussions of commodity agreements often s eem to suppose 
that the cap ital cos t s  o f  es tablishing a b uffer s tock would b e  
modes t .  This assump tion probab ly reflects the fac t that the tin 
9 3  
buffer s t ock -- which i s  the only buffer stock t o  operate i n  the 
pos t-war years -- is small and relatively inexpensive . But the tin 
buffer s tock has bee: . too small to have a marked e f fect on the 
price of tin . 1  In many cas es , at leas t ,  a relatively large buffer 
s tock will b e  required to obtain a significant degree o f  price 
s tability . For example , the maximum size  o f  the copper s tock for 
the s cenario behind Figure 3-2 was 4 . 8  million tons , which would 
have had an acquis ition cos t of roughly $5  billion . 2 
The size  o f  the buffer stock that an IGO mus t be  
p repared to acquire obvious ly depends on  the magnitude o f  shi fts 
in supply and demand and the· degree o f  price s t ability that is 
des ired . To take a simple cas e ,  suppose that demand remains cons tant 
while supply varies [cf . . Figure 3-1 , p .  6 7 ] .  Deno te base (or average) 
production by q and the amount that the buffer s tock mus t acquire 
in a good crop year by S .  Let s = S/q b e  the buffer s to ck ' s  
purchases as a fraction o f  bas e  production and let f b e  the fraction · 
by which price is permitted to decline from the target price . 
Assuming that the supply and demand curves are s traight lines , it  
is shown in Appendix 4-1  that: 
s = ( � )  d - (ns -n d) f  t ( 4-1) 
where a is the intercept of the supply curve , d is the fraction by 
which the supply curve shifts out in good crop years and ns and nd 
are , respectively , the elas ticities o f  s upply and demand . For values 
characteri s t i c  o f  the c o f fee indus try : 
s . 6 7*d - . 6 0*f . ( 4-2) 
Figure 4-1 is the graph o f  this relationship for d = . 1 ,  d = . 2 
and d = • 3 .  I f  supply shifts out by 10 percent (d = . 1) in good 
crop years , the buffer s tock mus t purchas e only 0 . 7  percent o f  
bas e production t o  hold price 1 0  percent below the target price . 
But for d = 0 . 2 ,  supporting price at a value 10 percent below the 
target price would require acquis ition of 7 . 4  percent of bas e  
product ion . In short , the size  o f  a buffer s tock required to 
maintain a given degree of price s tability is very s ensitive to 
the magnitude of variation in supply . 
Table 4-1 presents the results o f  similar computations 
for 15 collllllodities . I t  was as sumed in making these computations 
that supply or , for rubber and the metals , demand , varies by : 10 
percent , and that the buf fer s tock trades to keep price within 
+ . 
-10 percent o f  a target level . Other values that entered the 
computation appear in the right hand columns of the table . The 
formula employed is explained in Appendix 4-1 . I t  should be  
emphas ized that the firs t column gives estimates o f  the costs of  
purchas es in a s ingle year , for a given increas e in supply or  
9 4  
decrease in demand . If two or three good crop years , for example , 
o ccurred in succes s ion , the capital cost  o f  the s t ock required to 
support the price would be  double or  triple the values shown . 
The estimated maximum capital costs range from a low o f  
about $ 7  million (s isal ) to a high o f  $ 5  billion ( copper) . The s um 
o f  the maximum estimated initial outlays shown in Table  4-1 is 
· $ 15 . 7  b illion or , excluding copp e r , $ 10 . 7  b illion . The s e  figures 
compare with a total flow of aid to the LDCs in 1 9 7 2  o f  $ 1 1 . 8  billion 
( c f . Table 5-3 , b elow , p . 134 ) . 
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S i s a l  
Rubb e r  3_/ 
C opp e r  4 /  
T in �_/ -
Ir on Or e 21 
B a uxite 21 
'!:__/ 
2 4 . 8 
1 8 . 9 
3 9 2 . 6 
'!:__/ 
'!:__/ 
1 1 0 9 . 6 
7 2 5 . 3 
'!:__/ 
7 .  2 
1 2 3 . 1 
5 , 0 0 0  
·80 0 
2 6 2 . 7 
7 6 . 2 
T able 4-1  
Estimated Maximum Capital Costs  of Buff er S tocksi!:-/ 
M aximuin Stock 1 · A s s umptions 
as a Pe r c ent of E la s ti c ity E la s tic ity B a s e  
B a s e  Pr o d u ction o f  S upp ly o f  D emand P r oduction 
y 
0 .  7 
2 . 2 
2 . 6 
1 2 / 
2; 
5 . 4  
4 . 0 
y 
4 . 0 
8 .  5 
8 .  5 
8 . 0 
• 3 4  
• 3 3  
• 3 1  
• 2 :.,  
• 7 1  
. 7 1  
, 2 0 
. 2 2 
• 3 0  
• 1 5  
. 1 5  
• 1 5 
. 2 0 
- . 32 
- . 2 7  
- .  1 6 
- . 2 4  
- . 2 7  
- . 2 0  
- .  0 6  
- .  1 6  
- .  5 0 
- . 3 0  
- .  40  
- .  1 0  
- .  02 
3 , 48 8 , 0 Q.O 1. t .  
6 6 ,  3 1 9 , 0 0 0  b a g s  
1 ,  2 44 , .0 0 0  m. t .  
9 ,  7 4 2 , 0 0 0  m , t .  
1 1 ,  3 2 4 ,  0 0.0 m .  t .  
3 2 1 .  3 m illi on m ,  t .  
1 8 7 .  2 milli on m .  t .  
7 1 .  4 mi l lion m . t .  
• 7 2 2  mi lli on m, t .  
• 3 8 5  million m .  t .  
2 ,  6 2 8 .  4 milli on k .  g . 
2 54 .  6 mill i on m. t . 
6 8 ,  9 0  milli on m . .  t .  
S o ur c e s : S e e  A ppendix 4 - 1 
P r i c e  
$ 8 2 1 .  4 3  / 1 . t .  
$ 5 3 . 5 0 /b a g  
$ 6 9 0 . 1 8 /m .  t .  
$ 1 , 5 5 0 .  0 0  /m. t .  
$ 5 2 6 .  1 0 / m ,  t .  
$ 7 3 ,  2 1 /m .  t .  
$ 1 0 9 .  7 7  / m .  t . 
$ 2  5 3 . 96 / m .  t .  
$ 3 2 6 . 3 /m .  t . 
$4 6 6 .  0 0 /m. t .  
$0 .  5 5 /k .  g .  
1 2 . 1 4 /rri . t .  
1 3 .  8 2 /m . t .  
1./ 
2 /  
31 
"{_1 
The e s timate i s of the maximum a d d ition to the s t o ck in a s ing l e  y e a r  un de r c e r tain a s s umpti on s (cf.  
. The e s tim at e d  v a lu e s would in c r e a s e if  the a s s um e d  c ond iti ons p e r s i s t e d  for mor e than one y e a r . 
A pp endix 4-1 ) . 
A 1 0 % in c r e a s e  in s upply would not thr e aten a p r i c e  floor 1 0 % b e l o w  the ba s e pr i c e ,  
C omp uted f o r  "J. 1 0 % var iati on in d em and r athe r than s upply .  
U . S .  D epartment o f  the T r e a s ur y ,  O ffi c e  o f  Raw Mat e r ia l s  and O c eans Policy, ££• cit. 
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less -- roughly $ 1  million p e r  year . 5 Comparable estimates for 
o ther comrr�dities are no t available . It is possib l e , however ,  to 
form an impress ion of  how large these costs are likely to be . 
The adminis trative costs  o f  a buf fer s tock operation wo uld 
be small in relation to o ther cos t  components and to net benefits ,
6 
and it can b e  assumed tha
.
t the average trad ing costs  o f  a well 
managed pure buffer s tock would be  zero .
7 
Warehous ing cos t s  would 
also be small for the metals and mos t  agricultural commodities , 
although storage cos ts  wo uld be appreciab l e  for cocoa , c o f fee , 
s ugar and tea .  
This leaves cap ital costs , about whi ch more can b e  s aid . 
The buffer s tock would not b e  at its maximum value at all times . 
Suppose that there is a · re gular and recurring cycle o f  good , average 
and bad years . The s to ck would be built up dur ing the cours e o f  
the goo d  year , held during the average year and s o l d  during the bad 
year . The average value o f  the s t o ck would then be two- thirds o f  
the maximum value . I f  good and bad years alternated , the average 
value of the s tock would be  half the maximum value • 
The commodity markets  do no t follow either o f  these s imple 
patterns . However ,  the upper and lower price b ounds for a price 
buf fer s to ck would be  chos en s o  that purchases and s ales balance out . 
Given that changes in demand and supply o ccur fairly o f t en ,  this 
sugges ts  that the buffer s t o ck would be buying , holding and s elling 
with roughly equal frequency . I f  s o , the average value of the 
buffer s t o ck would be  about one-half to two-thirds o f  the maximum 
value o 
100 
I t  is reasonab le to assume that the relevant interes t 
rate for a pure buffer s tock would be in the range 9-15 percent . 
Then , given that the average amount held is one-half to two-thirds 
of the maximum, the annual average interes t cos t would be 6-10 percent 
of the maximum value of the buffer stock . 9  The total cos t , 
including admi_nis trat ive and s torage cos ts , would be a bit  larger . 
This concludes the discuss ion o f  buffer stock costs . 
- The next task is to form an impress ion o f  the benefits t o  reducing 
price fluctuations . 
BENEFITS OF PURE BUFFER STOCKS 
The benefits that might flow from a reduction in period-
to-period variations in prices were discussed in Chapter 2 .  Mos t  
o f  the arguments  used t o  j ustify buffer s tocks were found t o  b e  
insubstantial . The one solid argument identified had to do with 
the effects o f  price ins tability on the gains to buyers and sellers 
from exchange . 
This section pres ents numerical examples o f  the effects 
of price s tab ilization on suppliers ' pro fit  and consumers' surplus . 
The computations employ resul ts obtained by Maissel . The formulas 
us ed , along with the assumptions made , are p res ented in Appendix 
4-2 . 
I t  is useful , before s tating the results , to sketch the 
nature of the computations . Figure 4-2 describes the firs t case to 
be considered . The demand curve (D) _is as sumed to remain s table , 
while supply varies between s1 (b_ad crop years ) and s2 ( good crop 
pr ice 
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F igure 4-2 
Pr ic e Stab ilizati on When Only Supply Var ie s  
s 1 
,, _ 
- I -
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I I I 
q l q q2 
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D 
quantity 
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years ) . In the abs ence o f  a buffer s tock ,  price would be P
1 
in bad 
crop years and :2 
in good crop years . The buffer s t o ck would trade 
so  as to maintain price at P , which is the average of P
1 
and P
2
• 
In bad crop years , the buffer stock would s ell to hold price at 
P .  Consumption would remain a t  q ,  production would b e  q1 and buffer 
stock sales would be q-q1 . When supply is at s2
, production would 
be q
2 
and the buffer s tock would purchas e q
2
-q so as to maintain 
price at P . 
Figure 4-3 shows the effect o f  price s tabilization on 
suppliers . Suppliers ' revenue is price times quantity and the 
total cost  of producing any output q is equal to the area under · the 
supply curve to q .  I t  can b e  s een , then , that b ecaus e o f  the buffer 
s tock sales , suppliers lose profits equal in magnitude to the cross-
hatched area s
1
. In periods when supply is s
2
, the buffer stock 
would buy to support price at P ,  which would increase suppliers ' 
pro fit by an amount equal to the area s 2 . The total gain to suppliers 
from price s t abilization is Gs s 2 
- s
1
. It can be s een by 
superimposing the graph on the right o f  Figure 4-3 on the graph on 
the left that s
2 
is larger than s 1 , so suppliers gain by price 
s tabilization when demand is s tab le and supply varies . 
Figure 4-4 shows the e f fects o f  price s tabilization on 
consumers . For the reasons brought out earlier [note  24 ,  p .  62 ] ,  
the appropriate measures o f  gains and losses to  buyers is no t their 
exp enditure but consumers ' surplus . Consumers ' s urplus is defined 
as the total value placed on the quantity .consumed , which is 
measured by the area under the demand _curve , 10 less expenditure . 
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For example , looking at the right panel of  Figure 4-4 , when price 
is P2 quantity q2 is  purchased and expenditure is equal to the 
area of the rectangle with height P2 and base q2 . Consumers ' 
surplus is then the area o f  the triangle lying above the l ine 
from P2 to the demand curve . Increas ing price to P then reduces 
consumers ' surplus by an amount equal to the area lab eled c2 . 
S imilarly , when the buf fer s tock acts to hold price down to P , 
consumers gain an amount equal to the area c1 . The net gain to 
consumers is G c c1 - c2 • I t  is clear from the figure that c 2 
exceeds c1 , s o  Ge 
is negative ; i . e . , consumers are net losers 
from price s tabilization if  s upply. varies while demand is cons tant . 
The total gains to consumers and producers as a group 
are : 
G
T ( cl - c2
) + (s 2 - s l) . (4-3) 
Rearranging terms : 
G
T (c1 - s 1) + Cs 2 - c2) . (4-4) 
The firs t term in this expression is the ne t gain to consumers and 
producers as a group when the buffer s tock sells to reduce price 
from P1 to P .  Looking back at Fi gures 4-3 and 4-4 , it is clear that 
c1 is  greater than s � ; i . e . , consumers gain mo re by the price 
reduction than suppliers los e .  The second term i n  4-2 is the net 
gain when price is supported . Again comparing Figures 4-2 and 4-3 , 
i t  is clear that suppliers gain more when the buffer stock acts to 
support price at P than consumers los e . Since both terms in 4-4 
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are positive , GT is necessarily positive ; i . e . , there are net gains 
from price s tabilization to buyers and sellers as a group . 
A s econd relevant case is shown in Figure 4-5 . It is 
assumed in this cas e that supply is s tab le but that demand varies . 
The buffer stock would , again , trade so as t o  s tab ilize price at 
its average value P . For this cas e arguments that parallel those 
used  above lead to thes e  conclus ions : 
1 .  Consumers are net gainers and suppliers are net losers 
from price s tab ilization . 
2 . Consumers gain more than s uppliers lose when price is 
held down ; and suppliers gain more than consumers los e  
when price is supported . 
3 .  There are net gains to buyers and s ellers as a group 
from price s tab ilization . 
In the general case where b o th supply and demand vary , both 
buyers and s ellers may be net gainers . However ,  suppliers may be  
net  gainers while consumers are  net  losers ; or  consumers may gain 
while suppliers los e .  The nature of the outcome , in this cas e ,  
depends on the magnitudes o f  the elas ticities o f  supply and demand 
and the extent o f  variation in supply and demand . The only general 
s tatement that can be  made is that there are net gains from price 
s tabilization to buyers and sellers as a group . 
Tab le 4-3 presents illus trative values o f  the exp ected 
(or average ) annual gains to price s tabilization for each o f  the 
three cases identified . The assumptions used in making these  
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Figure 4-5 
Pr i c e  Stabilization When Only Demand Varies  
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computations are s tated in Appendix 4-2 . Briefly , the computations 
res t on measured values of elas ticities and hypothetical variations 
in s upply and d emand . The potential gains from price s tabilization 
. for wool , wheat , rice , sugar and copper are fairly subs tantial , but , 
in mos t  cas es the benefits , both gross  and net , are small .  
GUIDELINES ON BUFFER STOCKS 
The estimates that have been presented are in large part 
hypo thetical . They can , nevertheless ,  at leas t b e  used to illus trate 
what a cos t-bene fit analysis o f  buffer sto ck would look like and to 
provide a fir s t  guess  on what the outcome of the complete cost-
benefit  analysis would be . 
Tab le 4-4 shows the gains to s tabilization when only 
supply or only demand varies (Table 4-3)  and 5 percent and 15 percent 
of estimated maximum cap i tal cos ts . Both the computation o f  benefits 
' and cos t s  assume that the maximum variation in supply or , for 
!rubber and the metals , demand , is 10 percent  from the bas e level • 
The benefits are for perfect price s tabilization . The capital cos t 
·
figures used are correspondingly tho s e  for buffer s to cks large 
enough to maintain exactly the target price in the face of  a 10 
. . . ] d d 11 percent variation in supp .y or eman • 
Estimated annual net b enefits exceed 5 percent o f  
es t imat ed capital cos ts f o r  all o f  the commodities except rubber 
and copper . Es t imated annual net b enefits , however , are less than 
15 percent of es timated cap ital costs  for all commodities except rice . 
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The overall impress ion conveyed by Tab le 4-4 is that the cos ts o f  
buffer stocks for the commodities cons idered are o f  very approximately 
the s ame magnitude as the benefits . 
Some o f  the amb i guity s ugges ted by Tab le 4-4 can b e  
resolved by applying reasonable negative tes ts o f  the suitab ility 
o f  buffer s tocks , Firs t ,  a buffer s tock makes no s ense for commodit ies 
in which there is  no open market .  This tes t rules out buffer s to cks 
in iron , bananas , bauxite and rice -- at leas t until  markets in 
thes e  commodities are organized . A s econd s imple tes t is provided 
by the costs  of s torage . This consideration almo s t  certainly should 
rule out buffer stocks in meats and bananas . Co ffee , cocoa and tea 
have the s ame problem ,  but less s everely . Sto cks in these commodities 
mus t  b e  "rolled over" -- i . e . , the commo dity mus t b e  sold after 
being held for a certain amount o f  time . This fact limits  the 
amount of time that a s tock can be held , and , hence , the amount o f  
material that can be  held o f f  the market . 
A third negative tes t  is the orgin o f  the commodity in 
world trade . Referring ahead to Table 5- 2 (p . 132 ) , DCs are the 
principal exporters of wheat , rice , wool  and iron . As the concern 
is primarily with the prices o f  commodities exported by LDCs , there 
does not s eem to be much point in creating buffer s t o cks i'il thes e 
commodities . 12 Furb�ermore , supply probably varies substantially 
more than demand for wheat , rice and wool , and in this cas e , b uyers 
are net losers from price s tabilization . 
A final -- and probably more controvers ial -- negative 
tes t  is structural characteris tics of the indus try . The danger 
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that a buffer stock will be us ed as a res trictive agreement is 
acute to  the extent that concentrat ion and barriers to entry are 
high .  Production o f  cocoa and c o f fee i s  highly concentrated , but 
entry into these indus tries is relatively easy . The copper and 
tin indus tries are both . highly concentrated and relatively difficult 
to  enter and are , for thos e  reas ons , probab ly not s uitable candidates 
for buffer s t o cks . 
The s urvivors of these negative tests are : cot ton , 
s ugar , j ute , sisal , and rubber . To proceed with the analysis o f  
these commodities , i t  i s  necessary t o  employ positive indicators 
o f  benefi ts . 
One test  o f  the bene fits to buffer s t ocks is the degree 
o f  price ins tab ility . Looking back at Tab le 2-2 (p . 31) , the prices 
o f  the s urviving commodities ranked from leas t ta° mos t  s tab le are : 
sugar , sisal , rubber , cot ton , and j ute . The price of s ugar is by 
far the mos t  uns table o f  this group with a coefficient o f  variat ion 
mo re than hal f again as large as that of s is al . A closely related 
test is the ab sence o f  a futures market .  (Appendix 4-3 lists  the 
organized markets in maj or c ommodi ties . )  There are futures markets 
in all o f  the s urviving commodities excep t s is al and j ute . Taking 
these two tes t s  to gether , s isal and j ute app ear to be prime 
candidates for buffer s t o cks . The ne t benefits shown in Table 4-3 
give a different impress ion . The net benefits o f  buffer s t o cks for 
s i s al and j ute are very small . The b enefits are much larger for 
s ugar and a t  leas t noticeab l e  for co t t on and rubber . However , the 
net b enefits  of s t abil<. z ing the price of rubber do no t seem to 
' 
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compare favo rab ly with costs . Sugar and cot ton are relatively 
easy to  s tore and the indus tries are relatively unconcentrated and 
easy to  enter , and so would s eem to be promis ing candidates for 
buffer s to cks . 
This is only a pres umption that might be overturned by 
detailed emp irical res earch . It should also be emphas ized that 
this dis cuss ion has assumed that any o r ganization created would 
meet the s tringent tests of a pure buffer s tock set down in 
Chap ter 3 .  This assump tion has b een made for the s ake o f  the 
argument and it  is no t necess arily realis tic . 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Buffer s t o cks are o f ten regarded as goo d  o r  bad as s uch . 
This chapter sugges ts  that the reality is much mo re comp l icated . 
The costs o f  a buffer s to ck ,  and the difficulties o f  buffer . s t o ck 
management vary from one commodity to the next . There is no 
general presump tion that the cos ts  exceed the bene fits , or c onvers ely . 
It does s eem clear , however , that buffer s t ocks have a us e ful role 
to play in only a few cas es . 
The potential importance o f  pure buffer s t o cks is limited 
by their nature . A pure buffer s t o ck would only s erve to reduce 
period- to-period fluctuations in prices , s uppliers ' incomes and 
buyers' expenditures . While this cas e may be very us eful , the 
e ffects would not be large . Looking b ack at Table 4-4 , the to tal 
annual net b ene fits to perfect price s tab ilization are only 
$ 840 million and the b enefits to suppliers -- given than only s upply 
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varies -- are j us t  over $ 1 . 1  billion . On this basis , i t  seems to 
be very unlikely that a sys tem of pure buffer s tocks would have 
more than marginal effects on the LDCs or would work sweeping 
changes in world commodity trade . 
Appendix 4-1 
Maximum Capital Requirements 
o f  Buffer Stocks 
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This appendix derives the formula used to compute the 
estimates , pres ented in Table 4-1 of the maximum capital requirements 
of buffer s to cks . Denote  by P the target price and by P"  and P '  
respectively the upper and lower prices that are to be  defended . 
. Let f be the fraction by which. price is permitted to va.ry from 
P . 
The bounds on price can then be s tated as : 
P "  ( l + f) P ,  (4-3a) 
P '  ( 1 - f) P .  (4-3b ) 
Assume that supply and demand are , respectively , des cribed by : 
s q 
d 
q 
o: ( l  :!:° d) + $P 
a ( l  :!:° h) + bP 
(4-4 ) 
(4-5)  
where d and h are "shift variables . "  A positive value for d shifts 
supply to the right and a negative value shifts supply to the left . 
Similarly , a positive value for h shifts the demand curve up and a 
negative value shifts the demand curve down . It is assumed that 
supply and demand are defined on an annual basis . 13 
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One o f  the cases contained in . this model is  des cribed 
in Figure 4-6 .  I t  is  ass umed in this figure that h = O ;  i . e . , that 
demand is s table . Supply is assumed to be  s0 under average conditions · 
( d  = O) and to shift between s
1 
and s 2  with variations in , for example , 
the weather . When supply is at s 2 , the buffer stock mus t purchase 
a quantity S* to maintain price at its  lower bound P ' . 
As sume , that because o f  shifts in supply and/or demand , 
that the price floor P '  = ( 1 - f ) P  ·mus t be defended . The total 
amount demanded by users p lus purchas es by the buffer s to ck ( S* )  
mus t b e  equal supply for P '  to be  maintained . The refore : 
a ( l - h) + b ( l - f) P + S* a (l + d) + 13 ( 1 - f) P . 
Expanding this express ion : 
{ a + bP } - ah - b fP + S*  f o + l3i? } + ad - 13 fP .  
Each o f  the bracketed terms i s  equal to q ,  s o : 
Dividing by q gives : 
S* = (ah +  ad) + f (b - 13 ) P . 
s*  (ah_:- ad) 
+ (n d - ns ) f ,  
q 
(4-6a) 
(4-6b) 
(4- 7 )  
(4-8)  
where s *  = S*/q is the maximum annual increment to  the buffer s t o ck 
as a fraction o f  base production , and n d and ns are , respectively , 
the elas ticities o f  demand and supply . The value o f  the s tock is 
p S* . 
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F igur e 4-6 
Maximum Size of a Buffer Stock When Only Supply Var ie s 
pr i c e  
s 1 
S o 
v / 
/82 
p" 
p 
p ' 
s* D 
q quantity 
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Equation 4-8 was used to compute the values shown in 
Table 4-1 . For the agricul tural commodities (except rubber) it 
was assumed that h = 0 and that d = 0 . 1 .  For rubber and the metals , 
it was assumed that d = 0 and that h = 0 . 1 .  In all cas es , it was 
assumed that f = 0 . 1 .  
The values used for ns ' nd ' P and q are thos e  shown in 
Table 4-1 . The elas tici ties o f  s upply and demand , for cocoa , coffee , 
tea , wool , cotton , wheat , rice and sugar were computed using results 
contained in F. G.  Adams , "An Econometric Model of the World Sugar 
Market , "  Univers ity of Pennsylvania , Department of Economics , 
Dispus s ion Paper No . 330 (Oct . , 1 9 7 4 )  and F .  G .  Adams and J .  Behrman , 
Seven Models of International Commodi ty Markets , unpublished 
manuscript prepared for the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development , December , 1 9 7 4 . The elas ticities for copper were 
taken from F .  Fisher , P .  Coo tner and M .  Bailey , "An Econometric .Model 
of the World Copper Indus try , "  Bell Journal of Economics Vol . 3 ,  
No . 2 (Autumn , 1 9 7 2 ) , and the elas ticities for bauxite from 
R. Pindyck , " Gains to Producers from Cartelization of Exhaus t ible 
Resources , "  Mas sachus etts Ins titute o f  Technology , Energy Laboratory 
World Oil Proj ect , Working Paper MITEL 76-012WP (May , 1 9 76 ) . In 
the remaining cases ( j ute , s isal , rubber , tin and iron ore) the 
elas ticities used were .e licited from commodity experts in the 
Economic Analys is and Proj ections Department of the International 
Bank for Recons truction and Development . 
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The values o f  a were es timated using : 
a q ( 1 - n ) s ( 4-9a) 
a q ( l - nd) ( 4-9b) 
which hold given Equations 4-4 and 4-5 . 
All o f  the bas e  ·prices and quantities , excep t those  for 
bauxite , were taken from International Bank for Recons truction and 
Development , Commodity Trade and Price Trends , 1 9 7 5 . The base price 
for bauxite was computed using value and production data from U . S .  
Department o f  the Interior ,  Bureau o f  Mines , Minerals Yearbook . 
Bauxit e  production was taken from American Me tal Market ,  Metal 
S tatistics , 1975 . 
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Appendix 4-2 
Benefits and Costs o f  Price S tabilization 
The values shown in Table 4-3 were computed using 
results derived by Maissell . 14 Maissell ass umes that s upply and 
demand are , respectively , described by : 
s q 
d 
q 
aP + X,  
-f3P + Y , 
where X and Y are shift factors . He then computes : 
G s 
G c 
(a + 2 f3 ) crXX - acrYY , 
2 (a + f3 ) 2 
( 2a  + B ) crYY - f3crXX,  
2 ( a + B ) 2 
( 4-10 ) 
( 4-11) 
(4-12)  
( 4-13) 
where G and G are respectively the expected gains from price s c 
s tab ilization to s ellers and buyers , and crXX and crYY are , the 
variance of X and the variance of Y .  
Multiplying and dividing by (P/q) 2 , (4-12) and ( 4-13) can 
be rewritten as : 
c 
s 
[< ns - 2nd) crXX - nscrYY] !'_ [ 2 (ns - nd) 2 q ' (4-14) 
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Ge = 1( 2n s - nd) crYY + ndcrxx] !'_ [ 2 ( n s - nd) 2 q ' ( 4-15) 
where ns and nd 
are , respectively , the elas ticity of s upply and the 
elasticity of demand . 
Equations 4-14 and 4-15 were used to compute the values 
presented in Table 4-3 . The values employed for ns ' nd ' P and q were 
thos e  given in Table 4-1 . Crude estimates o f  crX:X were obtained by 
assuming that supply is 10 percent above i t s  base level , as measured by 
q ,  one-third o f  the time , 10 p ercent below base one-third of the 
time and at its base level one-third of the time . Given thes e 
-2 -2 assump tions , crXX = ( . 66 x 10 , ) q • A value for crYY was computed 
s imilarly . 
C ommod ity 
Banana s 
C o c oa 
C off e e  
C ott on 
Ha r d  F ib r e s  
Jut e  
Meat (b e ef )  
Ri c e  
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A ppendix 4-3 
O r gani z e d  Markets in Maj or C omm oditi e s  
Spot Mark e t  
None 
N .  Y .  C o c oa Exchange 
N. Y .  C offe e  and Sug a r  
Exchang e  
N .  Y .  C ott on Ex chang e 
Liv e r p oo l ,  Eng l and 
New Y ork - E a s t  Afr i c an s i s a l  
- ·· Manila hemp 
In India - - Some organi z e d  
Indian markets e x i s t  b ut hav e  
n ot b e e n  v e r y  s uc c e s s ful 
- ·- Banglad e s h  
Chic a g o  - - b e e f  
Omaha s t e e r s - - c hoi c e  
Sioux C ity s t e e r s  - - c ho i c e  
None 
Futur e s  Ma rket 
None 
N. Y .  C o c o a  Exc hang e 
C o c o a  Exchange of London 
- - up t o  1 8  months ahead 
N .  Y. C off e e  and Sugar 
Exchang e ,  Lond on 
- - up t o  1 3  months ahead 
N. Y. C ott on Exchange 
- - up t o  1 9  months ahe ad 
Ind ian markets 
Chic a g o  - - liv e c att l e ,  
fe e d e r  c attle 
None 
A pp end ix 4-3 
( c ontinue d )  
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O r gani z e d  Markets in Maj or C omm oditi e s  
C ommodity Spot Ma r k e t  
Rubbe r  
S ug a r  
T e a  
Whe at 
Wo o l  
C opper 
Tin 
S ing apor e 
London 
New Y ork 
Kuala Lumpur 
N .  Y .  C offe e  and Sug a r  
Exchang e : 
London 
P a r i s  
London 
C e ylon 
N o r th India 
Java 
F ormo s a  
Chi c a g o  
Kans a s  C ity 
Minne apolis 
S ydne y ,  A us t r a lia 
London 
New Y or k  
F utur e s  M a r k et 
S ingapo r e  
Lond on 
- - up to 2 y ea r s  a.head 
N e w  Y or k  
- - u p  to 12  months ahead 
Kuala Lumpur 
N .  Y .  C offe e and Sugar 
E x chan g e  
Lond on 
- - up to 1 8  months ahead 
None 
Chic a g o  
Kans a s  City 
Minneapolis 
Winnep e g  
Sydn e y ,  A u s tr alia 
Lond on 
- - up to 1 8  months ahead 
Lond on - - 3 m onths forwa r d  
N e w  Y or k  
- - up t o  1 8  months forwa r d  
1 2 4 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1 .  This  s tatement i s  based on information p res ented in U . S .  
2 .  
3 .  
Treasury , Office o f  Raw Materials and Oceans Policy , ££. ·  cit . 
The s uccess o f  the tin agreement in preventing large price 
declines seems to have been due primarily t o  the us e of 
export quo tas . 
Ibid , p . 74 .  The maximum s i ze o f  the tin s tock was estimated 
to  be 384 , 000 metric tons with an acquis ition cos t o f  about 
$ 800 million . 
The same s eries were used  in computing the correlation 
coefficients as were used to compute the coefficients of 
variation given in Table 2-2 . 
4 .  . Ass ume that the market is "s lack" one period in -three , "average" 
in the next and " ti ght" in the third period .  Given �his 
assumption and the values of Table 4-1 , i t  is easy to show that 
the mean capital requirements for b uffer s t ocks in all 15 
commodities would be $ 5 . 2  billion or , if copper is excluded ,  
5 .  
$ 3 . 9  billion . 
Ibid . , p .  7 4  and p .  6 6 . These  are present  values in 19 6 7  
dollars . 
6 .  
7 .  
1 2 5  
It  is unlikely that mo re than 10 p ro fess ionals would be  required 
even for a large s tock . 
The underlying as sumption is that the s tock would buy as much 
at a price below the target price as i t  later sells at a 
price correspondingly abo ve the targe t price . In the economic 
s tudies referred to earlier , trading costs  for tin and copper 
buffer s tocks were small for mos t  rules . See U . S .  Department 
of the Treasury , Office of Raw Materials and Oceans Policy , 
.2£.· ci t . , pp . 65-75 . 
8 .  The relevant measure i s  no t the buffer s tocks borrowing rate 
but the opportunity . co s t  of funds available t o  the buffer 
s tock . 
9 .  The cos t  es timates for the copper and tin buffer s tocks 
were much less than this because only a 2 percent dis count 
rate was ass umed . 
10 . The rationale o f  this definition is basically as follows . 
Suppose that purchas es are made on a monthly bas is and that 
demand remains s table over serveral months . As sume that price 
i s  100 in month 1 and 90 in month 2 , and that quantity 
demanded is 1 unit in month 1 and 2 units in month 2 .  
Expendi ture is then 100 in month 1 and 180 in month 2 .  In 
month 2 , the firs t unit is purchased for 9 0 ; but , from the 
11 . 
12 . 
13 . 
14 . 
results o f  month 1 it is clear that the consumer p laces a 
value o f  at leas t 100 on the firs t unit bought . Hence , the 
total value placed on the 2 units mus t  be at leas t 180 + 10 
190 , s o  consumers s urplus is at leas t 10 . If price were 
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reduced in smaller increments , it would become clear that the 
change in consumers ' surplus is an area such as c1 in Figure 4-4 . 
That is , in terms o f  the notation o f  Appendix 4-1 , it was 
assumed that f = 0 .  
Contingency stocks for wheat and rice , however ,  are another 
mat ter . 
Given this representation , the buffer s tock mus t b e  understood 
as defending an annual average price , s o  price can , for brief 
periods , b e  allowed to go below the lower limi t  or  ris e  above 
the upper limit . 
B .  Maissell , "Price S tabilization and Welfare , "  Quarterly 
Journal o f  Economics 83 ( 1 96 9 ) : 285-29 8 .  
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CHAPTER 5 
ASPECTS OF RESTRICTIVE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
The IP is frequently described as a means of speeding 
development by s tabilizing commodity prices . The burden o f  Chap ters 
2-4 is  that this ellip tical charac terization is  at best uninformed . 
Fir s t , a reduction in the magnitude of p eriod-to-period variations 
in commodity prices would have only a marginal effect  on development , 
and in some cases would work to the disadvantage of seller s . S econd , 
the mechanisms envisioned in the IP ' s  commodity agreement s  are not 
those  that would be  used only to reduce fluctuations in price or 
export  earnings . Finally , the cases  in which pure buffer s tocks 
are warranted in terms of  their direct effects  are so  few ,  and the 
magnitude of  the effects  so  small, as to make pure buf f er s to cks 
virtually irrelevant to any discuss ion that is  focused on economic 
development .  
These conclusions clear the way for an appraisal o f  the 
IP . The IP ' s  commodity agreements are no t designed simply to reduce 
f luctuations in price ; their primary obj ective is to transfer income 
to the LDCs  via higher commodity prices . 
I t  would b e  tedious to consider the IP in standard economic 
terms b ecause the answers  are obvious . To the extent that the IP 
was successful in increasing commodity price s , it would no t b e  in 
the economic interests  of the DCs and the IP would be a gro s s ly 
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inefficient way of  aiding the LDCs' development .
1 
The IP could , then , 
be dismissed out of hand by the DCs but for the contention that i t  
would promote  international cooperation . 
This i s  a difficult proposition . I t  would clearly b e  futile 
to forecast in detail how the IP would effect international affairs ; 
apart from the myriad sys tematic economic and political fac t s  that 
are relevant , the course of the IP would be subj ect to accidents of 
his tory and the vagaries of  personality . But the maj or problems that 
the IP would face and its means for dealing with those problems can 
be identified and , on that basis, i t  is possible  to make an assessment 
of  the IP ' s  impac t .  
The analysis can be anchored i n  .the fact that the I P  would 
be built around restrictive commodity agreements . The potential o f  
the I P  for increas ing the LDCs ' export  earnings ,  and the problems 
encountered would be  those of  restrictive commodity agreements .  
These matters are access ible  through facts about the s tructure and 
his tory of the commodity markets . Analysis  of restrictive commodity 
agreements should no t ,  however , be  confused with analysis  of  the IP 
itself . The IP ' s  commodity agreements  are unlike mos t  of  those that 
have been tried in the pas t  and the IP as a complete organization is 
without hist.orical parallel . The properties  o f  restrictive commodity 
agreements, which is  the subj ect  of  this chapt er , should ins tead b e 
understood as posing the prob lems whi ch the IP is des igned to s o lve . 
w 
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POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RESTRICTIVE COMMODITY AGREEMENTS  
The success  of  restrictive commodity agreements is  no t 
assured . The organization could collapse or b e  reduced to impotence 
by internal conflicts . Even i f  these prob lems are laid asid e ,  the 
increase in earnings which a restrictive commodity agreement 
could generate is limited by the size  o f  the market s  and the 
character istics  of  demand and production costs . 
Table  5-1 presents very rough estimates of the effects  o f  
price increases for s ixteen commodities . These  estimates assume that 
the demand for each of  the commodities was at its 19 7 1  level . The 
estimates take account of the fact that price increases reduce 
consump tion and incorporate a crude attemp t to  take account of  the 
effect  of  reductions in the quantity produced on the cos ts  of  
d . 2 pro uction . App endix 5-1 presents the formulas used in computing 
the estimates . Given the 19 7 1  level of demand , and the o ther 
assump t ions mad e ,  a 20 percent increase in the price of each of  the 
s ixteen commodities would generate an additional revenue of $ 17 . 6  
b illion and a 100 percent price increase would increase revenues by 
approximately $88  b illion . If wheat and r ice are excluded , the 
corresponding f igures are $10  b illion and $ 5 0  billion . 
The estimat es in Table 5-1 use short-run elas ticities of  
demand and , for that reason , mus t  b e  regarded as maximal . A price 
increase invariably induces some sub s t i tution but the sub s titution 
may require two or three years to accomp lish .
3 
Henc e ,  while a 
price hike may initially yield a large increase in revenue , the increase 
will tend t o  diminish over t ime . In some cas e s , this e f f e c t  would b e  
4 large . 
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The LDCs would not. ob tain all of  any increase in revenue 
and would p ay par t  of the increased prices . These  two effects  are 
described by the es timates presented in Tab le 5-2 . The first  column 
of this table shows the fraction of the commodity exported by the 
LDCs . It is r easonab le to assume that if the LDCs  expor t ,  say , 
9 0  percent of a commodity , they would ob tain 9 0  p ercent of any 
increase in revenue due to higher prices . The figures in columns 
(2) and (3) use this assump t ion and the estimates given in Table 5-1 , 
t o  compute the revenue f lows to the LDC s  from higher prices for the 
s ixteen commodities . Columns ( 3 ) - ( 6 )  present estimates of the 
increased costs  to the LDC s  of higher commodity prices and . the 
f inal columns show the net revenue flows to  the LDCs . Increases  
in  the prices  of  wheat and rice would impose very heavy costs  on  
the  LDCs  and , for that reason , presumab ly would not b e  included 
in an IP .
5 
If these  two commodities are excluded , the net 
increase in revenue to the LDCs for 20 p ercent and 100 percent 
increases in the prices o f  the f ourteen remaining commodities  
would b e  $ 4 . 1  b illion and $ 20 . S  b illion respectively . 
These overall f igures mask the fact that some of the LDCs 
would be  net losers if commodity prices were increased . The principal 
gainers would be the maj or producers of cocoa , coffee , cotton , copper 
and sugar . Approximately thirty o f  the LDCs  would b e  in this group . 
The losers would b e  nations who export relatively low value commodities 
and who import sub s tantial quantities of  o ther commodities -- especially 
cot ton , copper , sugar and wool . The data on commodity imports 
r equired t o  identify these nations is not availab le , but quantitative 
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information provides some help . India , the nations j us t  b elow the 
Sahara , and many of the nations in northern Afr ica and South Eas t 
Asia export relatively low value crops ; and there i s  s ome indication 
that they tend to be  importers o f  agricultural products . These 
nations , which are the maj ority of  the poores t of  the LDCs , would 
probab ly be net losers under a system of  restrictive commodity 
agreements . 
The information in Tab le 5-3 provides a way o f  put ting 
the estimates of  Table  5-2 in perspec tive . In 19 7 2 , the total f low 
of cap ital to the LDCs  was $ 2 0 . 2 b illion . Of this , $ 8 . 4  b illion 
was private inves tment , while the remaining $ 11 . 8 b i llion was 
b ilateral and multilateral assis tance . Then , if an IP doub led the 
prices of the commodities  in Tab le 5-2 , excep t wheat and r ice , the 
additional revenue would be about 17 5 p ercent of  the level of  
development assis tance . To the extent that the IP  would act as a 
sub st itute for foreign aid , the net increase in funds available to  
the LDCs would be  smaller . 
It may also be relevant to compare the effects  of a 
succes sful IP with those  of OPEC . In each of 19 7 4 , 19 75 and 19 7 6 ,  
the higher prices enforced b y  OPEC increased the oil producers' 
revenues by approximately $80 b illion , the bulk of  which o ccurred 
to Middle Eas tern nations with a total p opulation of  less  than 
100  million . The increased revenues o f  an IP would b e  much smaller 
and would be spread over a much larger population base . 
The conclusion of this discussion is that a successful IP 
would generate s ignif icant increases in revenue to the LDCs , but
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that thes e  increase s  would not b e  extremely large relative to development 
assis tance or the additional revenues generated by increases in the 
price o f  oil . This i s  an important point which will b e  d iscussed at 
greater length in the following chap t er . 
THE HISTORICAL RECORD
6 
The estimates that have been presented assume that restrictive 
commodity agreements would b e  successful . As has been mentioned 
several times , this assumption is  ques tionab le .  I f  nothing els e , a 
glance at the his torical record is sufficient to create doub t s  about 
the prospects  for restr ic tive agreements . 
Figure 5-1 shows the periods during which the maj or inter-
national restrictive agreements  in commodities operateq . This f igure 
excludes all non-governmental and unilateral restrictive s chemes , o f  
which there were many , informal arrangements under the U . N . Food and 
Agriculture Organization and some very specialized agreements . 
At the s tart of World War II , there were agreements  
covering f ive commodities tin , rubber , copper , sugar and tea . 
All of . these  agreements  were among governments , but only supp liers 
were included .
7 
In each cas e ,  export quo tas were the principal 
mechanism of the agreement ; in fac t , the agreement s  basically set  
up  a means for estab lishing , adj usting and enforcing export  quotas .
8 
The export quotas were usually tied in some way to a notion o f  a 
desired price .
9 
Only the tin agreement made provision for a buffer 
s tock, and that operated only sporadically . 
1920 
Tin 
Rubber 
_ EWFRS%¥¥5tllU 
S t evenson Plan 
Copper 
Co f fee 
Sugar 
Tea 
Wheat 
Cocoa 
Figure 5-1 
Maj or Commodity Agreements  
1930 1940 
,MritiW®hifl#R pm MMffllNI * 
Interr.at ional Ttn Control 
l�':t3%¥ti i:==:i 
I n t e r n :i t i o n n l  Rubbr :- Rcr.u h . t ion 
Agreement 
™ 
I n t t!rn a t i C>nal C o p p e r  
Control 
i@fa!i'fits#>£ii4Ul.ild 
IQfii!i i o l!lillii3ll( 
l n t er-Amcr icnn Coffee 
Agreemen t 
·r:::::-:i 
Cha<lbou rne P lnn I n t e r na t i onnl Sugar Aercemc n t  
llUifii@§@Mi@?MAWIM 
I n t e C" n o t iom1 l  Tea Agreeme n t  
llllllll 
Internat ional l<.'h e a t  
J\gT.ecmcnt 
� 
0 . 
..... \0 
..... 
V1 '"" 
� 
0 
::I 
trj 
..... 
::I 
§ 
n V1 
(1) -!'-
,.... 
'-< 
i:: 
n 
0 
� 
p. 
..... 
rt 
'<: 
� 
ti 
(1) � 
rt ::i • (1) 
(1) .!'> a Ii � ::i ..... 
P> \0 rt 
rt -!'- (/l 
...  °' . 
0 '"" 
::i . .  I-' 
Ill \0 
I-' 0 
f-' N 
n \0 I 
0 w f-' 
� 
I \0 
N -!'-
0 N V1 
p. 0 . 
..... . .  : 
rt 
<I c::: '-< 
u, 0 > i:: )Q Ii 
Ii ::i 
(1) Cl> P> 
m 
(1) f-' 
::I 
Ill P> 0 
::I rt ..,, 
rt (1) 
(/l . "" 
0 
,.... (") f-' 
� i ...  rt (/l ...  
P' ..... n 
...  rt P> 
::I rt f-' 
OQ (1) 
rt ro 
0 
::I 
1950 
.-"jl'.• 
1960 1970 1976 
iti¥mw i!l§hM¥ff'¥dJ#?tm .. ;w·g;Mff1@?¥¥Gt!:S?4$W'iHWf4fififAM¢ianwum& 
International Tin A g r e ecen t 
Conse i l  I n t e r mi. t i o n a l  des  Pays 
Expor t a-teurs d u  Cuivr� 
PM*i· 9t#@@4·· 91 9ett -;JhM?4¥V&®bd' Mfitlifilti&IU 
Latin Ame r i c a n  
Coffee Agreement 
I n t e rn a t i o n a l  C o f f e e  
Agreement 
. Mt®·-"1i¢'41#M•lil™™ � 
I n t e r n a t ional Sugar 
Agr eemen t 
lllliS.llmrillilll!l<!llil 
Interna t i o nal 
Tea Agreement 
I n t e rna t io n a l  Sugar 
Agre emtm t 
"'4WW#i'ii*1!¥#·MX4hNlUiil:az1&W£4'tsilliJ•'%# rfulQfWt MU..� n 
trj :;;:: ,,.... 
§ n � p. ::;:: . P> 
rt Ii 
..... ?<' ...  \0 ..... p. 
-!'- ::I OQ 
..... (/l (1) '"" . 
. .  c::: 
n ::i 
'-< P> r'· 
ti < 
rt (1) 
t:I (1) Ii 
� .I-' (/l (/l ...  
...  rt 
(/l ...  '<: . ::I 
'ti 
t<i" > ti n (1) 
� rt C/l 'O ...  (/l 
(1) 0 . 
Ii ::i 
...  f-' 
(1) ,.... \0 
::i ..;i °' 
n P" V1 
(1) (1) '"" . .  
§1 � (;") 
p. (1) 
(1) ::i 
Ii rt Cl> 
...  rt 
H (1) 0 
::I rt n rt P' ?<' 
(1) ...  
ti n ::i 
OQ ro OQ 
0 ::i 
< rt § (1) i:: 
ti Ii p. 
§ 
'<: 
(1) 
::I rt 
P> 
f-' 
Cl> 
0 
i:: 
Ii 
n 
(1) 
(/l 
'-< 
!>ti 0 
� 
(1) . 
"" 
Ii 
...  
a 
P> 
Ii 
n 
0 
� 0 
p. 
�·· 
rt 
...  
Ill 
(/l 
...  
::i 
H 
::I 
rt 
(1) 
Ii 
::i 
P> rt 
...  
0 
::i 
P> 
f-' 
H 
Ii 
P> 
p. 
ro 
I n t e rnat ional \..'heat Agreement 
* * 
* 
z fi 'ti 0 Ii 
p. 0 
(1) < 
n n ...  
0 0 (/l 
::I ::I ...  0 rt 0 
a Ii ::I 
...,. 0 (/l 
n ..... 
(/l 0 
'O ..,, 
Ii 
0 rt 
< P" 
..... Ill 
(/l 
...  P> 0 OQ 
::i ti 
(/l (1) 
m Ill 
::I 
rt 
(/l 
i:: (/l 
't:I 
(1) 
::l 
p. 
(1) 
p. 
p. 
i:: 
(1) 
rt 
0 
� 
P> Ii 
rt 
..... 
� 
n 
0 
::I 
p. 
...  
rt 
..... 
0 
::I 
(/l 
,,.... 
(") 
0 
::I rt 
..... 
::i 
i:: 
Ill 
p. 
111¥J'$t4Wfflktiit& 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o c o a  
Agre emen t 
trj 
..... 
OQ 
i:: 
ti 
(1) 
V1 
I 
f-' 
I-"' 
w 
°' 
'"" 
I-"' 
w 
..... 
138 
The agreements in tin ,  rubber , copper , sugar and tea 
effectively ended with the imposit ion of  wartime controls . Some of  
these  agreements -- especially the International Rubber Regulation 
Agreement -- might have collap sed in any event , but this is not 
entirely clear . The clear failures in the period through the end 
10 of World War II are the S t evenson Plan ,  the Chadbourne Plan , 
the International Wheat Agreement ( IWA) and the Inter-American 
Coffee Agreement ( IACA) . 
The IWA and the IACA were out of the mains tream of  
prewar commodity agreements . While both are  mentioned below ,  they 
wil� be laid aside for the moment . 
The S t evenson P lan covered rubber production in three 
British dep endencies Ceylon , The Federated Malay S tates and The 
S traits Settlements . When the p lan was inaugurated in 19 22 ,  these 
British colonies accounted for about 7 0  percent of  the worid rubber 
supply .
11 
The Stevenson P lan relied on export restrict ions to 
increase prices . Rubber prices were in fact increased by the 
imposition of export res trictions , but therein lay the se.eds  of  the 
p lan ' s failure . The higher price for natural rubber s t imulated the 
development of synthetic rubber and increased use of reclaimed rubber • .  
Furthermore ,  production not covered by the agreement , especially in 
the Ne therlands Eas t Indies , increased dramatically . In 19 22 ,  the 
Dutch accounted for 2 3 . 2 percent of world product ion . By 19 2 7  
the year b efore the S tevenson Plan was abandoned - - the Dutch share 
had increased to 3 7 . 7  percent and the British share had f allen to 
12 5 4 . 1  p ercent . 
The Chadbourne Plan , which began in May 1931 , collapsed 
four years later for s imilar reasons . The principal aim of the 
Chadbourne P lan was to work off  large s tocks of sugar , which had 
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accumulated , without depres s ing price . The p lan included a s chedule 
for disposal of  the s tock and bo'und the participants -- Cub a ,  Java , 
Peru , and the maj or Europ ean sugar producers -- to export quotas . 
The Chadbourne Plan did not succeed in increasing the price of  
sugar . While members o f  the  Chadbourne Plan reduced their 
production by about s ix million tons , increased production from 
non-member s made up about two-thirds o f  the reduc tion .
13 
This 
increase was not a response to higher prices but was ins tead the 
" • . •  result of the intens ified programs of numerous consuming countries 
for fos tering domestic  production • • .  1 1
14 Never theles s ,  the 
increase in sugar produc tion by non-members limited the profitab ility 
of  .the Chadbourne Plan , and i t  was not renewed when the agreement 
expired in 1935 . 
In addition to the Stevenson and Chadbourne P lans , the 
19 20 ' s provided several examples of  regulatory s chemes undertaken 
by individual governments  or groups of producers . The International 
Tin Control ,  for example , was preceded by the Tin Producers Association , 
and the International Copper Control was preceded by the Copper 
Exporters Ass o ciation and Copper Exporters , Incorporated . None o f  
thes e  s chemes were very successful and none lasted for more than a 
f ew years . 
The f ate of unilateral government actions is illus trated 
by Brazil ' s valorization s chemes . Brazil ' s efforts to influence the 
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price of  coffee by stockpiling go b ack 'to 1907 . The las t of thes e  
schemes began i n  1 9 22 , when Brazil es tablished the Coffee Defense 
Institute . The Coffee Defense Ins titute was conceived along the 
lines of an ever normal grainery . The Ins titute advanced producers 
payment when their crops were delivered to government warehouses . 
Suppliers wer e  paid a preset base price , which should have been set  
at the  average level of  price  over good  and b ad crop  years . But , 
at leas t after 1 9 2 6 , the base price was set at too high a level , 
so the valorization s cheme became a price support program . This 
required accumulat ing s tocks . The Coffee Defense Ins titute was 
able,  to handle the bumper harves t  of  1927-19 28 .  But , contrary to 
the usual cycle , this was followed by another large crop in 1929 . 
The Ins titute was unab le to ob tain suf f i.cient f inancing and was 
forced to s top buying . Coffee prices then declined by approximately 
15 5 0  percent . 
The International Rubber R.egulation Agreement of 1934  was 
descended from .the Stevenson P lan in that it responded to the 
Stevenson Plan ' s failure . The Chadbourne P lan was also , in this 
respec t ,  the predecessor of  the Internat ional Sugar Agreement of 
1937 . There is a more general sense in which the commodity agreement s  
of  the late 1930 ' s  were successors to earlier failures . Commentators 
on this period s tate that past experience had taught two and p erhaps 
three lessons . Firs t , to have a chance of success  an agreement must 
include very nearly all supp liers . Second, unilateral s chemes , or 
agreements among private f irms , did not work , which imp lies that 
restrictive arrangements  mus t  be based on agreements among governments . 
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Apart from any role that political means may have in gaining the 
necessary coverage for an agreement , governments have the means of  
enforcing export quotas . A third lesson was that to be successful , 
an agreement mus t  behave in a moderate way -- in par ticular , i t  mus t· 
not attemp t to increase price above the comp etitive level . 
The f ive agreements  that were in force at the s tart o f  
World War II generally honored these lessons , and they at least 
avo ided collapse . It is no t s o  c lear that they achieved their 
economic aims . If OPEC ' s  quadrupl ing of the price o f  oil  is taken as 
a s tandard , then none o f  these  agreements  was a success ; in fac t , 
by this stringent tes t , all previous commodity agreements were 
dismal failures . But there is a consensus that , in more limited 
terms , the commodity agreement s  of  the mid- to-late 19 30 ' s  were 
reasonab ly succes sful . 
The nature and extent o f  their success reflect the special 
circumstances  of  the 1930 ' s .  From 1930 to the s tart of  World War II 
the commodity market s  were , with scattered excep t ions and interrup tions , 
' severely depressed . In these circums tances , commodity prices would 
fall to the level of  average out of  pocket costs . Some suppliers 
would b e  driven from the market more or less immediately , and all 
producers would fail to cover cap ital costs . This  situation would 
persist  until , by the elimination of  supplier s , the size  of  the industry 
had b een accommodated to the drastically reduced level of demand . 
The f ive commodity agreement s  that persisted to World War 
II were a response to this s itu�tion . Their means were monopolistic , 
as was their aim -- to increase prices . However , i t  seems that thes e  
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agreements only attemp ted to increase price to the long run competitive 
level -- that is , to  the long run average cos t  of  efficient operations .
16  
The incentive for overshipp ing would remain but , given that price 
was not increased above long run average cos t , the viability of  the 
agreement would not be challenged by new entry . By moderate behavior , 
then , the commodity agreements  of the 1930 ' s  avoided a principal 
cause o f  the failure o f  earlier restrictive s chemes . Their maj or 
purpose was app arently to preserve· exi s t ing suppliers p ending an 
eventual recovery of  demand , and in this respect they were reasonably 
successful . 17  
The postwar commodity agreements differ from those  of  the 
1930 ' s  in that buyers were more often included . The Latin American 
Coffee Agreement (LACA) , the International Tea Agreement ,  and Conseil 
International des Pays Exportateurs du Cuivri (CIPEC) include .  only 
sellers . However , the other pos twar commodity agreements  shown 
in Figure 5-1  include both buyers and sellers . 
The International Tin Agreement , like the prewar International 
Tin Control , includes a small buf fer s to ck but relies primarily on 
export quo tas . The International Cocoa Agreement also made provision 
for a buffer stock ,  as well as the usual mechanism for export 
controls . The LACA , the sub sequent International Coffee Agreement , 
the International Sugar Agreements and the International Tea 
Agreement all were essentially agreements on export quotas . The 
International Wheat Agreements  ( IWA) made provision for purchases  
or sales at guaranteed prices , when the market price rose above or 
fel l  below preestablished values . 
The International Cocoa Agreement has yet to b e  tes ted 
becaus e , for reasons unconnected with the agreement , the price of 
cocoa has been excep tionally high . CIPEC was formed without 
economic provisions ; i t  is  an example of  a failure to reach an 
agreement rather than of the failure of  an agreement . But of  the 
remaining cases , only the International Tin Agreement has not 
collap s ed . 
The International Tea Agreement that operated during 
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19 50-19 55 was a very mild , or perhaps desul tory , restrictive scheme . 
The agreement was no t brought down by economic forces , but apparently 
was not renewed because i t  accomplished very little . 18  In  1 9 6 2 , 
af ter four years o f  operation , the LACA was on the brink o f  the 
fate of  Brazil ' s earlier. valorization s chemes . The price of coffee 
had declined over the life of  the agreement and in 19 62 Brazil ' s  
carry-over s tock exceeded to tal world coffee exports of  the 
preceeding year . 19 This situation was retrived when the U . S .  
indicated its  willingness  to j oin a coffee agreement . The LACA 
was replaced in 1 9 6 2  by an . Internat ional Coffee Agreement . 
The International Coffee Agreement , two International 
Sugar Agreements  (ISA) and the IWA were brought down by disputes 
among participants . The is sue in the failure of the ISA in 19 6 1  
was Cuba ' s insis tence that her quota be  increased to include s ales 
made under contracts with Communist nations . This would have 
amounted to a tripling of Cub a ' s  quo t a ,  which was unaccep t able to 
o ther suppliers . 2 0  The failures of a s econd ISA, the IWA and the 
International Coffee Agreement all . involved d isputes between buyers 
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and sellers over price ranges and/or  export quo tas . The Inter-American 
Coffee Agreement was also , apparently , not extended when i t  exp ired 
in 194 6  because o f  a dispute b e tween supp liers and the U . S .  over 
prices . 
Although failures by the s tandards of OPEC , some of the 
postwar agreements  had brief success  in increasing prices . For 
example : 
The 19 6 4  price j ump (to  nearly 50¢)  mus t  be considered 
the direct result of  the coffee agreement , with only 
. " f . f h h 21 minor , i any , assis tance rom t e weat er . 
The International Tin Agreement , to give another example , enj oyed 
its cus tomary success in limiting declines in price . There were 
not , however , any dramatic successes . 
If the postwar experience contains any lesson , i t  i s  that 
commodity agreements are contentious affairs . Of the nine p o s twar 
agreements , five -- counting CIPEC2 2  -- failed b ecause o f  
disagreements  among participants .  The excep t ions are the International 
Tea Agreement and the LACA , which failed for other reasons ; the 
International Cocoa Agreement , which has yet to  be tes ted ; and the 
International Tin Agreement , which mus t  be counted a success . 
The his torical record as a whole conveys a mixed impression . 
On the one hand , the commodity agreements o f  the 1930 ' s  worked 
reasonably well . On the o ther hand , the restrictive schemes of  
the  19 20 ' s  and those  o f  the postwar period were no t  successful . 
The resolution of this contradiction perhap s lies in the special 
circumstances o f  the 1930 ' s  and the relatively modest aims of  the 
c ommodity agreement s  o f  that p eriod . It seems reasonab le to conclude 
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that attemp ts  to use international agreement s  to increase price above 
the competitive level have had only trans itory success . 
STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS OF INSTABILITY 
This conclusion doe.s no t ,  however , carry any s trong 
imp lications for the IP , because the IP would be s ignif icantly 
different from anything attemp ted in the pas t . The IP should b e  
viewed as a response to the failures of  postwar commodity agreement s  
i n  the same way the agreements  of  the 1930 ' s  responded to ear lier 
failures . The his torical record does point to the problems and 
conflicts associated with restrictive commodity agreements .  Thes e  
problems a r e  neither his torical accidents nor the result o f  
inep titude , b u t  have their r o o t s  i n  the s tructure o f  the commodity 
markets . 
The IP ' s  commodity agreements  would include both buyers 
and sellers and so  could be  threatened by disputes -- over price , 
purchase and sales po licies of the buffer stocks , export quotas 
with buyers on one s ide and sellers on the o ther . There i s  a 
surrealistic aspect to this possib ility : why would buyers ever 
j oin an organization designed to increase prices ? The ques tion 
can perhaps be  answered and it  is  possible  to indicate how buyers ' 
actions would be cons trained by accep tance of the IP . But examination 
of  the role that buyers would play is p o s tponed to the following 
chap ter . The remainder of this chap ter is concerned with the 
behavior o f  supplier s . 
' i  
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Perhap s because international discussions of  commodities 
problems have cast the DCs and the LDCs  as opponents , there is a 
tendency to treat suppliers as a unified bloc . Doing so brushes 
aside the critical problems that afflict  restrictive arrangements  
o f  all  sorts . Opposing forces work on restrictive arrangements . 
The suppliers in an industry have an incentive -- increased profit 
to cooperate in restricting supply and increasing price . But price 
increases set  up forces that tend to undermine the arrangement .  
The continuing short-term prob lem o f  any restrictive 
arrangement is  limit ing output to the level consis tent with the 
"des,ired" price . His torical experience makes it obvious -- i f  it is not 
s imply obvious -- that this requires an agreement which covers 
sub s tantially all of supply . Given that this condition is satisfied , 
the problem is to ensure that members abide by their assigned export 
quotas . The problem exists  b ecause any supplier can ob tain an 
increased profit  by overshipping , s o  long as overshipping does not 
become general . Given that overshipping occur s , and as a consequence 
price declines , sellers that s tay within their quo tas will typ ically 
be lef t worse off then they would be in the ab sence of  the agreement . 
The result o f  s ignificant overshipp ing is , therefore ,  likely to b e  
the collapse  of  the agreement .  
The forces that operate are such that restrictive 
arrangements can b e  self-policing in the sense that suppliers restrain 
themselves from overshipping . Whether a restrictive agreement would 
have this feature depends primarily on the degree to which supply is  
concentrated . Given that no small group of sellers retains a 
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preponderant share of  the market , s igni f icant overshipp ing i s  more 
likely to o ccur , and the prob lem b ecomes more intractab le as the 
number of  suppliers increases . 
This proposition is best  viewed as a s tatement o f  observed 
fact , but it  can be  rationalized to an extent . The explanation 
turns on sellers ' perceptions of  the effects  of  their actions on the 
market and other sellers . Consider first  an indus try with only two 
sellers , A and B ,  of roughly equal size . Suppose that A cuts price , 
which will have a large effect  on B ' s s ales . B can b e  expected to 
respond by matching or undercut ting A ' s price , which would leave 
both sellers worse  off . In an indus try with only two sellers , this 
logic , and hence the need for cooperation , is  easy to grasp . But , 
suppose there are twenty-five sellers o f  roughly equal s ize  in the 
indus try . In this case , a price cut by any one seller will not have 
a large impact on the o thers . Fur thermore , cheating b ecomes more 
difficult to detect as the number of  sellers increases . The danger 
of  retaliation then decreases and the incentive to cheat accordingly 
increases , as the number of s ellers increases . 
How "few" sellers is "few enough" for a restrictive 
agreement to be self-policing is a matter of  informed j udgment . 
Mos t  s tudents  of indus trial behavior would agree that collusive 
arrangements tend to be s table in industries dominated by three or 
four sellers and many would extend this to industries with eight 
to ten maj or supp lier s .  These  j udgments , however , primarily reflect 
domestic  experience ,  and interna.tional restrictive arrangements  
would probably b e  more prone to  ins tab ility with any g iven number 
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of  seller s . 
23  
Unfor tunately , it  is  n'ot  clear much more s tringent a 
tes t should be app lied in j udging international agreements . 
Table 5-4 shows the share of the four largest suppliers 
among the LDCs  in each of  seventeen commodities . The f our larges t  
suppliers hold at leas t 75  percen t  of  the export marke ts i n  s ix of  
thes e  commodities -- cocoa , j ute , rubber , sisal , tea and tin . The 
f igures for j ute , sisal and rubber , however , are misleading as each 
of these commodities faces s trong competition from synthetic p roducts . 
If the markets wer e , as they should be , defined as including the 
synthetic sub stitutes , concentration in rubber , j ute and s isal 
woµld be  low . But concentration in the export markets  for coco a ,  
t e a  and tin is  high enough to suggest  that supp liers would behave 
cooperatively . The extent of concentration in the export market s  
for bananas , bauxite , c o f f e e  and copper
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falls into a n  amb iguous 
range . Concentration in the export  markets for the remaining seven 
commodities is  low .  I t  is  reasonab le to assume that restrictive 
arrangements  for these  commodities , and for j ute , s isal and rubber , 
would require a means for enforcing production controls . or export  
quotas . 
Overshipp ing was a maj or cause of the failure of the first  
International Wheat Agreement .  Argentina had a bumper wheat crop 
in 1933-1934  and exceeded its  quo ta to a no ticeable extent . It was 
apparently not the overshipping as such that b rought down the IWA, 
but rather a related dispute over l imitations on production . 2
5 
Overshipping was also a maj or problem for the International Coffee 
Agreement  i n  the mid-19 60 ' s 2 6 and , forty years earlier for the 
Table 5-4 
Export Market Shares of the Four Largest LD C  Producers , 
Average , 19 70-19 7 2  
(percent)  
bananas 5 7 . 4  
. bauxite 5 9 . 9  
beef 2 3 . 9  
cocoa 74 . 5  
coffee 54 . 4  
copper 4 7 . 4  
cotton 3 0 . 8  
iron ore 2 5 . 9  j ute 94 . 2  
rice 2 6 . 2  
rubber 8 7 . 6  
sisal 80 . 7  
sugar 4 2 . 5  
tea 66 . 3  
tin 7 5 . 3  
wheat 3 . 3  
wool 9 . 4  
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Source : Internation Bank for Recons truction and Development , 
Commodity Trade and Price Trends , 1 9 7 5 . 
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S tevenson Plan .  The difficulty in the ' last of  these  cases was not 
that participating governments  cheated , but rather that individual 
2 7 producers " smuggled" rubber out of the country . Thes e  cases 
are s imply examp les . Restrictive agreements block " . . .  exchange 
between consenting adults . • . 1 1 28 and for that reason encounter 
troubles , for precisely the same reasons that Prohib ition encountered 
troub les . This has b een true o f  virtually all restrictive agreements  
in the  past  and mus t  b e  expected under the  sort  of  agreements that 
the IP would create . 
A second continuing prob lem of restrictive commodity 
agreement s  would be  the nego tiation of  price and , to a much greater 
extent , market shares . The mos t  intractab le prob lems are likely to 
b e  posed by relatively recent , low cost entrants . Such a supplier 
would probab ly begin with a relatively small share o f  the market , 
but insist  on a larger share and threaten to withdraw if his demands 
were not satisfied . Tr.e threat could b e  very creditable as a low cos t 
supplier might be ab le to do better out s ide the agreement than he 
could by accep ting a relatively small market share within the 
agreement . If demand is growing , the o ther supp liers may b e  able 
to satisfy the demands of the low cost  producer without reducing 
their output . But if demand is not growing , the o ther producers 
can meet the low cost supp lier ' s  demand for an increased market 
share only by "moving over . "  
The profits of  the suppliers as a group would b e  larger 
with the agreement than without it, s o  there is  always s ome assignment 
of market shares that leaves all suppliers b e tter off than they would 
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b e  otherwise . But experience indicates that such a solution is not 
always found and , if it  i s  not , the agreement collapses . 
The record of t in agreements  provides an ins tructive 
example of the successful resolution of  a dispute over market shares .  
The tin agreement, conc luded in i9 3 3 ,  was first  extended for one year 
and then renegotiated in 1936 . These negotiations encountered 
serious difficulties when Thailand and what was then · the Belgium 
Congo insis ted on larger market shares . At one point , Britain and 
Portugal withdrew from the nego tiations . The nature o f  the s o lution 
is  indicated by the data in Table 5-5 . The large producers 
especially British Malaya and the Ne therlands Eas t Indies --
gave up part o f  their shares of  the market in favor o f  Thailand and 
the Belgium Congo . 
OPEC provides another example o f  this sort o f  b ehavior .  
Saudi Arab ia ' s  willingness  t o  reduce its  market share t o  accommodate 
o ther producers app ears to have b een an important factor in OPEC' s 
success . The maintenance of the International Coffee Agreement s  
from 19 6 2  to 1970  was a l s o  due i n  p a r t  to Brazil ' s  willingnes s  to  
move over in favor of new African producers .
29 
This pattern has not held in all cases . As was ment ioned 
earlier , the first  p o s twar International Sugar Agreement ended in 
19 6 1  with a dispute over market shares .  While this seems to b e  
the only agreement that collapsed because o f  a dispute over market 
shares , it is not the only pertinent examp le . The nego tiations that 
lead to  CIPEC were an attemp t to form a restrictive agreement . 
However , Chile ,  Zaire , and Zamb ia were reportedly unwilling to accep t  
Tab le 5-5  
Standard Tonnages Under the  Second and Third 
International Tin Control Agreements 
(Percent o f  To tal) 
Second Third 
Country Agreement �reement 
British Malaya 3 8 . 1  3 6 . 0  
Netherlands Eas t Indies 19 . 2 18 . 2 
Thailand 7 . 0  9 . 0  
French Inda-China 1 .  7 1 . 5  
Belgium Congo 3 . 6  6 . 6  
Nigeria 5 . 8  5 . 4  
Bolivia 24 . 6  23 . 3  
Total 100 . 0  100 . 0  
Source : K ,  Knorr , Tin Under Control (S tanford , 1949) , 
p .  249 . 
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Peru ' s demand for a larger market share and CIPEC remains without 
economic provisions . The failure of the cocoa producers to , twice , 
reach an agreement during the mid-19 60 ' s  also count as examples . 
The characteristic  that s eems to distinguish the successes 
from the failures is the share o f  the one or two larges t supp liers . 
In the cases where agreement was no t reached , there was no dominant 
firm . In the cases where agreement was reached , one or two nations 
accounted for upwards of one-third of  to tal supp ly . It is no t 
clear why this rule should hold , but , if true , it is not favorab le 
to the IP . There are a few commodities wi th dominant suppliers --
t in ,  coffee , bauxite -- but this is not typ ical . If the IP were 
created , s everal disagreements over market shares could be expected . 
And the longer the agreement s  persis t ,  the worse these  difficulties 
would be . 
Entry is the long run counterpart o f  price cutting and 
overshipping . A price above the long run average cost  o f  efficient 
operations is  an inducement to entry . Unles s  entry is limited by 
natural barriers , or somehow controlled by exis ting supplier s , 
price mus t  eventually fall to the competitive leve l .  
Relatively large cap ital c o s t s  are an impediment to entry 
into the metals indus tries . For example , the cap ital cos t s  of  
developing a copper mine of  moderate size  are upwards  o f  $ 250  
million , and the  cap ital costs  o f  an  integrated operation are  about 
twice that amount . Entry into metals mining , furthermore , requires 
f inding an ore body that can b e  profitab ly exp lo ited . Such discoveries 
are made from t ime to t ime , but they are not rout ine occurrences . 
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While detailed s tudy might sugges t  o therwise , there is a presump tion 
that entry into the metals · indus tries is  diff icult . This does not 
mean that entry is  impossible . A s ignificant price increase would 
spur efforts to f ind new deposits  and has ten the development of  
deposits  already known , and over the  course of  a decade thes e  forces 
probab ly would call forth a few new suppliers .  However , the prices 
o f  metals could b e  raised considerab ly above the competitive level 
without attracting a rush of  entrants . 
This is not the case for mos t  agricultural products . I t  
is  true that s ome agricultural commodities require relatively specialized 
conditions for their cultivation , but  even within these  limitations , 
the scope for entry is sub s tantial . For mos t  agricultural products , 
then , s ignificant price increases would attract entrants  within a 
year or two . Cocoa , coffee , rubber and tea are excep tions to this 
rule . In these  cases , the trees ( or bushes ) r equire s everal years 
to  mature and begin yield ing regular crop s . Hence , while price 
increases would encourage additional p lantings ,  the effects would 
not be felt for several years . 
In summary , the structural conditions that favor restrictive 
agreement s  are :  high concentration and the absence o f  competition 
from clo s e  sub s t i tutes ; the presence of  one or two dominant supplier s ; 
and high barriers to entry . Tin meets these tests  and copper and 
bauxite  come close , although concentration in the copper industry 
i s  on the low side and there are sub s titutes for bauxite .  The leas t 
favorab le cond itions f or restrictive commodity agreement s  are : low 
concentration or competi tion from c l o s e  sub s t i tutes ; the ab s ence of 
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a dominant supplier ; and low barriers to  entry . Thes e  conditions , 
and , especially , low barriers to entry , are charac ter i s t i c  o f  
agricultural commodities . 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chap ter has b een primarily concerned with describ ing 
the problems that would be faced by restrictive agreements . In order 
of increasing difficulty thes e  are : overshipp ing ; disputes among 
p articipants  -- in particular disputes among suppliers over market 
shares ; and entry . The s truc tural conditions o f  the commodity 
. markets are such that thes e  pr,ob.lems can b e  expec ted to b e  s ever e . 
Appendix 5-1 
The Effects o f  a Price Increas e on Production , 
Revenue and Profit 
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This appendix develops the formulas us ed to compute the 
estimates pres ented in Table 5-1 . Production and price are denoted 
by q and P respectively . Revenue is denoted by R and the elas ticity 
o f  demand by n ·  
where h 
From the defini tion o f  elas ticity o f  demand , 
liq n qh 
.!iP /P .  Incremental revenue is given by : 
.!iR -= (1 + l/n ) P ['.q . 
(5-1) 
c.5-2> 
Subs tituting the express ion on the right hand side o f  (5-1)  for liq 
and s implifying gives : 
.!iR = ( l + n ) hr . (5-3) 
The change in p rofit  is , by definition : 
.!'.IT l'.R - .!iC , ( 5-4) 
where C is total cos t .  Assume that long-run average cos t is a 
cons tant C and that the initial price P is equal to C .  Then : 
15 7 
·Lie cliq Pliq .:.. nhR, (5-5 ) 
again using (5'-1) . Substituting equations (5-3)  and ( 5-5)  into ( 5-4) : 
.!'.IT ;, hR . ( 5-6) . 
Equations ( 5-3) , and (5-6)  were used to compute the 
values shown in Table 5-1 .· The elasticities used are given in Table 
4-1 (p .  9 6 ) . 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1 .  See ch . 1 , pp . 16-18 . 
2 . The increase in profit exceeds the increase in revenue b ecause 
the price increase leads to a reduction in the quantity supp lied 
and hence a reduct ion in the costs  of  production . 
3 .  
4 .  
This will b e  the case whenever the sub s t i tution o f  one material 
for ano ther requires s ignificant changes in f ixed p lant and 
equipment or produc t des ign . For example , sub s titution of  
aluminum for copper in  mos t  applications requires investment 
in new equipment . The fact that tastes change slowly can b e  a 
source of delay in the sub s ti tution process for food items 
such as coffee and tea .  
For  example , the long run elasticity o f  demand for  copper i s  
more than twice the short run elas ticity . See F .  Fisher , 
P .  Coo tner and M .  Bailey , "An Econometric Model of the World 
Copper Indus try , "  Bell Journal of  Economics  3 (Autumn , 19 72) : 
5 6 8-609 . Some commodities -- especially sisal and j ute -- face 
s trong competition from synthetic produc t s . A s ignificant 
increase in the prices of thes e  commodities is  virtually 
precluded by competition . 
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
10 . 
Contingency s tocks , however , may b e  another mat ter . In his 
speech before the U . N .  General Assembly In S ep t ember 19 7 5 , 
Secretary o f  S tate Kissinger proposed the creation of  
contingency stocks for wheat and other maj or food grains .  
I was aided in writing this section by a review o f  the 
literature prepared by Robert S tillman . 
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The International Rubber Regulat ion included three non-voting 
observers from rubber manufacturers .  
Provisions on the size  o f  stocks that were permissible and 
more direct limitations on production were not atyp ical . 
The International Tea Agreement denied having any price 
obj ectives . See Davis , .2.E.· cit . , p .  201 . This apparently 
meant that export quo tas were set in terms of long run 
considerations rather than current prices . 
The Chadbourne P lan was an agreement among sugar producers 
associations , but the governments  of the nations conc�rned 
agreed to pass  t�e legislation necessary to  enforce export  
quo tas and , with one unimportant excep tion , did so . See G .  
S tocking and M.  Watkins , Cartels i n  Action (New York : The 
Twentieth Century Fund , 1947) , p . 6 6 . 
11 . 
12 . 
13 . 
14 . 
15 . 
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Ibid , p .  6 6 . 
Ib id , p .  7 2 .  The British share increased to 6 6  percent in 
1929 . Stocking and Watson also list  "defection and smuggling" 
as an important reason for the f ailure of the S tevenson Plan . 
J .  Rowe , Pr imary Commodities in International Trade 
(Cambridge University Pres s ,  19 6 5 ) , pp . 146-14 7 . 
S tocking and Watkins , EE_· cit . , p .  41 . 
Rowe , EE.· cit . , pp . 133-13 4 .  
16 . This is an interpretation of s tatements made by Davis ,  
.£.E.· cit . and , especially , Rowe , EE.· cit . 
1 7 . One ques tion that might be asked is whether efforts to 
preserve capacity are warranted on grounds of  efficiency . The 
affirmative case presumab ly would be that destruc tion of  capacity 
"today" and its  recreation after only a few years involves a 
waste of resources . Some economists  -- Rowe , .£.E.• cit . , for 
examp le -- accep t this argument ,  but mos t  do not . However , 
it seems that the possibility that actions to preserve capacity 
would be warranted on grounds o f  efficiency has never been 
subj ected to close analysis . 
18 . 
19 . 
20 . 
21 .  
2 2  • 
23 .  
The prewar International Tea Agreement was also only very 
mildly restrictive and was j udged by its  particip ants  to 
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b e  only moderately successful . See Davis , EE.· cit . , pp . 199 -202 . 
It may also b e  relevant to note  that the tea marke t s  are much 
less  uns table than are o ther commodity markets . See Rowe , 
EE.· cit . , pp . 148-14 9 . 
Rowe , EE.· cit . , p .  179 . 
Rowe , EE.· cit . P •  17 7 .  
A .  Law ,  International Commodity Agreement s  (Lexington Books , 
19 7 5 ) , p .  44 . 
This is fair , as the intent of the negotiations that produced 
CIPEC was a restrictive scheme . Two unsuccessful attemp t s  to 
create cocoa agreements during the mid-19 60 ' s  might also be 
added to this list . 
This would b e  true in part s imp ly because of the greater 
difficulty of  communication across  national boundaries . The 
more important reason has to do with the fact that international 
arrangements  would rely on restrictions on supply to maintain 
price rather than on direct agreement on price . Overshipping 
is mor e  difficult to detect than price cutt ing and hence can 
be  expected to be more prevalent . 
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24 . It is worth noting that DCs -- especially the U . S . , Canada 
and Aus tralia -- are b o th maj or  producers and consumers o f  
copper , which limits  the relevance o f  concentration i n  the export 
market .  
25 .  Davis , .2£· cit . , p .  205 . 
26 . 
2 7 . 
2 8 . 
29 .  
I .  Kravis ,  " International Agreements  to Promote  Aid and 
Efficiency : The Case of Coffee , "  Canadian Journal of Economics 
1 (May , 1968) : 295-317 , especially p .  305 . 
Stocking and Watkins , .2£· cit . , p .  7 4-7 6 . 
The phrase is borrowed from R .  Nozick,  Anarchy, S tate and 
Utopia (Basic Books , 1 9 7 4 ) . 
Kravis , .2£· cit . , p .  2 9 8 . 
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CHAPTER 6 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INTEGRATED PROGRAM 
Res trictive connnodity agreements are afflicted by a 
predictable  set  o f  problems which tend to undermine the agreements . 
Collapse  of such arrangement s  is not necessarily inevitab le . But , 
to be successful , restrictive connnodity agreements , and by extension 
the IP , mus t  have the means for dealing effectively with overshipping , 
disputes among par ticipants  and entry . 
The IP would b e  more than a collection of connno�ity agree­
ments .  I t  i s  intended to b e  a syst.em o f  connnodity agreements  related 
by a Connnon Fund , which in one way or another would s erve as an 
umbrella organization . This hints at the crucial fact that the IP 
as a whole is a means for mobilizing and focussing political forces 
t owards economic ends . 
There are several political aspec·ts to the IP . Fir s t ,  
the IP ·has served the LDCs  as a political p latform ;· i t  expresses 
generally shared aspirations and princip les and , in this way , provides 
a rallying point for the LDCs . Second , the IP responds , with seeming 
grac e ,  to a problem posed by s ome exis ting presump tions of international 
politic s . On the one hand , the DCs have , on many occasions , connnitted 
themselves to  assisting the economic growth of  the LDCs . On the o ther 
hand , the DCs have recognized that foreign aid has not succeeded . 
· While these  points do no t in themselves argue for the IP , they pose  
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a prob lem to which the IP is  arguab ly a solution . Third , associated 
with the IP is  a s trategy for gaining accep tance of  the program .  
The IP includes sufficiently many commodities to  hint at b enefits  
for all supp liers and sugges t a threat to all  buyer s . Furthermore , 
s imultaneous negot iation of all the various elements of the IP tends 
1 
to focus the p ower of the LDCs  as a bloc . 
These p o ints  are s traightforward . The more sub tle and 
comp licated political aspects  of the IP lie within its  s tructure . 
In particular , the IP contains a political s trategy for s tabilizing 
res trictive commodity agreements . Much hangs on this point . · The !P ' s  
s trategy for s t ab ilizing individual commodity agreements would involve 
the DCs in a range of  problems and disputes among the LDCs , which is  
important  in itself . Furthermore , the success  of  this s trategy would 
determine the extent to which the IP would speed the development 0f 
the LDCs . The effect  of the IP on development would , in turn , largely 
govern the extent to which i t  would p romote  international cooperation 
This chap ter attemp t s  to kni t  conclusions r eached in earlier 
chapters and politial considerations into  an analysis  o f  the IP . The 
f ir s t  two sections discuss the political s trategy of  the IP and the 
third presents an as sessment of the IP ' s  p rospect s . 
OPERATION OF THE !P ' s  COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
The LDCs ' obj ective is not s imply to reduce per iod-to-
period f luctuations in pri·ce and export  earnings , and the commodity 
agreements envisioned by the IP are . very diff erent from .pure buffer 
stocks . The IP ' s  commodity agreement s  are designed to transfer 
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income to  the LDCs  via higher prices . The !P ' s  commodity agreement s  
would , then , face the prob lems of  overshipping ,  disputes over market 
shares and entry . 
I t  is at the s e  problems that e conomic and p o l i tical forces 
mee t. .  While the point i s  seldom made explicitly , it  is apparent  
that the  IP  would rely on political means -- in particular , the 
power of the DCs -- to deal with the problems that tend to destroy 
restrictive commodity agreements .
2 
Par t  of  the s tory -- which is 
postponed to the following section -- involves the Common Fund , and 
part takes p lace at the level of individual ICOs . 
The IP ' s  commodity .agreements would emp loy a certificate 
sys tem ,  enforced by buyers , to deal with overshipping . The system 
would work along the following lines . Export quotas would be  
nego t iated each year and suppliers would b e  is sued appropriately 
denominated stamp s or certificates for a quantity equal to their 
quo ta .  The certificates would b e  attached t o  the items expor ted . 
The imp o r t ing nations would agree to refuse any material that did 
not have the appropriate certificates and evidence that .  the transact ion 
was made at the agreed price . Enforcement of this agreement would 
rest  directly with the importing nations ' customs s ervices . 
Certificate systems are not so s imple or as certain as 
they seem at first gJ ance . For example , prob lems can arise when 
country A exports  to country B via country C .  There i s  a ques tion 
as to whe ther overshipping in one period can be  off set by undershipping 
in the next . A certificate system obviously sets  up an oppor tunity 
for forgery,
3 
and , b eyond that market s  tend to f ind imaginative ways . . 
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around restrictions .
4 
Nevertheless , certificate systems have worked 
in the pas t .  While a certificate system would no t eliminate over­
shipping , ·there is  a reasonab le expectation that it would contain 
the prob lem within accep tab le bound s . 
Negot iation of export (or production) quo tas would be a more 
diff icult problem . There are a variety of grounds for disputes among 
supp liers over market shares . For examp le , country A may have only , 
_ say , 5 p ercent of current production , while a newly discovered ore 
f ield increases its  share of  known reserves to 10 percent . This new 
discovery will naturally lead country A to ins i s t  on a larger market 
share . Opening up of new lands ( e . g .  in Brazil) would have much 
the s ame effec t .  Changes in technology , o r  shifts  i n  transportation 
costs , could favor some supp liers more  than other s , leading the 
favored group to seek an increase in its share of  the market .  Or a 
nation might f ind that produc tion of coffee is more profitable  than 
p roduction of cot ton and for that reason seek a larger share of the 
cof fee market .  
For the reasons pointed out in the preceding chap ter , 
there is a presump tion that disputes among existing suppliers over 
market shares are resolvable . However , percep tions of political and 
economic power can easily be faulty , negotiations have their 
limitations , and one or more suppliers may decide to withdraw 
from the agreement rather than accep t a restriction on i t s  share 
of the market .  Historically , such decisions to "go i t  alone" are 
a common reason for the failu,re of  cartels . 
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The option of  withdrawing from the agreement , however , would 
always be less attrac t ive if  a thorough certificate system w�re in 
effect . The U . S . ,  Japan and the EEC account for 80-90  p ercent o f  
the imports  o f  mos t  of  the relevant commodities . Given that the 
certificate system remains in force , a supplier that withdrew from 
the agreement would probab ly have difficulty f inding a market .  Hence , 
s imply by adhering to the agreement , and enforcing the certificate 
sys tem , the DCs would provide s trong pres sure for conf licts  between 
suppliers over market shares to be resolved within the agreement . 
Disputes between buyers and sellers are ano ther mat ter . 
By accep ting the IP in good faith , the DCs would explicitly commit 
themselves to price increases of  some magnitude and corlli�i t  themselves 
to the s teps neces sary to enforce those  increases . But this would 
involve the DCs in some painful sit�ations
5 
and there would b e  
limits  to the D C s  willingnes s  to support measures that work against  
their economic interes t s . These limits  could eventually b e  defended 
by a threat to withdraw from the agreement . The credib ility of the 
threat to withdraw f rom a particular agreement , however , would b e  
cons trained by a commitment to the I P  a s  a whole and b y  some of the 
powers of the Common Fund . This point is  pursued below .  For the 
moment the conclusion is that the IP ' s commodity agreements .. in 
themselves do no t hav 0 a good means for settling disputes between 
buyers and se ller s . 
The las t ,  but mos t  intractable problem is entry . Unimp eded 
entry would eventually force p r i c e  down to the competitive leve l .  
However ,  this would not necessar ily occur i f  the � o f  entry were 
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limited . To  the extent that demand expands over time , so  does the 
output associated with the car tel price , and this growth would 
provide some room for entry . 
A certificate sys tem has the potential to block entry 
entirely , but an ICO probably could not , in fac t , act systematically to 
prevent entry . It is much more plaus ible to suppose  that a certificate 
sys tem would be  used to limit the rate o f  entry .
6 An entrant would 
have to apply for membership in the ICO and , in the course of doing 
so , nego tiate a market share . I t  is in the suppliers ' interest  to  
prevent entry . Whether entry is  accommodated by growth in demand 
or by yielding a part of the market , exis t ing supp liers lose profits  
that they would ob tain if  entry were prevented . The buyer s ' 
interes t  is to encourage entry . Given these  facts , the likely 
outcome is compromise . That is , the procedures associated with the 
certificate system could be used to delay entry , restrict entrants '  
initial size  and limit their rate of  growth .
7 
Such entry as occurs will nonetheless b e  p ainful and 
could des troy a restrictive agreement . This fact points towards  
one role  of  a buffer stock;  in  particular , there would b e  pressures 
to ab sorb supply from new entrants into the buffer s tock .  This 
sugges tion may seem farfetched at first  glance but , in terms of  how 
events would unfold , i t  is  not . Suppose  that over the course  of s ix 
months or a year , there i s  significant new entry while demand remains 
s tab le . Price would be bid down to the lower limit , which would 
automatically trigger purchases . by the buffer s to ck .  The fact that 
the p rice decline was triggered by entry rather than by . a fall in 
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demand is  clear evidence that the target price is  " too high" , in the 
sense that it is above the competitive level . The appropriate 
remedy then is  to lower the target price ( and not make further 
purchases ) .  But this conclusion does not follow if the negotiated 
target price is j udged to b e  "fair" and if the obj ective of the 
buffer s tock is to defend that price . Given tho s e  assump tions , 
purchases by the buff er s to ck are warranted even though the price 
decline i s  caused by entry . 
The extent of suppliers ' enthus iam for using the buffer 
s tock to cushion the effects  of  entry depends on how the buffer 
s tock is  f inanced . If the buffer stock were f inanced entirely by 
buyers , suppliers would be  content to rely on the buffer s tock to  
accommodate new entry . But suppliers would presumably p ay a 
s ignificant fraction of the costs  o f  a buffer s tock,  and hence would 
see use of  the buffer s tock to cushion the effects  of  entry as an 
expensive solut ion . Furthermore , there is  a limit to the size  that 
the buff er stock could reach . 
A certificate sys tem and purchases by a buffer s tock in 
many cases would not b e  sufficient to limit entry to the extent 
required to maintain price above the competitive level . The only 
o ther possib ility for a solution would be in actions by the , DCs . 
I t  is reasonable to p :· �dic t ,  then , that entry would lead to pressures 
on the DCs to f ind some way to buy off entrants and/or compensate 
exis t ing suppliers .  However , within the confines of  a s ingle 
commodity agreement , such pres sures are unlikely to be effective . 
It seems , then , that the individual ICOs would have availab le to 
them only relatively weak means for cop ing with entry . 
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The maj or purpose o f  this  discussion has been to indicate 
the part that the DCs would p lay within individual ICOs in stabilizing 
the agreements . Their principal role would b e  to enforce a 
certificate system .  S imply b y  j oining an ICO , and enforcing a 
certificate sys tem ,  the DCs would go far towards stabilizing a 
restrictive commodity agreement . S econdarily , the DCs would p lay 
a role by contributing to the costs  of  buffer stocks and f inding 
· ways to cushion the effects  of entry . 
THE COMMON FUND 
The solution that has been described is not one ·wi th which 
the LDCs  could be entirely comfortable . Fir s t , the IP ' s  commodity 
agreements do not have reliable means for resolving disputes between 
buyers and sellers and dealing with entry . Second , only a f ew 
LDC s  would be members of each ICO while virtually all of the DCs 
would belong . This would ·p ermit the DCs to act as a bloc and , if  
for no o ther reason , give them a large degree of  influence over 
each IC0 . 8  Third , the DCs have no direct economic incentive to 
support agreements des igned to increase prices . While the DCs 
might b e  pursuaded to j o in res trict ive agreements , it  would be  in 
their economic interes t  to let the agreements fail under the pressures 
of entry and the weight of  accumulated disputes . 
These comments provide the necessary b ackground to a 
discussion of the Common Fund . At UNCTAD IV the LDCs made the 
Common Fund the central p ar t  of their position -- the s ine qua non 
of an integrated program on commodities . The LDC s , in p ar t ,  sought 
the Common Fund as a power center . In this respect , the Common 
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Fund proposal is the concrete form of  the LDCs' insis tance on an 
increased participation in international economic affairs . The LDCs 
would presumab ly play a dominant role in the Common Fund and hence 
could use it  as a counterweight to the World Bank , the International 
Monetary Fund and les ser international economic agencies . The 
Common Fund would also have a strong bearing on individual commodity 
agreements . It is arguab le that the Common Fund would correct  the 
f laws in the solution , described above , to  the prob lem of stabilizing 
commodity agreements . 
This suggestion is difficult to pursue becaus e  the notion 
of  the Common Fund is not well worked out . The descrip tion o f  the 
Common Fund contained in UNCTAD documents
9 
is ambiguous and s ilent 
on s ome important points . Fur thermore , there are competing concep tions 
of what a Common Fund should , or would , be . 
A minimal C ommon Fund would be only a means for f inancing 
buffer stocks . A fund would initially b e  created by contributions 
from member nations . Individual buffer s to cks would then draw from 
the fund to f inance their purchases and pay back into the Fund when 
the s tock was sold . As was exp lained in Chap ter 4 ,  a pooling 
arrangement of  this sort can lower the a.mount of  money required 
to maintain a system of  buffer stocks . 
At the other extreme , a maximal Common Fund would b e  the 
central management of a set of commodity agreements . The crucial 
managerial (or coordinat ion o f  p o l i cy) p rob lems are : d e terminat ion 
of target prices , decisions on buffer s to ck operations , determination 
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of production and /or export quotas and control of  entry . These  mat ters 
would be  dealt with within a maximal Common Fund rather than resolved 
by nego tiation within individual ICO ' s .  The notion of  a maximal 
Common Fund would o therwise be meaningles s .  Under a maximal Common 
Fund , the adminis tration of the individual commodity agreements would 
presumably be  in the hands of  a permanent s taff , with a layer of 
political appointments  at the head of each program ( ICO) and a 
politically appointed top management .  To this extent , the maximal 
Common Fund would bear a familial resemb lance to the U . S .  Department 
of  Agriculture circa 1955 . The Common Fund ' s  management would b e  
respons·ib le to a governing body made up of the memb er nati0ns or 
representatives of  blocs of  member nations . 
The maximal version of the Common Fund could provide the 
LDCs with considerable leverage over the DCs . The source of  this 
power would b e  political , not economic . The key point  is s imply 
that in a Com on Fund the LDCs , as a group , would confront the DCs . 
Given that the LDCs  maintain their cohesion , the s takes could b e  
set at  relations between the DCs and the LDCs . The DCs , then , 
would be attached to the IP by their broad interest  in international 
s tab ility and a range of lesser , specific political and economic 
10 
concerns . 
If the prob lem o f  gaining the DCs ' adherence eould b e  
solved i n  this way , the s olutions to the o ther prob lems would follow 
readily . Fir s t , the LDCs ' b argaining position would obviously be  
improved . If an i ssue i s  handled at . the level of the Common Fund , 
rather than at the level of the ICO , i t  would b e  p o s s ib le for the 
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LDCs as a bloc to  confront the  DCs  as a bloc  and to raise  the 
stakes . Second , the DCs ' political interes t in the sys tem as a 
whole would limit the extent to which they could pursue disputes 
with sellers within individual ICOs . 
Finally the oppor tunities for log rolling inherent in a 
maximal Common Fund would make i t  easier to solve the prob lems of  
entry and disputes over market  shares . Because the commitment to 
es tab lish prices that are "fair to buyers and renumerative to  
producers "  is  open ended , the DCs would b e  under pres sure to resolve 
these problems by somehow buying off one or ano ther o f  the parties 
t o  the dispute . This might be done in an ad hoc way -- for example , 
b . · 1  d . 1 
11 
y granting specia tra e concessions or oans . Or a solution 
might be found by res tructuring the agreement , along the lines of 
U . S .  Agricultural programs , to make payment for reducing output below 
some predetermined level -- i . e . , payment for each unit  no t produced .
12 
Any Common Fund , and especially a maximal Common Fund , would afford 
much more variety in the sort of  "deals "  that could be  arranged . 
The inducement on the DCs to f ind solutions would , again , b e  
their P?litical s take i n  the IP . 
These  comments point  to the po tential of a Common Fund . 
They do not necessarily describe the IP ' s  Common Fund , which falls 
considerab ly short o f  the maximal form .  But , although it  would do 
that , the IP ' s  Common Fund i s  more than a way of  f inancing buf f er 
stocks . I t  would , firs t ,  have the right to trade in commodities 
not covered by agreements . The Common Fund would then b e  an 
operating _agency -- in e f f ec t , the manager of a series of buffer 
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stocks . Second , the IP ' s  Connnon Fund would have the right to take 
the initiative in organizing connnodity agreements . 
The question posed by the character of the IP ' s  Connnon 
Fund is whether it  would p lay the crucial roles of the maximal 
Common Fund . To the extent that the prob lems of individual 
commodities would be decided at the level of  the Connnon Fund , the 
answer is "yes " . However , it  is no t clear how large a role the 
-Connnon Fund would p lay in these issues . The Connnon Fund would 
have a significant degree of control over those ICO ' s  that 
maintained buffer stocks and drew their f inancing from the Fund . 
But buffer stocks are likely to be the excep tion rather than the 
rule , and it would seem that an ICO that did not hold a buffer 
s tock would have no formal relationship with the Connnon Fund . 
Presumably a web o f  clos e ,  but more or less informal , ties would 
grow up between the ICO ' s  and the Connnon Fund . If this occurred , 
and the Common Fund ob tained some p o litical importance ,  it would b e  
able to function as a permanent f orum f o r  connnodities ' prob lems 
and influence individual ICO ' s .  In this respect i t  would perform ,  
although imperfectly , the crucial roles of  a maximal Common Fund . 
Thi s  possib ility , however , seems forlorn . I t  is unlikely 
that the informal inf luence that the IP ' s  Connnon Fund could exercise 
would b e  o f  decisive importance . The means of control would at best  
be  c lumsy and erratic . Hence , as s ome form of  central control would 
be  required to maintain res trictive agreements , the IP would be 
unstable . While the system might no t. collapse , it would , . under 
the pressure of events ,  either co_llap s e  or change drastically . 
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THE IP ' s  PROSPECTS 
An IP with a maximal Connnon Fund i s  no t a realistic prospect 
in the foreseeable future . The relevant question then is : what would 
be the prospects of an IP along the lines o f  that considered at UNCTAD 
IV? 
The adherence of the DCs would be vital to the success  of  
13  an IP . To an extent the DCs would be bound to an IP s imp ly by an 
agreement to j oin , as a maj or international agency would not b e  
lightly abandoned . But over the long term , the DCs would adhere t o  
the I P  only if the direct economic costs  entailed were outweighed 
by political b enefits  -- esp�c iall� , maintenance of international 
s tability . 
The o ther side of this coin i s  the effect  o f  an IP on the 
LDCs . The IP is not intended to be a cosmetic measure , nor is it 
like the U . N .  and UNCTAD -- essentially diplomatic in charac ter . 
The LDCs  in par t  seek the Connnon Fund as a power center , but the 
principal obj ective of  the IP is  to  accelerate the economic growth 
of  the LDCs . OPEC is to a large extent the model behind the IP . 
The LDCs hope to obtain , through the IP , the funds necessary to 
divers ify and develop their economies .  Success might promote 
s tability in internat ional relations but an ineffective IP , could 
not be expec ted to do so . 
Whether the IP would have a s ignificant impact on development 
is then a maj or consideration . Suppose for the sake of the argument 
that the IP operates smoothly . As was mentioned earlier , the price 
increase s  ins tituted by OPEC increased the oil  suppliers ' profits  
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by about $ 8 0  b illion in  each of  19 7 4 ,  19 75  and 19 7 6 . Doubling the 
prices of  the commodities in the IP -- and in some cases that would 
no t be  economic -- would yield addi tional revenues of only s ome 
$ 2 0  billion and these would be spread over a large population base 
(cf . Table 5-2 , p .  13 2 ) . The recip ients would f ind the additional 
funds help ful ,. but they would not be sufficient to p ermit the 
mass ive development programs undertaken by the Middle Eastern oil  
· producers . Furthermore , while some of the LDCs would gain under an 
IP , many o thers would los e .  The predictab le result , then , even under 
favorable assump tions , would be frus trated exp ectations . 
This point  is no t worth pursuing in isolation becaus e  the 
supposition that the IP would operate smoo thly is  gro s s ly unrealis tic . 
Once i t  were instituted , the IP would be faced with the problems 
identified above . Frus tration over the limited results of the IP 
would appear as one maj or theme in a broader pattern o f  failures and 
disputes . 
General dissatisfaction with the IP , as well as some specific 
problems , would invariab ly give rise  to pressures for "reform" of  the 
system ,  especially of  the Common Fund . Firs t ,  problems that 
apparently call for the " coordination" of  various collli-rtodity agreements 
would appear . For example , the ICOs that maintained buffer s to cks 
and the Common Fund itself would be in competition for . .  a limited 
amount o f  funds . Other circumstances that would suggest  a need for 
coordination can also be  imagined ; e . g . , the impact o f  aluminum 
prices on the demand for copper . 
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Second , the failure of  individual agreements ,  or acute 
prob lems within ICOs would demons trate the inadequacy of a minimal 
Common Fund . The tin buffer stock provides an example . During 
19 5 8 , the Int ernat ional T in Agr e ement was purchas ing in an effort 
to maintain price , while at the same time the U . S . S . R .  increased 
its exports of  tin . This prob lem was solved when buyer s ,  especially 
the U . K . , imposed quotas on t in imports from the U . S . S . R .  S imilarly , 
in the early 19 6 0 ' s ,  the buyers in the International Coffee Agreement , 
including the U . S . , limited imports  from non-member nations .
14 
But 
such one-at-a- time responses are likely to be cumbersome and unsatis-
factory . It is reasonable to expect , then , that the IP ' s  Common Fund 
would be under pressure to evolve towards  the maximal form .
15 
Disappointment over the results  of the IP would , f inally , 
work in the same direction . Suppose that suppliers respond by 
successfully pres s ing f or higher prices . This would reduce the 
quantity that could be  sold and , after s ome point , higher prices would 
reduce the profits  from sales to  users . The higher prices would 
also encourage increased production and hence increase the amount 
that mus t  be withheld from the market to maintain the higher prices . 
I f  this were done by production controls , the higher price would 
not increase profits . Consequently , there would b e  pressu>:es  to 
ab sorb the surpluses  into buffer stocks or to develop methods to p ay 
suppliers for not producing . 
Once  the obj ectives and logic o f  the IP are accep ted , 
argument s  such as tho s e  j us t  sketched would have sub stantial appeal . 
In fac t , they are correct in the s ense that the IP would require a 
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central authority to s tab ilize the individual agreements . But the 
pressures that have been des cribed would p lay the irresistible force 
to  the Common Fund ' s immovab le obj ect . On the one hand , a successful 
IP would require a strong Common Fund . On the o ther hand , it seems 
very unlikely that a maximal Common Fund could be created or , if 
somehow created , could be s table . 
The no tion of a strong Common Fund involves (at leas t )  two 
- political contradictions . The firs t o f  these  grows out of the role 
assigned to the DCs , which i s  something like that o f  a regulation . 
To maintain an effective sys tem of restrictive agreements , the DCs 
would have to seek out ways , via the Common Fund , to solve a wide 
range of  problems . Apar t from any economic costs  involved , the 
DCs , and especially the U . S . , would be required to assume the 
diplomatic burdens of policing world trade in commodities . The 
DCs would no t want this burden , and the LDCs would f ind the 
resulting balance of politi cal power unattractive . Under an effective 
IP , many economic actions that individual LDCs might wish to undertake 
would be matters for negotiation , and hence would be subj ect to a 
significant measure o f  control by the DCs . Furthermore , if and 
when the DCs took s teps to maintain an IP , they could be expected 
to insist  on a corresponding degree o f  control .  But such control 
would probab ly be  intolerable to the LDCs and is  the . opposite  of 
16  one of  the  results sought through the IP . 
The more impor tant flaw in the no tion o f  a s trong Common 
Fund turns on the balanc e  of e'conomi_c and p o l i tical c o s t s  to the 
DCs . One part of the burden on the DCs would b e  the required 
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contributions to the Common Fund and another would be  the  costs  of  
higher commodity prices . While  significant , these are  probab ly not 
crucial in themselves .  Contributions to  the Common Fund could perhaps 
be j us t if ied as an aid measure and price increases , if accomplished 
s lowly , might no t b e  an issue in domestic  politics . The intractable 
diff iculties would grow out  of  the  measures required to preserve 
a system of restrictive agreements -- imposition of controls on 
domestic  producers , import quotas against  the U . S . S . R .  or o ther 
nations , etc . I t  would be very difficult to explain convinc ingly 
why the U . S .  should incur political and diplomatic costs  to support 
an international organization that
.
works agains t the direct  
economic interes t s  of  U . S .  consumers . The DCs could not be expected 
to support an IP on their own volation . The balancing force would 
be  the political power of  the LDCs and it seems very unlikely that 
this would be  sufficient . 
A s trong Common Fund would . no t  b e  required if the individual 
ICOs attemp ted to do no more than reduce p eriod-to-period f luctuations 
in price . But the IP ' s  commodity agreements are intended to increase 
the av�rage level of  prices , and this could be  done for a sub stantial 
period only if  there were a central authority wi th the capab ility of 
stabilizing the individual ICOs . The political f laws in the no tion 
o f  a s trong Common Fund , then , imply that the prospects o f  a n  IP along 
the l ines of  that endors ed by UNCTAD IV are dismal . 
CONCLUS IONS 
The conclusion of this discussion is that an IP would not 
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promote  harmony between the DCs and the LDCs . The tragic flaw seems 
to be this . On the one hand , by accep t ing the IP , the DCs would 
commit themselves to speeding the LDCs ' development with transfers 
created by higher commodity prices . On the o ther hand , the means 
included in the IP are insuf ficient to accomplish the task and the 
adequate means -- a s trong Common Fund -- is not a practical possibiliLy . 
While a weak Common Fund might survive for many year s as an essentially 
- defunct organization , the LDCs ' expectations would eventually be  
frus trated by what would be  called a f ailure o f  the DCs ' "political 
will . "  This event , and the process  of  an IP ' s  disintegration would 
be an "important s ource  of international acrimony . 
.. .  / .. 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
At UNCTAD IV , held in Nairobi in May 19 7 6 ,  the LDCs insis ted 
on a Common Fund and on parallel negotiations of agreements 
for all of  the product s  in the program .  
This seems to be  the meaning o f  s tatements to the effect  that 
the creation and succes s  of the IP require an exercise of 
"political will" by the DCs . 
And would , say ,  Wes t  Germany b e  particularly enthusiastic about 
exp o s ing a supplier whos e  o ffense i s  selling copper at  less 
than the going price to Wes t  German auto producer s ?  
4 .  Suppose , for example , that some country X i s  a relatively new , 
low cost  cocoa producer , that has b een given only a small 
export quota . X might well decide to go into  the chocolate 
business . Then , say , British chocolate producers would have 
to buy relatively high cost  cocoa while facing competition from 
low price imports  from country X .  They are very likely t o  cry 
" foul!' Etc • 
5 .  Suppose , for example , that an ICO in copper succeeds in 
sub s tantially increasing price and , as a resul t , production is  
expanded and entry attracted . The initial respons e would be 
production controls . Now the U . S .  is  the world ' s  largest 
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
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copper producer and if product ion controls were to b e  effective , 
U . S .  producers would have to be included .  A visib le ,  direct 
and fairly innnediate consequence would b e  unemployment of  
copper workers in  the U . S .  Could any adminis tration exp lain 
why it supports  an international organization whose  actions 
reduce employment in the U . S .  while increasing prices paid by 
U . S .  consumers ?  
The policing of  overshipp ing would n o t  require centralized 
control as i t  would be  enforced by individual buyers . Limiting 
the· rate of entry would require conscious management by the 
ICO but , given that the certificate system is  effective , this 
is a burden that the ICO could probab ly b ear . 
See I .  Kravis ,  £12.· c it . , pp . 310-311 , for an examp le . 
I t  is primarily informal influence that is referred to here . 
Vot ing procedures typ ically limit the amount o f  formal control 
that buyers can exercise . One common pattern , for example , 
requires agreement between buyers  and seller s , with each group s ' 
position determined by maj ority vo te . Votes are usually allocated 
among buyers in propor tion to  purchases and among · se'llers in 
proportion to  production or exports . 
See especially UNCTAD , Trade and Development Board , "An Integrated 
Program for Commodities , "  TD/B/ C . l/ 19 6 ,  October 19 7 5 . 
10 . 
11 . 
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For a discussion of  this point , see C.  F .  Bergson , "The Threat 
From the Third World , "  Foreign Policy 11 ( 1971) : 102-124 .  
An examp le i s  provided by a s i tuation that o ccurred in the copp er 
indus try . Early in November, 1965 , the domestic  copper producers 
increased their price to 38¢/lb . The increase was shortly 
thereaf ter rescinded to conform with guidepost  policy . On 
O ctober 20 , Chile had forced an increase in the price of i t s  copper 
to 3 8 ¢ / lb . Mos t  of  Chile ' s  output was produced by two U . S .  
firms -- Kenneco t t  Copper and the Anaconda Company -- and it  
was apparently Chile ' s  action that promp ted the  increase in the 
U . S .  producers ' price . The roll back put the U . S .  producers 
in an awkward position ,  as they were taxed in Chile on the 
basis o f  the Chilean price . "Three months later , in o f ficially 
separate actions , Chile agree to sell 100 , 000 tons in the 
U . S .  at the producer s ' price of 36¢ and the U . S .  government , 
through the Alliance for Progress agreed to lend Chile $ 10 
million for forty years to use in copper development : • Charles 
Riyer Associates , Economic Analys is of  the Copper Industry ; 
report to the Property Management and Disposal S ervice , General 
Services Administration , March 19 70 , p .  170 . 
Given that the costs  of the buffer s t o ck had become large , the 
DCs might be led to favor this solution , for two r easons : 
(1 )  The amount that the DCs would contribute would b e  more 
predictab le ;  and ( 2 ) The DCs ' power vis-a-vis suppliers might 
b e  increased . 
1 3 . 
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Without the DCs it  would , firs t , be  imp o s s ible to  enforce a 
certificate system .  Overshipping and disputes over market shares 
would then be  much more intractable and the IP ' s  means of  limiting 
entry would be reduced . S e c ond , the ability o f  the Common Fund 
to resolve conflicts  among suppliers and to limit entry would 
be  negligible unless the DCs participate , as o therwis e  the 
economic means and the political p ower are not there . 
14 . See Rowe , �· cit . , p .  1 71-172 and Kravis ,  �· c it . , p .  306 . 
15 . ·I t is a fairly reliable general rule that unsuccessful market 
intervention generates a demand for more and more s tr ingent 
regulation . A clas sic  examp le is  provided by regulation o f  
transportation i n  the U . S .  Beginning i n  the 1930 ' s ,  U . S .  
railroads , which are regulated by the Inters tate Commerce 
Commis sion , faced increasing s trong competition from 
trucking . The o s tensible rationale for regulation o f  railroads 
was their monopolistic character . It might be expected , then , 
that the development o f  trucking would have lead to a reduction of  
regulation . Ins tead , mos t  types  o f  trucking were brought under 
the j urisdiction of the ICC . See D .  Pegrum ,  Transportation : 
Economics and Public Policy (Irwin , 1968) , pp •. · 339-340 . 
16 . There is also a real . poss ib ility that an IP would increase the 
LDC s ' dependence on conub.odities . To the extent that i t  creates 
addi tional profit s , the IP would promote  d iversification . The 
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forces tending towards an increased , or maintained , reliance on 
commodities lie in the pat tern of restrictions that would b e  
associated with an effective IP . Once an IP was in p lace , buyers 
would face a pattern o f  production controls , export quotas , and 
limitations on entry enforced , via the ICOs , by the vested 
interests  o f  existing suppliers . At a minimum , many of  the LDCs 
would f ind their economic options reduced . 
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CHAPTER 7 
ALTERNATIVES -- THE DOMESTIC CONNECTIONS 
The LDCs have advocated adop tion of  a program along the 
lines of the IP for more than a decade . An IP has never been more 
than one issue among s everal , but during the past f ew years i t  has 
moved to the center of relations b etween the DCs and the LDC s . And 
the question , from the DCs ' perspective , seems to have been set  a s : 
"The IP -- yes  or no . "  The conclusion suggested by the preceding 
chap ters is  that the DCs should no t accep t an IP ; it  would not b e  
i n  their direct economic interests  to  do s o  and an I P  would not 
ultimately promote international s tab ility . 
Within the context o f  international relations , this decision 
would not b e  at tractive in itself  but only the lesser of  the two 
evils . But why should the range of choice be s o  limited? Besides 
the reluctance to face unpleasant choices , the DCs are bound to a 
search for alternatives to the IP by the responsibility that they 
assumed for aiding the LDCs . The DCs could adopt  the position that 
their commitment to aid the LDCs has reached its limit , and that . in 
the future the LDC s  mus t  rely to a greater extent on their own 
efforts
1
• There is a measure o f  obvious reality in this position.  
Given the fact of  nationalism and that development invariab ly 
· disrupts  existing social patterns , each of the LDCs  mus t  attempt to 
guide its own destiny . But as a response to the IP , "greater 
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self-reliance" seems hypocritical , as the DCs have on many occassions 
commit ted themselves to  aiding the LDC s , and conceded that existing 
development ass i stance programs are inadequate .
2 
More important , 
the DCs have an incentive to take collective actions which would 
reduce the danger of  a confrontation with the LDCs . 
There are economically feasible alternatives to the IP . 
In fac t , in standard economic terms , the IP may b e  the wors t  
program that could be  imagined .  This i s  quite  widely under s tood . 
The difficulties lie in the dearth o f  what are j udged to b e  
"politically realistic"  alternat ives . 
The New International Economic Order (NIEO) is perhaps 
the p lace to begin . The importance of the NIEO should no t b e  
exaggerated. The LDCs have divergent political predisposi tions and 
economic interes ts , and the positions of individual LDCs on 
particular issues may have no relationship to the programs supported 
by the LDC s  as a bloc . Nevertheles s , at the level o f  the dialogue 
between the DCs and the LDCs , it is reasonable to take the NIEO as 
an expression o f  the prob lems perceived by the LDCs and of  their 
aspirations . 
The NIEO indicates s ome hos tility to inves tment by 
multi-national corporations and expresses sub s tantial skepticism 
about the virtues of  free trade in promoting development . These 
propositions p o int vaguely towards  direct intervention in the 
commodity markets , but they are not crucial to  the NIEO . The 
essentials of the NIEO s eem to b e : (1) economic independence 
for the LDC s  -- i . e . , the absence of domination of their domestic  
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economies by foreign firms ; (2)  removal o f  trade restrictions that 
discriminate against  the LDCs ; and ( 3 )  international efforts  to speed 
the development of  the LDCs . 
Thes e  points , are not radical -- although the language used 
to  express them of ten is  -- and not controvers ial . The conflicts  
arise  over the question o f  what is to b e  done . The easy course would 
be to sieze on the prob lem of ins tab ility in commodity prices and 
· export  earnings .  If  the mat ter is reduced to these terms , compensatory 
f inancing and/or  pure buffer s tocks seem to be appropriate remedies . 
Both may, in fac t , have valuab le roles to play ,  but they would not 
have a · significant effect  on development . Given that .the pace of 
the LDC s ' development is  the real i ssue , there are three broad 
alternatives : (1) development assis tance ; ( 2 )  direct intervent ion 
in the commodity market s  along the lines of the IP ; and ( 3 )  reduct�.on 
of existing barriers to  trade . 
The efficient way to transfer income to the LDCs is directly 
via grants or loans . This is so because direct  transfers ( i . e . , 
development assis tance) do no t create inefficiencies which increase 
the cost of the transfer . However , i t  is  now generally held that 
development assistance is not sufficient to produce self-sustaining 
growth in the LDCs . 
The concensus that development assis tance is -an inadequate  
means o f  speeding development rests  primarily ' on political rather 
than economic considerations . The LDCs  argue that development 
assis tance is unreliab le , which is true at least to the extent that 
the level of aid provided by the _ DCs has tended to decline in 
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periods of  recession . More important , the DCs , and especially the 
U . S . , have not in recent years been willing to expand the level 
of  development assistance . 3 
The disenchantment with development assis tance also in 
par t  reflects the administrative and technical problems encountered 
by existing programs . These problems are s ignificant -- development 
assistance is not a s imple mat ter . But past  programs have more 
often been governed by military and dip lomatic goals rather than 
economic development ,  and the crucial problem is the level of  
assistance rather than technical and administrative difficulties . 
The proper response to the cr.itics . o f  development assistance may 
well be " • . .  That i t  has never seriously b een tried . 1 1 4 Development 
assistance should , then , be counted as an alternative to an IP . 
The only o ther alternative to direct intervention in 
commodity markets is increased access to the market s  of the DCs . 
This was basically the U . S .  response ' to  the IP . Specifically , the 
U . S .  proposed : ( 1) reduction of tariff  and non-t ariff  barriers to  
trade ; and ( 2 )  measures to  improve the  LDCs ' access  to the  cap ital 
markets  o f  the ncs . 5  
The U . S .  position i s  s omewhat awkward in the light of the 
o f t  repeated commitment to assist  the LDCs  development . Ttis 
commitment as sumes ii:.plicitly that  the market alone will not provide 
" sufficiently rapid" growth , whatever that is j udged to b e . As was 
pointed out in Chap ter 1 (pp . 4-5) , the LDCs  are also skep tical 
about the ability of  trade to  promo te development . Nevertheles s , 
removal o f  trade b arriers would b e  o f  sub s tantial b enefit to the 
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LDCs ,  and market access  has ranked s econd only to commodity agreement s  
i n  the dialogue b e tween the D C s  and the LDCs . 
The LDCs face maj or tariff  and non- tariff  barriers to 
trade on two classes of  goods . Fir s t , the DCs have acted to protect 
domestic  production of  certain agricultural commodities of  interest  
to LDCs . For example , sugar production , is protected in the U . S .  
and the EZC countries . Second , s emi-fabricated metal product s  ( i . e . , 
·wire , rod , e tc . )  and many manufactured goods are protected by 
relatively high tarif f s . These tariffs  are not the only barrier 
to industrialization in the LDCs , but they make indus trialization 
more difficult and in some cases are a crucial obs tacle . 
Removal of tariff and non-tariff  barriers to trade would 
be to  the advantage of  b o th the LDCs and the DCs . For examp le ,  if  
the  DCs s topped protecting their domestic  sugar indus tries , produc �ion 
of  sugar in the LDCs would increase ;  the price paid by consumers 
would fall and the direct costs of support  programs would be saved ; 
and the land and labor released by the decrease in sugar production 
in the DCs could be put to more productive uses . These  p leasant 
results occur because trade barriers ,  like restrictive commodity 
agreements , are inef f icient in the sense that the gains that they 
provide to some groups are less than the costs  imposed on o ther s . 
It i s  true , however , that the removal of barriers to trade 
would hurt particular industries within the DCs . For that reason , 
the domestic politics  of the DCs are likely to run counter to their 
national , and co llective interest  in removal of barriers to trade . 
1 9 1  
The DCs , to conclude , face  a difficult s ituation . The 
IP has s trong support from the LDC s  as a bloc and , for that reason , 
cannot be brushed aside . One possible response would be a s erious 
program o f  development assistance . This would be the mos t  efficient 
course  and would honor the DCs ' commitment to aiding the LDCs . If 
development assis tance is  ruled out , the choices narrow to greater 
restrictions on trade , through the IP by whatever name , or a removal 
of existing barriers to trade . Which way the balance will t ip depends 
to a large extent on what comes to be regarded as "politically 
realistic"  within the DCs . The developed nations may , over the next 
decade or so , bargain away existin& restrictions or they may accede 
to a more restrictive regime in international economic relations . 
1 .  
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
Secretary of State Kis singer made essentially this p o int in 
the initial U . S .  response to the IP . :  "Developing countries 
themselves will have to provide mos t  o f  the effort [ required 
to accelerate economic growth] " Kiss inger , "Global 
Consensus , "  .2..2.· cit . , p .  429 .  
2 . In his speech to the U . N .  General Assemb ly in S eptemb er ,  19 75 , 
S ecretary of S tate Kis s inger s tated : "We have ' learned from 
experience that the methods of development assis tance of the 
19 5 0 ' s and 60 ' s  are no longer adequate . "  See Kis singer , Ibid , 
p .  42 7 .  
3 .  The U . S .  has acknowledged this : 
But realistically , we canno t expect  the level 
[ of development assis tance] to increase s ignif icantly 
over the coming years . To put it frankly , the 
political climat e  for b ilateral aid has deteriorated . 
In the industrial countries , support for aid has b een 
eroded by domestic  economic s lowdown , compounded by 
energy prob lems ; in the developing countries , there 
is  resentment at forms of assistance which imply 
dependence . · · - •  · 
Kis s inger , Ib id , p .  430 . 
4 . G .  Helleiner , ed . A World. Divid.ed ( Camb r idge University Pres s , 
1976) '  p .  2 .  
5 .  
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Although billed a maj or initiative , this is  the traditional U . S .  
response . In effec t ,  the U . S .  said : "We really mean i t  this 
t ime . "  
